Agnes W. Y. Lo

TL;DR: Li et al. as discussed by the authors investigated whether good governance structures help constrain management's opportunistic behaviors (in the form of transfer pricing manipulations) in one of the world's most dynamic economies and found that firms with a board that has a higher percentage of independent directors or a lower percentage of "parent" directors (i.e., directors who are representatives of the parent companies of the listed firms), or have different people occupying the chair and CEO positions, or have financial experts on their audit committees, are less likely to engage in transfer pricing manipulation.

TL;DR: This paper examined tax, financial reporting, and tunneling incentives on the transfer pricing decisions of Chinese-listed companies and found evidence supporting the view that transfer pricing is used to increase a listed firm's profits as the corporate income tax rate decreases.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined the economic consequences of related-party transactions in Chinese listed firms and highlighted the interplay between ownership structure and tax avoidance incentives in determining the economic consequence of related party transactions.

TL;DR: Li et al. as mentioned in this paper empirically investigated the factors that affect the management's voluntary disclosures of the transfer pricing details of related-party transactions and found that firms that make voluntary disclosure of the pricing methods of relatedparty transactions are negatively associated with a higher level of earnings management and its underlying incentives.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors provided an empirical study of the association between the management's perception of the importance of environmental variables and their choice of international transfer-pricing methods in the context of a developing economy.