Showing papers on "Social cognitive theory of morality published in 1983"
2,336 citations
Book•
29 Apr 1983
TL;DR: In this paper, the development of concepts of social convention and coordination of domains is discussed. But the focus is on social experience and social knowledge, rather than on moral development, as in this paper.
Abstract: Preface 1. Introduction: approaches to the study of social knowledge 2. Structure and development 3. Social experience and social knowledge 4. Dimensions of social judgments 5. Rules and prohibitions 6. The development of concepts of social convention and coordination of domains 7. The development of moral judgments 8. Noncognitive approaches to moral development: internalization and biological determinism 9. Social judgments and actions: coordination of domains 10. Conclusions: interaction, development, and rationality References Index.
2,007 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, Nona Plessner Lyons offers interview data from female and male children, adolescents, and adults in support of the assertions of Carol Gilligan (HER, 1977) that there are two distinct modes of describing the self in relation to others, as well as two kinds of considerations used by individuals in making moral decisions.
Abstract: Nona Plessner Lyons offers interview data from female and male children, adolescents, and adults in support of the assertions of Carol Gilligan (HER, 1977) that there are two distinct modes of describing the self in relation to others—separate/objective and connected— as well as two kinds of considerations used by individuals in making moral decisions— justice and care. She then describes a methodology, developed from the data, for systematically and reliably identifying these modes of self-definition and moral judgment through the use of two coding schemes. Finally, an empirical study testing Gilligan's hypotheses of the relationship of gender to self-definition and moral judgment is presented with implications of this work for psychological theory and practice.
642 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the Self Model is proposed, starting from the assumption that moral reasons are functionally related to action, and it uses the self as the central explanatory concept, establishing both the sense of personal responsibility and the dynamism of selfconsistency.
494 citations
TL;DR: For instance, the authors found that young children distinguish between domains of social transgression and justify moral judgements with reference to the transgression itself, rather than to external features such as rules, authority directives, or sanctions.
Abstract: Early studies of moral judgement described young children's thought as undifferentiated and oriented toward external features of transgressions. However, more recent evidence suggests that young children distinguish between domains of social transgression and justify moral judgements with reference to the transgression itself, rather than to external features such as rules, authority directives, or sanctions. The present study hypothesized a possible explanation for this discrepancy: that undifferentiated reasoning occurs with the use of unfamiliar stimulus events or stimulus events not clearly differentiated with respect to social domain. Sixty-one 6-, 8-, and 10-year-olds were interviewed about four types of social transgression: familiar moral, unfamiliar moral, familiar conventional, and unfamiliar conventional. Assessments were made of several dimensions of judgement hypothesized to be criterial for the differentiation of social domains; responses were also analysed for types of justification used. For familiar stimuli all age groups showed a differentiated understanding of moral and conventional issues, both in judgement and in justification. Younger subjects showed less differentiation in judgement than older subjects when stimuli were unfamiliar. Age differences were also found in the types of justification given, both for familiar and for unfamiliar moral issues. The findings indicate that stimulus familiarity is a more significant factor in the moral reasoning of younger than of older children.
249 citations
199 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the theory of an ethic of care is described and contrasted with Kohlberg's morality of justice, and the empirical support for Gilligan's claim that men and women differ in their moral orientations is examined.
143 citations
31 Dec 1983
58 citations
Book•
01 Mar 1983
TL;DR: Naroll as discussed by the authors advocates the use of cross-cultural research to uncover a common core of values and morality, which would then be used to ameliorate problems and guide policy in the light of those values.
Abstract: A distinguished cross-cultural researcher presents a brave, heartfelt and exciting challenge to the social sciences: the creation of an international, moral order. He advocates the use of cross-cultural research to uncover a common core of values and morality. This research would then be used to ameliorate problems and guide policy in the light of those values. He shows his procedures at work in the study of ten major social and personal ills, such as mental illness, divorce, sex roles, and child abuse. His research leads him inexorably to the concept of the moralnet -- the social group that provides values and support. When these are disrupted, problems are aggravated or even created. 'The work of Naroll fits in well with the work of earlier sociologists. But his work is considerably more comprehensive and rich. He brings the whole world into perspective. His model for a moral order theory is a universal one...' -- Norwegian Medical Journal, 1983 'The book The Moral Order is recommended reading...because it gives us guidelines for the future development of our society.' -- Aftenposten, Oslo 'This is a significant book: it focuses on an important set of problems, and it treats them with considerable originality and care. The Moral Order will stimulate a good deal of future research on the topics that Naroll raises.' -- Anthropology and Humanism Quarterly, Vol 8 No 4, December 1983 'The Moral Order is extraordinary in its range, the social life of the whole world, and in its purpose. Sometimes the book appears charmingly naive, but on the whole, the author's strength of purpose and grasp of basics is admirable.' -- Sociology, September/October 1983 '...a highly informative and useful book.' -- Ethics, January 1985
TL;DR: Sobesky et al. as discussed by the authors found that when negative consequences for the actor were severe, students were less certain that they should and would act to help another person; they also displayed less principled thinking.
Abstract: SOBESKY, WILLIAM E. The Effects of Situational Factors on Moral Judgments. CHILD DEVELOPMENT, 1983, 54,575-584. Little empirical investigation has focused on how specific situational variables, such as negative consequences, interact with cognitive developmental variables, such as moral judgment stage, to influence moral decisions and moral thinking. In this study, 223 high school and college students completed 2 questionnaires. In the first, students answered the short form of the Defining Issues Test, which provided a measure of their predisposition to use principled-level rationales in solving moral dilemmas. In the second, students made moral judgments about what they should and would do, and they indicated their use of principled-level thinking in resolving 4 versions of the Heinz dilemma. Each version presented a different combination of negative consequences for the actor (Heinz) and for another (Heinz's wife). Results indicated that, when the negative consequences for the actor were severe, students were less certain that they should and would act to help another person; they also displayed less principled thinking. When the consequences for another were severe, individuals who had displayed a greater predisposition to make use of principled thinking were more certain of acting to help.
01 Jan 1983
TL;DR: For the past two decades, much of the research concerned with the effects of socialization practices on the child's personality and social development has been inspired by learning theory as discussed by the authors, and it is thus not surprising that learning-theory explanations figure prominently in contemporary accounts of the effectiveness of such practices as punishment, social reinforcement, and modeling.
Abstract: For the past two decades much of the research concerned with the effects of socialization practices on the child’s personality and social development has been inspired by learning theory. It is thus not surprising that learning-theory explanations figure prominently in contemporary accounts of the effectiveness of such practices as punishment, social reinforcement, and modeling (e.g., Parke, 1970, 1974; Walters & Grusec, 1977). Over the last several years, however, psychologists working within the framework of attribution theory have presented an alternative conceptualization of the effects of socialization practices on the child’s development and have begun to muster substantive support for their position.
TL;DR: The authors found that the level of consistency between attitudes about moral issues and their related behaviors is partially determined by the nature of the reasoning processes that underlie the attitude, and that attitude-behavior consistency was higher among persons at more advanced levels of reasoning.
Abstract: The hypothesis of the present studies is that the level of consistency between attitudes about moral issues and their related behaviors is partially determined by the nature of the reasoning processes that underlie the attitude. In our studies, reasoning processes were measured by Rest's (1979). Defining Issues Test (DIT), an objective test of moral reasoning that is based on Kohlberg's (1969) theory of moral development. Subjects' attitudes toward the legal status of abortions were assessed as well. Then the subjects were given a chance to engage in advocacy behavior that would support their attitude (Study 1) or were asked to sign a petition that was consistent with their attitude (Study 2). Both studies showed that attitude-behavior consistency was higher among persons at more advanced levels of reasoning.
TL;DR: In this article, a model of the connection between stage of moral reasoning and behaviour is developed, involving two separate steps, from reasoning to judgments, and from judgments to behaviour, and the implications for cognitive-developmental programmes of moral education are discussed.
Abstract: The cognition/conduct problem is outlined, as it arises in cognitive-developmental moral theory. A model of the connection between stage of moral reasoning and behaviour is developed, involving two separate steps, from reasoning to judgments, and from judgments to behaviour. The current unsatisfactoriness of cognition/conduct studies is due to the failure to distinguish these two. A closer examination of the role of moral reasoning suggests three ways in which reasoning stage might affect behaviour, and the implications for cognitive-developmental programmes of moral education are discussed. It is concluded that future research must take more account of the detailed connections between cognition and conduct, in particular the relationship between the form of moral reasoning and the content of moral judgments.
01 Jan 1983
TL;DR: In this article, the authors concentrate exclusively on the Kohlbergian model of cognitive-developmental models and focus only on how to apply it to the problem of moral education.
Abstract: Moral education has recently become a popular force in social education. There are now two journals, the Journal of Moral Education and the Moral Education Forum, devoted to the topic. Reviews of the literature and “how to” books are now abundant (Arbuthnot & Faust, 1981 ; Damon, 1978; Hersh, Paolitto, & Reimer, 1979; Lawrence, 1980; Leming, 1981; Lickona, 1978; Lockwood, 1978; Purpel & Ryan, 1976; Rest, 1974a; Scharf, 1978). Although there are numerous moral education paradigms, Kohlberg’s (1969) cognitive-developmental model seems, on the basis of sheer volume of publications, to be one of the most popular. This chapter will concentrate exclusively on the Kohlbergian model.
TL;DR: Can literature be moral philosophy? The question is more conceptual than empirical as mentioned in this paper, which is to say, the answer depends less on looking for instances than on deciding what is meant by "moral philosophy."
Abstract: HILOSOPHY, including moral philosophy, can certainly be literature. Can literature be moral philosophy? The question is more conceptual than empirical. That is to say, the answer depends less on looking for instances than on deciding what is meant by "moral philosophy." Before concentrating on this issue, it will be as well to clear the ground by making some distinctions. The thesis that there is a positive connection between literature and moral philosophy can mean different things. There are at least the following four possibilities: (1) A work of moral philosophy can also be a work of literature. (2) A work of literature can also be a work of moral philosophy. (3) Moral philosophy can feed literature. (4) Literature can feed moral philosophy. Propositions three and four can themselves mean more than one thing. The metaphorical use of feed does not indicate a single relationship unambiguously. Let us consider first proposition four. If someone says that literature feeds moral philosophy, he may mean that characters or situations in a work of literature can be used as evidence for some issues
TL;DR: The capacity for formulating moral judgments shown by 20 emotionally disturbed, cognitively delayed adolescents was related to their social behaviors as observed in a classroom situation, and the implication that social engagement is a critical determinant of moral judgment for these adolescents is discussed.
Abstract: The capacity for formulating moral judgments shown by 20 emotionally disturbed, cognitively delayed adolescents was related to their social behaviors as observed in a classroom situation. Adolescents reported by their teachers to be shy and submissive were less capable of reasoning about moral issues than were adolescents who were seen as more assertive and socially engaged. The level of moral judgment was not a function of intelligence or ability to understand concrete operations. The implication that social engagement is a critical determinant of moral judgment for these adolescents is discussed.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors identify progressions in two spheres of moral behavior: the reasoning used in making moral choices in dilemmas and the relative use of intentions and consequences in judging another's actions.
Abstract: Developmental theory identifies progressions in two spheres of moral behavior: the reasoning used in making moral choices in dilemmas and the relative use of intentions and consequences in judging another's actions. Adult subjects selected as high or low in moral reasoning level for moral choices sentenced hypothetical defendants for criminal acts varying in severity of intended outcome and actual consequence. Consequences affected sentencing more, and their effect was equally pronounced for both moral reasoning groups. Subjects with a high level of moral reasoning were influenced more by intention severity than were low-level subjects. Suggested guidelines on the relative importance of intentions and consequences were ignored by subjects. Individual differences in moral reasoning in choices were reflected in usage of intentions in retributive justice, giving partial support to the notion of structural parallelism. Failure of reasoning level to extend to con-sequences was attributed to the intrinsic impor...
TL;DR: This paper argued that moral socialization is an essential part of growing up, and young people need to be made aware of the ethos of their society, and that religious and moral education should be planned together and not be conceived as separate subjects in the school curriculum.
Abstract: Religious and moral education may be regarded by some educators as discrete and separate subjects, but it is argued in this paper that they have close relationships with each other. Moral socialization is an essential part of growing up, and young people need to be made aware of the ethos of their society. In the past in Britain the moral code was largely derived from the Christian faith, and educators in a secular society face difficulties helping young people to work out their form of commitment and to live by a moral code. For the religious person, belief and moral commitment belong inescapably together in one ultimate vision. Thus it is argued that religious and moral education should be planned together and not be conceived as separate subjects in the school curriculum.
TL;DR: In this article, the assumption is made that we first need to be clear about the nature of moral education before we can see how religious education may interfere with or help the process, and it is claimed that it is in the experience of the other person that both religion and morality have common roots.
Abstract: The assumption is made that we first need to be clear about the nature of moral education before we can see how religious education may interfere with or help the process. Taking Piaget's distinction between practical and theoretical morality, a brief exposition is given of what is involved in moral education. From this position, certain constraints upon religious education are argued on moral grounds, and it is claimed that it is in the experience of the other person that both religion and morality have common roots.
Book•
26 May 1983
TL;DR: The Moral Maze as discussed by the authors is a textbook for students of ethics in universities and theological colleges, and the ideal introduction to how to make moral decisions for the general reader, which is applied to the questions of abortion and euthanasis.
Abstract: Moral decisions present the individual with a maze of possibilities which can be overwhelming. The increasing complexity of modern life makes it difficult for Christians to know what is ethically right and how to make the right choices. David Cook, in this straightforward and very readable book, examines the main causes of the moral dilemmas in which we so often find ourselves. Not only does he provide an excellent introduction to moral philosophy and its leading schools of thought, but he also examines the sources of Christian principles. How can this Christian use the Bible as a guide to ethical problems? What role should the Church and tradition play? Dr Cook concludes that despite the numerous choices surrounding us, Christian values still offer an authoritative alternative. In the final section, a method is suggested for moral decision making at a practical level, drawing on Edward de Bono's innovative thinking techniques, and this is applied to the questions of abortion and euthanasis. The Moral Maze is a first-class textbook for students of ethics in universities and theological colleges, and the ideal introduction to how to make moral decisions for the general reader.
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01 Jan 1983
TL;DR: Pythagoras is reputed to have said that the Gods have been bountiful to Mortals in two eminent blessings, namely, to speak the truth, and, to act righteously as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: Pythagoras is reputed to have said that “The Gods have been bountiful to Mortals in two eminent blessings, namely, to speak the truth, and, to act righteously: for that both of these bore resemblance unto the Works of the immortal Gods. ”1
Journal Article•
TL;DR: In this article, a theoretical perspective for the psychological study of moral development is presented, which does not rely on the notion that different types of moral view have different logical structures, and does not assume that different moral views have different logic structures.
Abstract: A theoretical perspective for the psychological study of moral development is presented which does not rely on the notion that different types of moral view have different logical structures, and whic
01 Jan 1983
TL;DR: Gilman considered herself a social scientist and a feminist theorist and argued that doing social science and doing feminist theory were not two separate enterprises, they were one. But modern historians have dismissed her claim to being a social scientists and have resurrected her solely as an important feminist from the past as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: Charlotte Perkins Gilman considered herself a social scientist and a feminist theorist. In Gilman’s eyes, doing social science and doing feminist theory were not two separate enterprises, they were one. But modern historians have dismissed her claim to being a social scientist and have resurrected her solely as an important feminist from the past. There are at least two reasons for this dismissal. First, the social evolutionary theory on which Gilman based her claims for social reform was discarded long ago by social scientists because of its neo-Lamarckian reasoning. Secondly, since her feminism was an essential part of Gilman’s scientific argument, her social theory seems to be discounted on this basis alone. In other words, feminism, since it is a form of moral reasoning, has no place in social scientific research. Although historians of science are now engaged in assessing theories in the context of their time, no real consideration has been given to the role of moral reasoning in social scientific research. This is particularly important for those engaged in trying to reconstruct what a feminist social science might be.