https://biblio.ugent.be/publication/685594/file/1130605.pdf

Review of Particle Physics

The 11th edition of Harrison's Principles of Internal Medicine welcomes Anthony Fauci to its editorial staff, in addition to more than 85 new contributors. While the organization of the book is similar to previous editions, major emphasis has been placed on disorders that affect multiple organ systems. Important advances in genetics, immunology, and oncology are emphasized. Many chapters of the book have been rewritten and describe major advances in internal medicine. Subjects that received only a paragraph or two of attention in previous editions are now covered in entire chapters. Among the chapters that have been extensively revised are the chapters on infections in the compromised host, on skin rashes in infections, on many of the viral infections, including cytomegalovirus and Epstein-Barr virus, on sexually transmitted diseases, on diabetes mellitus, on disorders of bone and mineral metabolism, and on lymphadenopathy and splenomegaly. The major revisions in these chapters and many

Harrison's Principles of Internal Medicine

/pdf/the-theory-of-industrial-organization-19bejph0ej.pdf

The Theory of Industrial Organization

Evolutionary game dynamics is the application of population dynamical methods to game theory. It has been introduced by evolutionary biologists, anticipated in part by classical game theorists. In this survey, we present an overview of the many brands of deterministic dynamical systems motivated by evolutionary game theory, including ordinary differential equations (and, in particular, the replicator equation), differential inclusions (the best response dynamics), difference equations (as, for instance, fictitious play) and reaction-diffusion systems. A recurrent theme (the so-called `folk theorem of evolutionary game theory') is the close connection of the dynamical approach with the Nash equilibrium, but we show that a static, equilibrium-based viewpoint is, on principle, unable to always account for the long-term behaviour of players adjusting their behaviour to maximise their payoff.

https://www.ams.org/bull/2003-40-04/S0273-0979-03-00988-1/S0273-0979-03-00988-1.pdf

Evolutionary Game Dynamics

/pdf/review-of-particle-physics-1996-1997-jeg703df6k.pdf

Review of Particle Physics, 1996-1997

This paper contributes in three dimensions to the literature on health care demand. First, it features the first application of a bivariate random effects estimator in a count data setting, to permit the efficient estimation of this type of model with panel data. Second, it provides an innovative test of adverse selection and confirms that high-risk individuals are more likely to acquire supplemental add-on insurance. Third, the estimations yield that in accordance with the theory of moral hazard, we observe a much lower frequency of doctor visits among the self-employed, and among mothers of small children. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

http://people.stern.nyu.edu/wgreene/Lugano2013/RWM-MixedModel.pdf

Incentive effects in the demand for health care: a bivariate panel count data estimation

Optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion

There have been major changes in the way European insurance markets are regulated, and there is still considerable debate about what the form and scope of regulation should be. This article examines the arguments for solvency regulation when consumers are fully informed of the insurer’s insolvency risk. It is shown firms always provide enough capital to ensure solvency, unless there are restrictions on the composition of their asset portfolios. The conclusion holds even when competition means that only normal profits can be earned. This suggests that the role of regulation in insurance markets should be confined to providing consumers with information about the default risk of insurers.

/pdf/regulation-of-insurance-markets-3iolvj7t1u.pdf

Regulation of Insurance Markets

In their seminal work, Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) have shown that in competitive insurance markets, under asymmetric information, pooling contracts cannot exist in equilibrium, firms make zero profit, and, under some circumstances, equilibrium does not exist. In the present work, the model is extended by introducing unobservable wealth in addition to the differing risks. The study shows that if the differences in wealth are small, different wealth types are pooled while different risks are separated. For large wealth differences, partial risk pooling contracts, in which one type chooses different contracts in equilibrium, are feasible. Furthermore, equilibria with profit-making contracts can exist. Complete risk pooling contracts can occur only under very restrictive assumptions. The effect of the extra dimension of asymmetric information on the nonexistence problem is ambiguous. INTRODUCTION Since the seminal work by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), it has become clear that competitive insurance markets under asymmetric information display features not known from the conventional competitive analysis. Contracts specify both quantity and price, and it may happen that equilibrium does not exist. The nonexistence problem has led to a lengthy debate in the literature. Solutions proposed are other equilibrium concepts (Wilson, 1977; Miyazaki, 1977; Spence, 1978), extensions to multi-stage games (Grossman, 1979; Hellwig, 1987; Asheim and Nilssen, 1996), or the introduction of mixed strategies (Dasgupta and Maskin, 1986). Although the equilibrium nonexistence problem has been the main focus of research, some other results by Rothschild and Stiglitz deserve attention. First, they showed that in a competitive environment, pooling contracts cannot exist in equilibrium, and second (maybe less surprisingly), they demonstrated that firms make zero profits. In other equilibrium concepts, the existence of pooling contracts is possible; however, the no-profit result always holds. As was already argued by Spence (1978, p. 427), "not only may individuals differ in the expected cost they impose upon the insurer, they may also differ in their preferences with respect to insurance coverage." Following up on this remark, the author considers individuals who differ in risk aversion in addition to their risks. There are two dimensions of asymmetric information--the insurer observes neither the risk nor the degree of risk aversion of the individual. The author models the different degrees of risk aversion by assuming that individuals have decreasing absolute risk aversion and different wealth levels. Other studies on multidimensional adverse selection problems in the context of insurance markets include the ones by Fluet and Pannequin (1997) and Landsberger and Meilijson (1996). The first authors model two types of individuals with multiple risks. Their main result is that bundling insurance contracts can be efficiency enhancing. Landsberger and Meilijson analyze the case in which two types of individuals differ with respect to their distribution of losses. However, they are mainly concerned with the derivation of assumptions under which a first-best result can be achieved or approximated. In contrast to these studies, this article assumes that there are four different types of individuals: those with high or low risks with either high or low wealth. To the author's knowledge, this is the first study that analyzes the insurance market with four unobservable types. It derives the following new results. First, in the standard case, where the single crossing property holds in the relevant region of the contract space, different wealth types are pooled, while different risk types are separated. This pooling is the same as in the first-best situation, in which different risks obtain full insurance at their fair premium, which is independent of the wealth. …

Introducing Heterogeneity in the Rothschild-Stiglitz Model

http://directory.umm.ac.id/Data%20Elmu/jurnal/J-g/Journal%20of%20Health%20Economics/Vol19.Issue2.Mar2000/640.pdf

Achim Wambach

Papers

Incentive effects in the demand for health care: a bivariate panel count data estimation

Optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion

Regulation of Insurance Markets

Introducing Heterogeneity in the Rothschild-Stiglitz Model

Adverse selection and categorical discrimination in the health insurance markets: the effects of genetic tests