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Showing papers on "Military threat published in 2000"


Book
01 Apr 2000
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors provide the defense professional with a solid foundation on which to base organizational and personnel policies while describing the reality of life in today's military, and present a set of guidelines to support such policies.
Abstract: Provides the defense professional with a solid foundation on which to base organizational and personnel policies while describing the realities of life in today's military.

168 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors analyze the so-called military model in law enforcement and find that it leads to a paramilitary pursuit based on a specific "military model" of leadership and organization.
Abstract: Law enforcement is generally understood to be a paramilitary pursuit based on a specific “military model” of leadership and organization. This article analyzes the so-called military model in law e...

79 citations


Book
19 Dec 2000
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explore how the US military might improve co-ordination with relief agencies and with European allies in such operations, and provide an overview of the relief community, and delineate barriers to better co-operation.
Abstract: This report explores how the US military might improve co-ordination with relief agencies and with European allies in such operations. It examines the dynamics of complex contingency operations, provides an overview of the relief community, and delineates barriers to better co-operation.

73 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: A number of sexual harassment scandals in the United States armed forces have come to public attention in recent years as mentioned in this paper, and some experts have suggested that the incidents are not anom...
Abstract: A number of sexual harassment scandals in the United States armed forces have come to public attention in recent years. Commentators on these scandals have suggested that the incidents are not anom...

68 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The end of the Cold War had profoundly affected Brazilian military thought, and consequently, military planning and development, by the late 1990s as discussed by the authors, and recent evidence suggests that the Brazilian military mili...
Abstract: The end of the Cold War had profoundly affected Brazilian military thought, and, consequently, military planning and development, by the late 1990s. Recent evidence suggests that the Brazilian mili...

55 citations


Journal Article
TL;DR: In 1998, an undisclosed number of US Navy ships and submarines located in the Arabian and Red seas launched more than 79 cruise missiles in a simultaneous attack on alleged terrorist targets in Afghanistan and Sudan.
Abstract: On 20 August 1998, an undisclosed number of US Navy ships and submarines located in the Arabian and Red seas launched more than 79 cruise missiles in a simultaneous attack on alleged terrorist targets in Afghanistan and Sudan. Afghanistan-bound missiles targeted the Zhawar Kili Al-Badr Camp, an alleged terrorist training facility located about 160 kilometers southeast of the country's capital, Kabul. The Sudanese target was a manufacturing facility suspected to be producing precursor chemicals for the nerve agent VX. The attacks were carried out as part of a US response to terrorist attacks against US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. According to press and government reports, the missiles hit their targets as planned and the US government subsequently deemed the attacks a success. Because the two operations were essentially attacks by a state against non-state actors, American officials betrayed some uneasiness when confronted with questions about official terrorist involvement by the governments of Sudan and Afghanistan. Moreover, US military officials broke with previous practice by refusing to disclose damage assessments out of fear that it would give vital information to interested terrorist organizations. In defense of the government's policy of operational secrecy, General Hugh Shelton noted that such an antiterrorist operation required "different techniques" because "we are in a different ball game today." [1] Although the US attacks in Afghanistan and Sudan were widely viewed as unequivocal responses to global terrorism, they were, in many respects, symbolic of a much larger trend: the emerging tendency of nation-states to turn to military forces to deal with post-Cold War era security threats that are transnational and not state-centered. Increasingly, governments are characterizing problems that were once considered law enforcement or public health problems as security challenges. Some examples of these emerging threats include international organized crime, terrorism, arms trafficking, pandemics, and international illegal migration flows. Unlike traditional state-centered security threats, these transnational threats often emerge slowly and their causes and effects are often not easily ascertained. As transnational security challenges continue to grow in severity around the world, military leaders and planners are facing the almost inevitable reality that armed forces will be deployed against them in the decades ahead. This trend is not occurring without controversy, however. Some military leaders strongly oppose the use of military forces in non-warfare operations for a variety of reasons, including fears that such missions detract from military training and readiness. Nevertheless, governments around the world are increasingly discovering that civilian agencies which would normally manage these problems--such as police, health, environment, or immigration ministries--simply cannot cope with the magnitude of the problems they are confronting. This trend implies a major change in how countries will likely deploy their armed forces in the decades ahead. More important, however, it suggests a fundamental new role for military forces in the 21st century. Transnational Security Issues: Defining the Threat Transnational security issues, as the name implies, are nonmilitary threats that cross borders and either threaten the political and social integrity of a nation or the health of that nation's inhabitants. Moreover, such issues might be deemed as threats that tend "to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state." [2] Typically transnational threats or challenges arrive in the host state because of their intrinsic nature (e.g., air pollution that crosses an international border due to prevailing winds) or because of porous borders resulting from government policies that reflect either an unwillingness or inability to restrict or regulate cross-border flows. …

34 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, an important reason behind the European Council decision to elevate Turkey's status to that of candidate country is the EU's evolving security role, and the estimates of the potential benefits of Turkey's inclusion into the EU Common European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP) and the costs entailed by its exclusion essentially shape the EU’s policies towards Turkey.
Abstract: The restructuring of European security after the end of the Cold War has generally been to Turkey’s disadvantage. With the reduction of the level of military threat, Turkey was no longer recognized as European, so its claim to EU membership fell on deaf ears, despite its best efforts to put its economy in order and to be helpful to the Western partners, particularly in the Balkans. This article proposes that an important reason behind the European Council decision to elevate Turkey’s status to that of candidate country is the EU’s evolving security role. In other words, the estimates of the potential benefits of Turkey’s inclusion into the EU’s Common European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP) and the costs entailed by its exclusion essentially shape the EU’s policies towards Turkey. This argument does not deny the existence of other motives, such as the EU’s desire to influence Turkey’s politics and to resolve the Cyprus problem. In addition, certain internal changes in the EU member-states, particularly the shift in Greek attitudes following the Turkish earthquake of August 1999 and the better understanding of Turkey’s position shown by the Social Democratic/Green government in Germany, may have made the EU more open to and aware of the potential benefits of embracing

33 citations


01 Jan 2000
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors analyze the steps Taiwan should take to bolster the odds in its favor should a conflict with the mainland occur and describe how the United States can most effectively contribute in both peace and crisis.
Abstract: Among the hottest flashpoints in the world today, U.S. policymakers and diplomats cannot ignore the Taiwan Strait. China regularly rattles its saber to intimidate Taiwan and influence U.S. policy but has thus far stopped short of overt military action. This report analyzes the steps Taiwan should take to bolster the odds in its favor should a conflict with the mainland occur and describes how the United States can most effectively contribute in both peace and crisis. The authors conclude that the United States and Taiwan can take a number of fairly simple and relatively inexpensive measures - including hardening air bases and other facilities and upgrading the air defense command and control system - that would significantly enhance Taiwan's ability to defend itself against a large-scale Chinese attack.

33 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the disintegration of the military is a function of circumstances generated within civil-military relations, and this argument seems to undermine Samuel Huntington's military subordination through either subjective or objective controls.
Abstract: The primary argument of this article is that the disintegration of the military is a function of circumstances generated within civil-military relations. This argument seems to undermine Samuel Huntington's military subordination through either subjective or objective controls. In looking at the Congolese situation, this analysis relies on Morris Janowitz's idea of a politicized military corps to understand the rise and fall of General Mobutu Sese Seko. Janowitz's suggestion that the military is becoming more politicized, regardless of its level of professionalism, properly represents events in the Congo under General Mobutu. In fact, it was this high level of politicization that over time led to Mobutu's downfall. Using Janowitz's typology of the military in developing countries, this article focuses on several factors that explain why the military might fail to perform effectively in its mission of defending the state. Among these conditions are colonial legacy, economic survival, frequent military purg...

29 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The dangers posed by military rule to democracy is not really because of its intrinsic authoritarian posture, although it is the most perceptible as discussed by the authors, however, the patrimonial tendency in military rule that creates the most transcendent and pernicious effect on democracy because of unconcealed ethnic/sectional alignment of regimes.
Abstract: Military regimes in Nigeria exhibit patrimonial characteristics such as personal rule, absence of separation between the public and private realms, patron-client administrative networks, veneration of the ruler, massive corruption, ethnic/ sectional-based support, and repression of opposition and violation of human rights. Most of the dangers posed by military rule to democracy is not really because of its intrinsic authoritarian posture, although it is the most perceptible. It is the patrimonial tendency in military rule that creates the most transcendent and pernicious effect on democracy because of unconcealed ethnic/sectional alignment of regimes. This generates inter-ethnic acrimony and rivalry, in effect, delegitimizes the state and state power, and consequently, engenders a hostile environment to the growth of democracy.

27 citations


Journal Article
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine the difference between the Roman experience in 1st-century Germania and the Russian experience in the North Caucasus is that the Roman army learned the lesson that city streets do not win or lose battles.
Abstract: The term du jour for future military operations is asymmetric warfare"; ironically, it's a concept as old as warfare itself. For centuries, even millennia, weaker opponents have sought to neutralize their enemy's technological or numerical superiority by fighting in ways or on battlefields that nullify it. It is the human dimension of man's oldest profession, and the latest example of this anything-but-recent phenomenon is the Russian debacle in Chechnya. When the Chechens decided to use military means to achieve their independence, they did not hesitate for an instant to make their very own capital city the battleground. Once forced to abandon Grozny, these hard-nosed "fighters" focused their efforts on other towns and villages in the region, some outside their own borders. Russian failures in Grozny and other less well-known urban battles over the past five years attest to the effectiveness of this particular strategy--effective, but not new. The "take-away" from the fighting in the northern Caucasus is tha t it is the skill of soldiers of all ranks, not the peculiar nature of the terrain they are operating on, that decides the outcome of military operations. City streets do not win or lose battles. It might be instructive to step back in time two thousand years to examine another instance where a tribal society refused to be intimidated by a modern army, chose their battlefield wisely, capitalized on some bad operational decisions, and brought a superpower's army to its knees. The similarities between events separated by so much time are extraordinary and boil down to a variation on an age-old theme: God might usually favor the side with the heaviest battalions, but always the smartest. The difference between the Roman experience in 1st-century Germania and the Russian experience in the North Caucasus is that the Roman army learned the lesson. The jury is out as to whether the same can be said for Russian, or, for that matter, US military forces. Eschewing the urban or any other complex battlefield is simply not the answer. Learning how to fight smart in it is. It is a matter of strategic necessity because, like it or not, "It doesn't do you any good to make the grand strategy of the Roman Empire if yo ur legions can't fight, and we can't fight." [1] The statement requires further examination. Lessons from the Distant Past... In 9 A.D., the Roman legate Publius Quinctilius Varus led his XVII, XVIII, and XIX Legions into modern north Germany between the Rhine and Elbe rivers on what we would today call a peace enforcement mission. His opposite number was Arminius, a Germanic chieftain who had served in the Roman army as commander of auxiliary forces and was, therefore, a Roman citizen. We can surmise that Arminius fully understood the Roman army's operational strengths and weaknesses. He was surely familiar with the weapons and tactics of this "technologically superior" force and must also have known that Varus had at his disposal three legions of infantry, three troops of equitati (cavalry), and six cohorts of auxiliaries. [2] As the underdog must, Arminius sought an innovative means to defeat this impressive force. His success graphically underscores the human dimension of warfare. Not satisfied with his already well-developed knowledge of the enemy, the Germanic chieftain took the time and effort to further enhance his situational awareness by frequently dining in Varus's officers' mess. He went to great lengths to flatter the corrupt Roman legate and convince him that he and his tribe, the Cherusci, were friends and allies of Rome. [3] All the while, he was adroitly shaping his future battlefield. For his part, Varus was an easy mark. More interested in plundering the region for personal gain than protecting it, he quickly fell into the self-delusional trap that the Cherusci were friendly and that military preparedness to fight in this heavily wooded and hilly terrain was not a requirement. …

ReportDOI
08 Feb 2000
TL;DR: The authors argued that casualty aversion does not determine public support for military operations and that the public weighs the costs and benefits of military interventions and makes a decision with the aid of cues from political leaders, but civilian and military elites still act on the false assumption the public will not accept the risks of military action.
Abstract: : As the only remaining superpower, the United States has adopted a strategy of engagement to preserve our vital interests. Engagement depends on the instrument of military power, but our status as a superpower is challenged based on the perception a casualty-averse public limits our ability to intervene using military force. Research shows casualty aversion does not determine public support for military operations. The public weighs the costs and benefits of military interventions and makes a decision with the aid of cues from political leaders. The conventional wisdom that the public is casualty averse is wrong, but civilian and military elites still act on the false assumption the public will not accept the risks of military action. By attributing casualty aversion to the public, civilian and military elites have masked their own aversion to casualties and threatened our status as a superpower. Casualty aversion on the part of civilian leaders renders coercive diplomacy ineffective and undermines deterrence. Casualty aversion on the part of senior military leaders limits bold options and aggressive plans and destroys the military ethos. The misinterpretation of public casualty aversion by policy makers and senior military leaders undermines our strategy of en engagement.

01 Dec 2000
TL;DR: The Russian Armed Forces at the Dawn of the Millennium conference as mentioned in this paper was held at the Collins Center of the Army War College's Center for Strategic Leadership from 7 through 9 February 2000.
Abstract: : This anthology is an outgrowth of a conference titled "The Russian Armed Forces at the Dawn of the Millennium," held at the Collins Center of the Army War College's Center for Strategic Leadership from 7 through 9 February 2000. The genesis for the conference was the realization by several members of the staff of the Collins Center and Army War College faculty that the U.S.-led NATO operation in Kosovo resulted in a significant shift of Russian views on the United States and NATO. The conference also complemented our general objective of examining the changing environment in which the United States-including its armed forces-finds itself. The conference brought together over 50 individuals from academia and the policy and intelligence communities to examine the current state of the Russian military. Focusing primarily on the socio-political dimension of the military but not ignoring the military-technical dimension, the presentations delivered during the conference looked at Russia's domestic environment, the state of the military, perceived threats, and Russia's capacity to generate responses to those threats.

Book
09 Jun 2000
TL;DR: In this paper, the constraints of international law and political considerations on those planning and conducting military operations in urban environments are examined, and the authors argue that while technological advances may increase the precision of air power, advances may also bring new constraints.
Abstract: This study examines the constraints of international law and political considerations on those planning and conducting military operations in urban environments. It argues that while technological advances may increase the precision of air power, advances may also bring new constraints.

ReportDOI
10 Apr 2000
TL;DR: The authors examined the military's organizational culture through the use of an organizational culture/climate survey that measured and compared the attitudes and perceptions of Army officers toward a wide range of culture-related issues.
Abstract: : This project reviews key concepts of organizational culture and examines how our military culture may change as a result of various social and environmental influences. Military culture has always had a significant impact on operational effectiveness. But even military culture has a context and can be acted upon by other forces. Changes in our society will produce changes and strains inside the military, which could force new learning and adaptation of its culture. For the Army's culture, change may pose dangers. On one hand, the Army's culture may evolve too far, causing the force to become "civilianized" and less ready for the demands of combat. On the other hand, an Army focused on its own norms and values could lose sight of the values of the society it is sworn to defend. This study examined the military's organizational culture through the use of an organizational culture/climate survey that measured and compared the attitudes and perceptions of Army officers toward a wide range of culture-related issues. The results of the survey provided insights as to the need for change in our military culture due to internal and external influences. The study concludes by outlining implications for the Army.

Book
09 Jun 2000
TL;DR: In this article, the applicability of deterrence theory to the future Sino-U.S relationship and the particular requirements that deterrence of China might impose was examined, which is part of a larger project entitled "Chinese Defense Modernization and the USAF," which is being conducted in the Strategy and Doctrine Program of Project AIR FORCE under the sponsorship of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations.
Abstract: : China is emerging as a major global and regional player that will likely play a part in U.S. foreign policy well into the 21st century. A better understanding of China's interests, as well as its economic and military capabilities, will assist in crisis prevention and war avoidance. This report examines the applicability of deterrence theory to the future Sino-U.S relationship and examines the particular requirements that deterrence of China might impose. This report is part of a larger project entitled "Chinese Defense Modernization and the USAF," which is being conducted in the Strategy and Doctrine Program of Project AIR FORCE under the sponsorship of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations.

ReportDOI
TL;DR: The most recent example of U.S. troops deployed to Kosovo in support of Operation Joint Guardian demonstrates that there is not a pre-determined end state for the withdrawal of forces from the region.
Abstract: : PKD/OOTW by military forces has been the primary focus of military operations since 1982. The most recent example of U.S. troops deployed to Kosovo in support of Operation Joint Guardian demonstrates that there is not a pre-determined end state for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the region. Military forces play a vital role by performing security tasks, to include humanitarian assistance, and conducting information operations and civil affairs functions. Lessons have been learned in Kosovo concerning the proper sequence of establishing law and order, coordinating interagency activities, implementing an interim government, and embedding the media. Certain operational measures of effectiveness can be used to determine when each phase of the operation is complete in order to determine when the conditions are established for the transfer of control from military to civilian authorities.

01 Jan 2000
TL;DR: The U.S. military has been slow to match the call for transformation with action and the American public has been generally indifferent to defense matters in one opinion poll after another as mentioned in this paper, while some members of Congress appear more concerned over the economic implications of defense allocations in their districts than with national security.
Abstract: : Given the enthusiasm for transformation, why does the Pentagon hew to a modernization plan that will leave the military on the near side of the coming transformational divide, prepared to address old challenges far better than those now emerging? There is no single source of the problem. Only by examining a range of factors can we draw tentative conclusions. Just ten years ago the Armed Forces won the Cold War, emerged victorious in a lopsided campaign in the Persian Gulf, and became the preeminent military in the world. This dominance, together with a defense budget that dwarfs those of all other nations, has led some to conclude that only the United States is fiscally and technically able to effect a large-scale leap in military affairs. Thus, while paying routine lip service to transformation, the defense establishment has adopted the Wells Fargo approach to the problem: move in slow stages. This gradualist approach worked during the Cold War when the threat was well known and technology progressed at a leisurely pace. But this condition no longer obtains. As leaders peer into the coming century, they confront dramatic challenges: electronic strikes against a blossoming information economy, precision attacks with smart weapons, large-scale use of ballistic and cruise missiles, and war in space. Such developments will transform warfare--and require a transformed U.S. military. Although the Pentagon has been slow to match the call for transformation with action, the American public has been generally indifferent to defense matters in one opinion poll after another. Consequently, some members of Congress appear more concerned over the economic implications of defense allocations in their districts than with national security. Furthermore, President Clinton has not provided significant leadership for transformation, let alone brought pressure to bear.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigate the relationship between military structure and political liberalization and find that military structure can be manipulated to influence the process of democratization for the purpose of enhancing inter-state peace.
Abstract: Is there a significant relationship between military structure and political liberalization? If so, can military structure and organization be manipulated to influence the process of democratization for the purpose of enhancing inter-state peace? To test the implications of these questions, I will investigate a decidedly contentious premise. Military factors traditionally considered destabilizing in the international environment (to include large, well-trained armed forces organized for offensive or out-of-country operations) have, at critical junctions in the Western experience, had a distinctly positive impact on the emergence and maintenance of the liberal democratic state. If this is indeed the case, and liberal democracy can be shown structurally and normatively to produce inter-state peace, then the preferred policy of peace-desiring states should be to promote and implement military reform at home and abroad that most efficiently generates democratic structures and values, regardless of intuitive f...

Book
20 Dec 2000
TL;DR: In this paper, the moral and ethical foundations of military professionalism are discussed, including the need to rethink the basis of military organizational forms and the six-million dollar G-3: Army professionalism in the computer age.
Abstract: : Contents: Moral and ethical foundations of military professionalism; Ethics in the military profession: The continuing tension; Competence as ethical imperative: Issues of professionalism; Modernism vs Pre-modernism: The need to rethink the basis of military organizational forms; and The six-million dollar G-3: Army professionalism in the computer age.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The study of military forces in southern Mediterranean countries leads to the conclusion that for the present and the immediate future, NATO is not confronted with a real threat from the south as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: The study of military forces in southern Mediterranean countries leads to the conclusion that for the present and the immediate future NATO is not confronted with a real ‘threat from the South’. St...

Book
03 Apr 2000
TL;DR: In this paper, the implications of the changing strategic environment in and around Europe and its implications for the United States and NATO are discussed. But their focus is on air forces and military units that can support air operations and their broad conclusions are relevant to all future U.S. and European forces.
Abstract: : The research summarized here is part of a larger project on the implications of the changing strategic environment in and around Europe and its implications for the United States and NATO. The project, sponsored by the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Air Forces in Europe, and by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Headquarters, United States Air Force, was conducted in the Strategy and Doctrine Program of Rand's Project AIR FORCE. This report should be of interest to those engaged in policy toward, or the study of, European security in the post-Cold War setting. Although its focus is on air forces and military units that can support air operations, its broad conclusions are relevant to all future U.S. and European forces.

ReportDOI
14 Jun 2000
TL;DR: In this paper, a layman's description of the major environmental degradation and resource scarcity issues in the world, a strategic threat assessment of the risk of these issues, a delineation of environmental security into the military and civilian security missions, and identification of possible military supporting role missions in environmental security.
Abstract: : Environmental security is a topic of growing interest in national security affairs and thus has significant implications to the military national defense mission. In the context of this report environmental security is a process of addressing those environmental issues having the potential to cause crisis or conflict to such an extent that they represent a threat to the security of the United States. The major products of this research are: A layman's description of the science of the major environmental degradation and resource scarcity issues in the world, a strategic threat assessment of the risk of these issues, a delineation of environmental security into the military and civilian security missions, and identification of possible military supporting role missions in environmental security. Geographic Information Systems (GIS) analysis was applied to correlate regional environmental scarcity and degradation issues. This analysis of the major issues determined that the best predictive metric of environmental degradation is rate of natural population growth. Strong correlations were found between this statistic and rates of deforestation and water scarcity. All data reflected that population evaluated on the basis of regional carrying capacity best determined the overall stability of a region.

Journal Article
TL;DR: The United States is increasingly accepting its role in global security as one of securing peace and prosperity through efforts directed toward states that are failing or at risk of failing as discussed by the authors, which can have a ripple effect well beyond their borders.
Abstract: SINCE THE END of the Cold War, the United States is increasingly accepting its role in global security as one of securing peace and prosperity through efforts directed toward states that are failing or at risk of failing.1 Even if these states do not pose a direct military threat, their failure clearly has a ripple effect well beyond their borders. Recent history and current events point to national tragedies in places such as Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, Bosnia and some of the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union. In many of these places the universal human value of widespread good health is lacking, with obvious effects on productivity and contentment. Contrary -to traditional Malthusian thinking, poor health is also associated with uncontrolled population growth.2 Such growth typically leads to migration and the creation of the dense urban slums now found in so much of the developing world. These circumstances in turn lead to the conditions that foster the emergence of new infectious diseases, some of which, due to their epidemiologic characteristics, threaten the very fabric of nations and even humanity. President William J. Clinton's national security strategy of engagement and enlargement and former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry's doctrine of preventive defense take a broadly defined, proactive approach to securing global stability.3 The concept that some infectious diseases are national as distinct from international is outdated. In an era in which business and recreational travel, environmen-- tal change and population migrations occur on a global scale, it is unrealistic to think that national borders can secure the United States from infectious disease threats or their consequences. The international importance of emerging infections has been reflected in discussions among the world's most senior leaders, including those of the G7, the USEuropean Union New Transatlantic Agenda, the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission and the GoreMbeki Commission. During the 1997 Denver summit the United States presented a major infectious disease initiative that included a commitment from the heads of state to develop a global surveillance system. The Problem Throughout human history, infectious disease epidemics and pandemics have affected not only the health of individuals but also the success of military operations and even the stability of societies. Despite tremendous public health progress during the 20th century, numerous infectious conditions have grown harder to control, and some new infectious diseases have emerged. To public health leaders, the optimism or indifference displayed toward infectious diseases poses a threat to society. Because of readiness demands and-the particular environments in which military personnel train and deploy, this concern is especially important to the services. The fact that recruits from throughout the country mix closely in basic training camps and later travel and mingle extensively with persons throughout the world favors the appearance and rapid spread of emerging infections in the military. The fact that our troops tend to grow up under good hygienic conditions further means that upon reaching adulthood they tend to be "immunologic virgins" compared with members of many potential opposing forces who spent their childhood in hygienic squalor. As a result, some infections, to which our opponents may have almost universally become immune during childhood, can pose a significant health threat to a deployed US force. The military effect of dif ferential immunity was well illustrated in the colonization of the New World: small numbers of European explorers had a relatively easy time conquering native forces because indigenous populations were highly susceptible to deadly manifestations of what were, for the Europeans, commonly occurring illnesses such as measles and smallpox.4 The term "emerging infectious diseases" is usually applied to those conditions in which the incidence in humans has increased within the past two decades or threatens to increase in the near future. …

Book
01 Jan 2000
TL;DR: The Revised Anthology as mentioned in this paper is a collection of essays about the future of military operations in the opening decades of the 21st century, focusing on military operations as an instrument of national policy in a world absent massive thermonuclear and conventional superpower confrontation characteristic of the Cold War.
Abstract: : This Revised Anthology is about the future of military operations in the opening decades of the 21st century. Its purpose is not to predict the future, but to speculate on the conduct of military operations as an instrument of national policy in a world absent massive thermonuclear and conventional superpower confrontation characteristic of the Cold War. Also absent are indirect constraints imposed by that confrontation on virtually all political-military relationships, not solely those between superpower principals. Most of these essays are attempts to define military operational concepts that might be employed to execute such an engagement strategy.

01 Feb 2000
TL;DR: The U.S. Army's Crusader Concept Experimentation Program 3 (CEP 3) was selected as an ideal arena in which to conduct a preliminary investigation of METT-TC dimensions and their associations with representative battle command decisions as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: : War is a complex phenomenon. The dynamics and complexities associated with modem military engagements, from peace keeping to major regional conflict, demand that the information associated with such environments be carefully selected, framed, and presented to facilitate effective decision making at all levels. We hypothesized that the six fundamental variables of combat represented by the military acronym METT-TC (Mission, Enemy, Troops, Terrain and weather, Time available, and Civilian considerations) would provide a framework from which to efficiently organize and represent the salient dimensions of the battlefield during the military decision-making process (MDMP). The U.S. Army's Crusader Concept Experimentation Program 3 (CEP 3) was selected as an ideal arena in which to conduct a preliminary investigation of METT-TC dimensions and their associations with representative battle command decisions. Subjects were five field grade officers permanently assigned to a U.S. Army combat unit. During a 2-week experiment period, 24 decisions were isolated and documented across three phases of combat operations (delay, defend, attack). Importantly, decision makers reported high levels of both %significance and understanding for most of the dimensions represented by METT-TC, except for civilian considerations, which were not represented in the experimental scenarios. Significant differences in levels of understanding according to decision types (major versus minor) were observed. In summary, experienced military decision makers recognize the importance of METT-TC dimensions, and we suggest that these dimensions offer a means to present aggregate information to increase situational understanding. Further research is recommended to isolate patterns of interactions among these important dimensions across the full spectrum of military operations.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: A military dimension to the use of space has existed since the earliest days of space activity as mentioned in this paper and the ever increasing use of Space in support of military objectives has now driven it into the mainstream of military planning, leading to new consideration being given, particularly in the USA, to the organisation of space for national security and also raised the question as to whether national security interests demand space superiority and dominance.

10 May 2000
TL;DR: In this article, the authors explore the world of living systems to identify the mechanisms and processes for surviving and sustaining combat effectiveness within a military system, and analyze military systems at the tactical level of war.
Abstract: : The explanation to the phenomenon of how a military unit, which seemingly on the verge of annihilation, still manages to survive and fight effectively, lies in the understanding that a military organization is a living system Recognizing the parallels between a living system and a military system's need to survive and prosper within an environment full of positive and inimical changes, this study explores the world of living systems to identify the mechanisms and processes for surviving and sustaining combat effectiveness within a military system The emerging understanding of living systems provides a valid theoretical framework for the exploration The theory of living systems, as developed by Dr Fritjof Capra, and the Santiago theory of cognition, as developed by Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela, form the foundation of the analysis Subscribing to the notion that the concept of self- preservation and self-organization of a living system are analogous to the terms of living, surviving, and prospering, the explorative study analyzes military systems at the tactical level of war The emerging paradigms discovered in the study of chaos, complexity, and non-linearity, are leading people to shift from seeing the world as a machine to seeing it as a living system For military planners, they need to follow the trends and begin to see the enemy as a living military system The shift in view allows planners to develop innovative and creative military operations to compel the enemy to a desired will Perhaps this shift of mind gets planners closer to attaining, what Sun Tzu called, the "acme of skill" the skill to subdue the enemy without fighting

ReportDOI
10 Apr 2000
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined the relationship between public affairs and information operations in the context of the war in Bosnia and found that I0 may deal with false intentions, as an element of military deception or black propaganda activities.
Abstract: : Today's complex, cyber-powered global information environment presents formidable challenges for the military. Facing the certainty of intrusive media and an overload of information, the military has elevated the importance of two related battlefield functions: public affairs (PA) and information operations (IO). PA serves as the military-media interface, tasked with the role of facilitating media coverage of military operations. In doing so, PA fulfills the obligation to keep the American people informed, and helps to establish the conditions that lead to confidence in America's military. 10 has a different purpose. It encompasses a wide range of offensive and defensive capabilities aimed at achieving information dominance over an adversary. Department of Defense joint doctrine identifies PA as a key related I0 activity. But the relationship between the two is problematic. On the one hand, PA deals with the public release of factual information. On the other hand, I0 may deal with false intentions, as an element of military deception or black propaganda activities. By association alone, actual or perceived I0 to manipulate public information could jeopardize the credibility of concurrent PA media relations, and potentially damage the credibility of the overall military mission. It will be the purpose of this study to further examine this 10-PA relationship under fire in Bosnia, as the initial I campaign there confronted multiple non-cooperative and IO-capable adversaries. Through this examination, the study will make a determination as to whether PA and I0 are integral or incompatible military functions. Additionally, the study will look at initial feedback on I0 and PA in more recent operations involving Kosovo. Based on these sets of experiences in the Balkans, the study will conclude with recommendations for a future direction for joint and service I0 and PA doctrine.

19 Jul 2000
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine two eras in which armed forces faced the prospect of adjusting to operations other than war (OOTW): counterinsurgency in the early 1960s and peace operations in early 1990s, and explore the depth and breadth of change in Army doctrine and training and educational programs.
Abstract: : This dissertation examines two eras in which armed forces faced the prospect of adjusting to operations other than war (OOTW): counterinsurgency in the early 1960s and peace operations in the early 1990s. Although the military has had considerable experience over its history with various types of OOTW, their doctrinal treatment and acceptance has been minimal. This study compares the military's reaction to counterinsurgency to more recent accommodation to peace operations. Unlike the failure to incorporate counterinsurgency in the 196Os, lessons from peace operations have been institutionalized within the armed forces and have led to important adjustments in doctrine and training. This study focuses on the changes in the US Army that followed participation in the peace operations of the 199Os. These developments raise questions about the potential for more fundamental changes in the military. This is important from a policy standpoint since the crises that precipitate peace operations are expected to continue to occur for the next fifteen to twenty years. This study's relevance addresses the question of change in military organizations and explores the nature and circumstances of such change. The dissertation reviews organization theory, focusing on the concept of change, and the literature on change in military organizations. It finds that many studies rely on a single factor external to the military to explain change: civilian intervention. They also concentrate on sweeping, fundamental change. Focusing on peripheral change in secondary missions, this study suggests a more integrative approach in which a learning cycle model is combined with contextual factors that may facilitate or impede organizational change. The body of the dissertation summarizes the key operations in the two eras and explores the depth and breadth of change in Army doctrine, and training and educational programs.