Showing papers on "Pyrrhonism published in 2014"

Sextus and Wittgenstein on the End of Justification

Abstract: Following the lead of Duncan Pritchard’s “Wittgensteinian Pyrrhonism,” this paper takes a further, comparative and contrastive look at the problem of justification in Sextus Empiricus and in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty. I argue both that Pritchard’s stimulating account is problematic in certain important respects and that his insights contain much interpretive potential still to be pursued. Diverging from Pritchard, I argue that it is a significant and self-conscious aspect of Sextus’ sceptical strategies to call into question large segments of our belief system en masse by exposing as apparently unjustifiable fundamental propositions which are closely related in their linchpin role to Wittgenstein’s hinge propositions. In the first instance, the result is a more complex account of both a deeper affinity between Wittgenstein’s approach to hinge propositions and Sextus’ approach to what I term archai propositions and a divergence between the two. In the second instance, I suggest how the comparison with On Certainty can be illuminating for the interpreter of Sextus. In particular, it can help us to see how the Pyrrhonist’s everyday conduct—common assumptions to the contrary notwithstanding—involves rational procedures of justification, in line with a naturalism reminiscent of Wittgenstein. Furthermore, it can help us to reflect on the Pyrrhonist’s attitude to what Wittgenstein would have called her ‘worldview’. Throughout, I suggest that the comparison with Wittgenstein is interesting, although it must be cashed out differently, not only on the interpretation—or, perhaps, strand—of ancient Pyrrhonism which has the sceptic exempt ordinary beliefs from her suspension of judgement, but also on the interpretation (or strand) which has her disavow all beliefs categorically.

Investigative and Suspensive Scepticism

Abstract: Sextus Empiricus portrays the Pyrrhonian sceptics in two radically different ways. On the one hand, he describes them as inquirers or examiners, and insists that what distinguishes them from all the other philosophical schools is their persistent engagement in inquiry. On the other hand, he insists that the main feature of Pyrrhonian attitude is suspension of judgement about everything. Many have argued that a consistent account of Sextan scepticism as both investigative and suspensive is not possible. The main obstacle to characterizing Pyrrhonism as both investigative and suspensive is the fact that it seems that the mature sceptics, after they have suspended judgement and thus reached tranquillity, have no motivation for further inquiry. Any inquiry they seem to be interested in after they have suspended judgement is the refutation of (relevant) beliefs needed for maintaining tranquillity. I try to show that the mature sceptics' removal of distress does not ipso facto mean removal of the desire for knowledge. This is because distress is not just a matter of unsatisfied desire, but of belief that one of the opposed appearances must be true, or, more generally, of belief that the truth is the only worthwhile epistemic goal. Having abandoned this belief, the sceptics can still engage in philosophical inquiries. This is because Sextus does not assume that philosophy is the search for truth: it is so only for the dogmatists. In a more general sense, applicable to the sceptics as well, philosophy is just an inquiry into certain things, and for the sceptics, its epistemic goal is still open.

Hume's scepticism revisited

Abstract: I shall situate Hume's scepticism within a broader philosophical and historical context. Firstly, I shall consider the place of Hume's thought within the early modern break with the almost millennium long metaphysical tradition, a break initiated by Descartes. The framework of being structured by a universal order was replaced by the individual human mind that broke free from any higher authority and became an autonomous cognitive agent. Subsequently, the ontological self-evidence of the world or the possibility of adequate knowledge came under sceptical attack. Hume firmly belongs to this discourse and can be seen as the most consistent exponent of this early modern sceptical line. In this light, the �New Hume� claim that Hume was an ontological realist will be shown to be misplaced in principle. Secondly, the strong influence of Pyrrhonism on Hume's philosophy will be considered, together with his concept of mitigated scepticism. The Pyrrhonian legacy is especially noticeable in Hume's acceptance of the weakness of reason and in his emphasis on the instructive role of philosophy � instead of attempting to make it the foundation of science it becomes a guide to a balanced, happy life. In this respect, Hume stands outside the early modern mainstream in philosophy.

Do Syllogisms Commit the Petitio Principii? The Role of Inference-Rules in Mill's Logic of Truth

Abstract: It is a common complaint that the syllogism commits a petitio principii. This is discussed extensively by John Stuart Mill in ‘A System of Logic’ [1882. Eighth Edition, New York: Harper and Brothers] but is much older, being reported in Sextus Empiricus in chapter 17 of the ‘Outlines of Pyrrhonism’ [1933. in R. G. Bury, Works, London and New York: Loeb Classical Library]. Current wisdom has it that Mill gives an account of the syllogism that avoids being a petitio by virtue of construing the universal premise as an inference-rule. I will show that both the problem and the role of inference-rules in its solution have been misunderstood. Inference-rules have very little to do with this problem, and I will argue further that nothing is gained with regard to this problem by the introduction of inference-rules in preference to premises.

Escepticismo y anti-intelectualismo: una revisión del ideal socrático desde la perspectiva pirrónica

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is twofold. Firstly, I argue directly for the thesis according to which, skepticism and anti-intellectu alism associated with Pyrrhonism constitute a radical rejection of what I refer to in this paper as “the Socratic ideal” –a cluster of theses predominant in ancient philosophy. In order to reach this objective I review the main figures in the Pyrrhonian tradition (from Pyrrho to Sextus) showing the evolution of Pyrrhonism from a dogmatic metaphysical position to an anti-dogmatic and anti-intellectualist epistemic stance. In each stage I analyze the way in which its representatives rejected the Socratic ideal and the way in which those rejections meant the introduction of some novel theses on the philosophical scene of Antiquity. Secondly, I use this last point in order to argue indirectly against one of the most widespread readings of Pyrrhonism, namely, that Pyrrhonism was a monolithic movement in which all of its members subscribed to exactly the same theoretical position.

The influence of Pyrrho of Elis and the Pyrrhonian praxis of aporetic language

Abstract: This thesis aims to develop a specific understanding of Pyrrhonian scepticism that follows an analysis of ancient scepticism as it began to form in the teachings of Pyrrho of Elis, moved into the Academy, and reached its greatest clarity in Sextus Empiricus. The focus of the thesis is to expose an understanding of Pyrrhonism as offering an approach to finding a less troubled life by way of habitual alteration of everyday language. The discussion of Pyrrho centers on several key passages that indicate a specific attitude towards the human condition, towards the way beliefs are generated, and towards the way language can be utilized to refine the generation of beliefs. Further, comparisons are made between Pyrrho and Plato regarding aporia and how central uncertainty and wisdom through awareness of ignorance were to both of these thinkers. Turning to the Academic tradition, the thesis strives to underscore the unargumentative, ascetic aspect of Pyrrhonian scepticism by showing the fundamental differences between the ascetic, language oriented Pyrrhonians, and the eristic, argumentative Academics. Looking at Arcesilaus and then Carneades as examples of the Academic tradition, it is shown how the focus on finding the untroubled life as well as the language praxis found in Pyrrho’s teaching are diminished and supplanted by dialectical argument. The final chapter briefly examines the revival of Pyrrhonism by Aenesidemus, showing that he appeared to be aware of the language practice that Pyrrho espoused, as well as the tangent that Academic scepticism took from Pyrrho’s original intentions for living a less troubled life. A detailed discussion of Sextus Empiricus is contained in the third chapter, which revolves around a treatment of the five tropes of Agrippa, includes an explanation of several concepts key to understanding Sextus and an elucidation of the sceptical utterances central to the linguistic practice that has once again been reinstated. Ultimately Pyrrhonism is found to be a philosophy of revealed experience, such that she who wishes to live a more tranquil life needs to practice what Pyrrhonism teaches in order to experience its effects, beginning with aporia and epoche, and ending fortuitously in ataraxia.

Scepticism, Truth, and Value: A Reply to Brennan

Abstract: In response to Tad Brennan’s critical notice of The Demands of Reason, I offer further arguments in defense of the distinction between appearance and belief, the claim that truth for its own sake is the Pyrrhonist’s goal, and the centrality of the rationalist interpretation of Sextus’s work.

Madhyamaka and Pyrrhonism: doctrinal, linguistic and historical parallels and interactions between Madhyamaka Buddhism & Hellenic Pyrrhonism

Abstract: There have been recent explosions of interest in two fields: Madhyamaka-Pyrrhonism parallels and Pyrrhonism itself, which seems to have been misunderstood and therefore neglected by the West for the same reasons and in the same ways that Madhyamaka traditionally has often been by the West and the East. Among these recent studies are several demonstrating that grounding in Madhyamaka, for example, reveals and illuminates the import and insights of Pyrrhonean arguments. Furthermore it has been suggested that of all European schools of philosophy Pyrrhonism is the one closest to Buddhism, and especially to Madhyamaka. Indeed Pyrrho is recorded to have studied with philosophers in Taxila, one of the first places where Madhyamaka later flourished, and the place where the founder of Madhyamaka, Nāgārjuna, may have received hitherto concealed texts which became the foundation for his school. In this dissertation I explore just how similar these two philosophical projects were. I systematically treat all the arguments in the Pyrrhonist redactor Sextus Empiricus’ Outlines of Pyrrhonism and Against Dogmatists and compare them to the most similar arguments available in the Madhyamaka treatises and related texts. On this basis, I ask whether the Pyrrhonists and the Buddhists would satisfy each other’s self-identifying criteria, or what characteristics would disqualify either or both in the other’s eyes. I also ask what questions arise from the linguistic and historical evidence for interactions between the Pyrrhonist school and the Madhyamaka school, and how sure we can be of the answers. Did Pyrrho learn Buddhism in Taxila? Was Nāgārjuna a Pyrrhonist? Finally I bring the insights of the living commentarial tradition of Madhyamaka to bear on current scholarly controversies in the field of Sextan Pyrrhonism, and apply the subtleties of interpretation of the latter which have developed in recent scholarship to Madhyamaka and its various difficulties of interpretation, to scrutinize each school under the illumination of the other. With this hopefully illuminated view, I address for example whether Sextus was consistent, whether living Pyrrhonism implies apraxia, whether Pyrrhonism is philosophy at all, and whether Madhyamaka is actually nihilism.

Le Dœuff, Pyrrhonism and the Rational Solidarity of ‘People fed up with Oppressive Relationships’

Abstract: The discourse that calls itself philosophy has long had problems with both women and Pyrrhonian Sceptics. This article explores how both Pyrrhonism and Michele Le Dœuff's feminist philosophizing threaten this discourse by revealing its lack of philosophical rigour, to the extent that it should be relabelled philosophism. This exploration will also reveal how anti-feminism relates to anti-scepticism in the masculinist and philosophist imaginaries. Using Pascal as an initial point of contact, the article then suggests how feminist philosophy and Pyrrhonism might develop a rational solidarity in the practice of philosophizing and in undoing, and keeping undone, oppressive relationships.

La Mothe Le Vayer’s Attack on Opinion and Superstition

Abstract: Francois de La Mothe Le Vayer (1588–1672) is usually viewed as a major free thinker and libertine, engaged, through his revival of ancient Pyrrhonism, in destroying Christianity This chapter focuses on his attack on two main enemies of Charron’s Academic skeptical wisdom: opinion and superstition By showing the extent to which he was a follower of Charron’s and that Academic skepticism also plays an important role in his work, a different La Mothe Le Vayer emerges Neither a skeptical apologist nor a disguised libertine, La Mothe Le Vayer is presented as combatting superstition but not as irreligious Like the ancient Academic skeptics, he is portrayed as genuinely believing in the compatibility between his skepticism and religion, in a way similar to Charron’s view However, by arguing for the compatibility between skepticism and Christianity, his main interest is to eliminate a major obstacle to the acceptance of the Hellenistic philosophy, not at al to use this philosophy in an apology for Christianity