Showing papers on "Morality published in 1977"

In a different voice: Women's conceptions of self and of morality.

Abstract: As theories of developmental psychology continue to define educational goals and practice, it has become imperative for educators and researchers to scrutinize not only the underlying assumptions of such theories but also the model of adulthood toward which they point. Carol Gilligan examines the limitations of several theories, most notably Kohlberg's stage theory of moral development, and concludes that developmental theory has not given adequate expression to the concerns and experience of women. Through a review of psychological and literary sources, she illustrates the feminine construction of reality. From her own research data, interviews with women contemplating abortion, she then derives an alternative sequence for the development of women's moral judgments. Finally, she argues for an expanded conception of adulthood that would result from the integration of the "feminine voice" into developmental theory.

Perversion: The Erotic Form of Hatred

Abstract: 'Why in this enlightened day would one choose to entitle a work Perversion, a term that is becoming passe? The great research published in the last decade or two has taught us that aberrant sexual behavior is found in other species, is ubiquitous in man, and is the product of brain and hormonal factors that can function independently of anything we might call psyche. Then too, their findings make researchers regret society's moral stance that sexual aberration is unnatural - sinful - and the repressive social action that follows. Thus, in ridding ourselves of the concept of perversion, we have the tempting combination of good research serving a humane cause. Yet it is my contention, explored in the body of this book, that perversion exists.The connotations of the word are unpleasant and have a flavor of morality and therefore of free will that is antiquated in these days of science and determinism. It is to avoid such connotations that the softer terms "variant", "deviation," or "aberration" are used. More and more these days, decent people - many of them scientists - are concerned about the price their fellows, and even more, whole societies, pay in their effort to suppress victimless aberrant sexual behavior. And so, in the name of decency, it has become the style, using the trappings of Science, to try and get rid of the concept of perversion. This is done not only by changing the terms to ones with less severe implications but by trying to show that there are no (or very few) states that fit the nasty connotations of "perversion". These workers reach their conclusions by objective means that they feel avoid the dangers of introspective material, such as by studying brain mechanisms an animal and man, which reveal capacities for aberrant behavior inherited and laid down in hormonal organizations of the central nervous system: by statistics that unmask how widespread are those allegedly heinous acts; by anthropological studies that show aberrant sexual behavior to have been the usual - not the exceptional - throughout history and across cultures; and by observation of or experimentation on intact animals. In all these cases, data have been gathered disclosing that aberrant sexual practices are found throughout the animal species and are ubiquities in human behavior. It is easy, then, to conclude that the widespread aberrance in man does not really signify willed behavior - that is, sinfulness, disobedience to accepted morality - but rather a natural tendency of the sexual impulse in the animal kingdom.- From the Introduction by the AuthorThus begins this classic work on perversion from Robert R. Stoller. Written in ordinary language, accessible for analysts and non-analysts alike, Stoller addresses the lack of information and discussion on perversion in a clear and concise way. His purpose is not to describe and discuss various perversions and their origins and dynamics, but rather to define the term "perversion" clinically; to be able to recognise the common factor throughout regardless of manifestation. His key contention is that in perversion the main clinical factor is hostility. It combines with sexual desire to produce the various forms that perversion can take on. Stoller shows that the perverse scene aims not only at denying castration, but also at securing a more solid basis for a jeopardized sexual identity. Risk, vengeance and trauma are some of the ideas that the author discusses while building up his argument.The book is divided into three parts - Definition, Dynamics and Social Issues - and through these Stoller successfully explores and concludes his theory.

The theory of morality

Abstract: "Let us . . . nominate this the most important theoretical work on ethical or moral theory since John Rawls's "Theory of Justice." If you have philosophical inclinations and want a good workout, this conscientious scrutiny of moral assumptions and expressions will be most rewarding. Donagan explores ways of acting in the Hebrew-Christian context, examines them in the light of natural law and rational theories, and proposes that formal patterns for conduct can emerge. All this is tightly reasoned, the argument is packed, but the language is clear." "Christian Century" "The man value of this book seems to me to be that it shows the force of the Hebrew-Christian moral tradition in the hands of a creative philosopher. Throughout the book, one cannot but feel that a serious philosopher is trying to come to terms with his religious-moral background and to defend it against the prevailing secular utilitarian position which seems to dominate academic philosophy." Bernard Gert, "Journal of Medicine and Philosophy""

Carl Rogers on Personal Power

Abstract: To anyone interested in psychology or sociology or politics or morality, Rogers will give a new dimension of awareness. The Month

Morality and expediency : the folklore of academic politics

Abstract: This book is about micro-politics: that kind of manoevre to control or avoid being controlled, to claim friendship or proclaim enmity, which takes place between people who know one another, and who must temper and adjust their actions towards one another because they share other activities They are members of the one community and of the same organization, and this not only moderates their actions but also provides them with themes for use in the political arenaThese justificatory themes and the irresolvable contradictions between them, and what is to be done when decisions cannot be made through rational procedures, is one subject of the book The setting is the university world of committees and dons and administrators, but the inquiry is into general questions about organizational life How are value contradictions resolved? Why are some matters discussed openly and others only before restricted audiences? Could we dispense with confidentiality and secrecy? What masks are used to make a person or a point of view persuasive?It is impossible and therefore wholly unwise to try to attempt to run such organizations in a wholly open and wholly rational fashion: without an appropriate measure of pretence and secrecy, even of hypocrisy, they cannot be made to work At a basic level organizations require secrecy and confidentiality to run effectively

Moral Reasoning and Premarital Sexual Behavior: Toward Reasoning about Relationships

Abstract: Sexual behavior is the result of a relationship-based decision-making process focusing on the morality of the contemplated behaviors and the implications of those behaviors for the relationship. Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental theory of moral reasoning is used as a framework for understanding the moral reasoning processes involved in sexual decision-making. Research which examines the association of moral reasoning to sexual standards, sexual philosophy, sex guilt, and sexual behavior is discussed. It is suggested that sexual involvement is a moral issue reflecting decisions about the quality of interpersonal relationships desired by the partners. A cognitive-developmental model for understanding interpersonal relationships is proposed and three levels of relationship reasoning are described.

Nation and community: a landscape and its morality

Abstract: A landscape is the most solid appearance in which a history can declare itself. It is not a background, nor is it a stage. It is a history made manifest and, because this is so, the study of landscape resolves many of the old difficulties of method. There it is, the past in the present, constantly changing and renewing itself as the present rewrites its past and makes it new on behalf of the future. We read upon the face of the landscape the pasts which it has borne in order to create our present. We select from these pasts new ones which answer our sense of our own present needs. We choose, that is, a memory which will help us to accommodate the present, the dense, intractable present and the insane possibilities of its future. The reassuring fact is that such a first paragraph is, in a quite technical sense, thoroughly materialist. The history of the landscape is there for the most empirical eye to see, and to speak of that evidence as embodying and directing the dialectical processes is to fasten historical Marxism with unusual purchase on to its central and dynamic ideas. Landscape, then, stands at the intersection of concepts a social scientist would strain to hold apart: 'institution', 'product', 'process', and 'ideology'. Its moral and political economy will only give up structures and meanings if these terms, and the field of force which they generate, remain in high tension with one another, and are not broken up into the dead taxonomies which are the dry bones of western sociology's waste land.

Social Ethics: Morality and Social Policy

Abstract: Abortion surrogate motherhood and reproductive technology euthanasia the death penalty sexual morality pornography and censorship discrimination and preferential treatment economic justice and welfare world hunger animals the environment.

Moral Reasoning and Moral Behavior in Conventional Adults.

Abstract: Traditional approaches to the study of morality have found little relationship between either knowledge of or respect for conventional moral standards and moral behavior Studies such as those of Havig hurst & Taba (1949), Hendry (1960), Lehrer (1967), Mills (1967), and Rau (1964) have supplied consistent support for the conclusions of a classic study on honesty by Hartshorne and May (1928-1930) Hartshorne and May (1928-1930) found that there is little relation ship between what people believe is right and wrong and what they do,· and that behaviors such as lying, cheating, and stealing are de termined mainly by situational demands, not characteristics of indi viduals Although a factor analysis of Hartshorne and May's data by Burton (1963) revealed a general factor for cheating, the amount of variance accounted for by the factor was small The cognitive-developmental theorist Kohlberg (1964, 1969, 1971) has challenged traditional conceptions of morality, and of fered a conceptually different approach to the understanding of the relationship between moral judgment and moral behavior Kohlberg accepts the two main findings of traditional research: (a) there is not a necessary relationship between the content of moral reasoning (what people believe is right or wrong) and moral behavior; and (b) external situational demands determine behavior that is con ventionally considered moral However, he holds that behavior that conforms to conventional standards of right and wrong is not neces sarily moral According to Kohlberg, morality is an aspect of rea soning, not behavior The only behaviors that can be considered moral are behaviors that spring from the types of moral decisions that are determined by high level moral reasoning Behaviors such as lying, cheating, and stealing are generally immoral because they generally follow from low-level conceptions of morality However, such behaviors are not necessarily immoral, or immoral by definition

Two Dimensions of Moral Reasoning: Social Principledness and Social Humanism in Cross-Cultural Perspective

Abstract: Summary A project was undertaken to (a) provide evidence from three contrastive cultural contexts for the cross-cultural operativity of two proposed underlying dimensions of moral reasoning and (b) examine the relationship holding between them. The first dimension, social principledness, relates to a readiness in making sociopolitical decisions to differentiate between a conventional and a personal standard of morality; while the second, social humanism, to a readiness to grant priority to the human implications of such decisions. Questionnaires distributed to 336 Hong Kong residents and 76 French and 52 American university students provide strong evidence of internal consistency in each dimension in each culture, of uniformity in the operation of each dimension cross-culturally, and of validity for each dimension as defined. Correlational analysis indicates the lack of any necessary interdependence between the dimensions. The results represent a challenge to Kohlberg's assumption (9) of a necessary link ...

Rationality and morality: A reply

Abstract: In his contribution, 'Rationality and Morality', (this issue, pp. 197-223), Professor Kurt Baier has provided a detailed and interesting critique of the treatment of the Prisoners' Dilemma and related games in my paper for the 1972 Bristol Conference on Practical Reason.1 The purpose of this note is to respond to Professor Baier's criticisms and to take this opportunity to make a few general remarks on the issues involved.2

Two theories of morality

Abstract: In this expanded version of his Thank-Offering to Britain Fund lectures, delivered at the British Academy in February 1976, Stuart Hampshire compares two radically different conceptions of morality, those of Aristotle and Spinoza, authors, he claims, of the most plausible of all moral philosophies. He discusses the relation between moral intuitions and moral theory, and the contrasting ideas of moral normality and moral conversion. Spinoza's theory of the relation between mind and body is expounded and its relevance to recent theories is explained.

John Dewey and Character Education

Abstract: Some of the character education programmes that were implemented in American public schools during the first three decades of this century are examined. The educational theory underlying these programmes is contrasted to John Dewey's ideas on moral education. Character education programmes reflected a trait‐inspired approach to morality: character was assumed to be a structure of virtues and vices. Dewey's conception of morality was broader; he held that character embraced all the purposes, desires, and habits that affect human conduct. Dewey's recommendations for moral education differed significantly from those put forward by the advocates of character education, as Dewey,’s proposals were basically proposals for school reform. Because character education programmes were aimed at developing specific virtues in students, the programmes were narrowly conceived and were unable to affect major changes in educational practice.

Abortion and human rights.

Abstract: Philosophical and popular thinking about abortion is influenced by the belief that the fundamental issue in settling the morality of abortion is whether a fetus is a person (is a human being, has a right to life, or has passed the point at which "life begins"). Despite widespread disagreement over "where to draw the line," many people believe (a) that there is a point somewhere between conception and adulthood that is morally significant, and (b) that the morality of a particular abortion depends upon whether it occurs before or after that point. These assumptions are widely shared: ardent antiabortionists insist that the significant point is conception; at least one philosopher thinks that the Supreme Court, in permitting abortions during the first two trimesters of pregnancy, has ". . for all practical purposes . . . resolve[d] the difficult question of when life begins;"' and more than one philosopher has searched for criteria for determining whether or not a being is a person in order to settle the morality of abortion-the basic idea being that if a fetus is not a person, then abortion is morally permissible. All of these ideas, I shall argue, rest upon mistaken assumptions, and after explicating briefly some of the principles that determine the distribution of human rights, I shall argue on the basis of those principles that (a) and (b) are false.

Ruling Illusions: Philosophy and the Social Order

Abstract: The kingdom of ends and the end of kingdoms philosophical statism the politics of production forensic philosophy moralism and morality.

The Unwed Father: a "Non-Deviant" Rule Breaker

Abstract: By and large, men (unwed fathers) responsible for impregnating unmarried women have successfully avoided being labeled deviant and have been largely overlooked as sociological research subjects. After they responded to newspaper advertisements, 140 men responsible for 176 extramarital pregnancies were interviewed to determine how they avoid being identified and sanctioned despite their apparent culpability. Factors investigated include: lack of a sense of moral trespass (including the double standard, perception of the pair relationship, and contextual moral meanings), visibility, and social distance. The apparent inconsistency between culpability of behavior and absence of labeling is reconciled by consideration of the “morality of consequences” and the “morality of intentions.” It is suggested that consideration of the interaction of rules based on these moralities contributes to an understanding of the labeling process.

Authority and Community: The Contributions of Carl Friedrich, Yves R. Simon, and Michael Polanyi*

Abstract: The problem of authority has a practical and a theoretical side. Practically, the decline of authority contributes to the crisis of legitimacy in contemporary governments and to difficulties in the practice of morality. Theoretically, authority is often confused with power, force, or coercion. Thus, it is viewed with suspicion. The thesis of this paper is that authority is not a form of power; rather, it transforms power. Like power, force, and coercion, authority is directive, but it is so in quite a different way. An examination of the concept of authority in three very different theorists – Carl Friedrich, Yves R. Simon, and Michael Polanyi – reveals that a sound concept of authority must be rooted in community as a system of shared beliefs, experiences, and traditions and in transcendent standards referred to by such beliefs, experiences, and traditions. Authority is that which directs a community to its proper end.

Sidgwick and Whewellian Intuitionism: Some Enigmas

Abstract: Sidgwick's Methods of Ethics'1 appears to defend a revised utilitarianism against both egoism and intuitionism, while conceding that the practical results of enlightened egoism largely coincide with those of utilitarianism, and that the utilitarian greatest happiness principle can be justified only as a fundamental intuition. It is true that Sidgwick was distressed by the description of his treatment of intuitional morality as 'mere hostile criticism from the outside', and protested that that morality 'is my own...as much as it is any man's; it is, as I say, the "Morality of Common Sense", which I only attempt to represent so far as I share it1 (ME, x). However, he could not well have denied that, in The Methods of Ethics, the endorsement tentatively accorded to intuitional morality as a system is in the end withdrawn. Ultimately it is concluded that utilitarianism can define and correct what intuitional morality is vague or mistaken about, and can complete what common sense does not venture to treat at all. Hence the teaching of The Methods of Ethics appears to be that, at the final