In this provocative book, Barwise and Perry tackle the slippery subject of \"meaning, \" a subject that has long vexed linguists, language philosophers, and logicians.

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Situations and Attitudes.

Pragmatic Language Interpretation as Probabilistic Inference

How Children Learn the Meanings of Words by Paul Bloom. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2000, xii+300 pp. Reviewed by Masahiko Minami San Francisco State University How do children learn the meanings of words? In his new book, Paul Bloom examines a variety of issues associated with children's word learning, a process intricately connected with other aspects of language acquisition. Bloom claims that children learn words via cognitive abilities that already exist for other pur- poses, such as the ability to infer others' intentions, the ability to acquire concepts, and an appreciation of syntactic In structure. Bloom's book provides a series of el- egant and convincing arguments concerning how children learn words. briefly Chapter First Words, Bloom lays out the plan for the book and describes issues surrounding the overall topic. In Chapter 2 the author explores fast mapping, in which children make a quick guess about a word's denotation on the basis of limited experience. Chapter 3, Theory of Mind, deals with a wide range of topics, including the listener's ability to determine the references made by his or her interlocutor's choice of words; here also, Bloom investigates children's appreciation of the mental states of others, through which children acquire lexical items (and syntax as well) by means of associative acquire are nouns, learning. Because the majority of words that children initially Bloom gives special treatment to nouns and pronouns: Common nouns are discussed in Chapter 4, and pronouns and proper names are dealt with in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6, Concepts and Categories, Bloom extends his analysis to the conceptual foundations of word learning. In Chapter Naming Representations, he discusses a case study important to any theory of concepts and naming visual representations. From here, Bloom moves to other parts of speech: In Chapter 8, Learning Words through Linguistic Context, he offers an account of how chil- dren learn verbs and adjectives, as the development of syntactic abilities cannot be dissociated from the development of lexical abilities. Chapter 9 deals with learn the how we numbers and Chapter 10 with how the words we learn affect our mental life. In Chapter 11, Final Words, Bloom provides a brief summary and some general remarks. Throughout the book, the author weaves in ideas pro- posed by such linguists, psychologists, and philosophers as B. F. Skinner, Noam Chomsky, and Jean Piaget, who, through different lenses, have closely observed words for and analyzed how human beings develop and around them. issue long relevant to how they conceptualize the world As with most language acquisition texts, Bloom makes early reference to an human development: the nature/nurture debate. These alter- ISSN 1050-4273 Vol. 12 Issues in Applied Linguistics © 2001, Regents of the University of California No.

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How Children Learn the Meanings of Words

Pragmatic Tolerance: Implications for the Acquisition of Informativeness and Implicature.

Abstract This paper attempts to articulate the essential nature of the notion ‘root’ in the morphosyntax. Adopting a realizational (Late Insertion) view of the morphosyntactic model, the question of whether roots are phonologically individuated, semantically individuated, or not individuated at all in the syntactic component are addressed in turn. It is argued that roots cannot be phonologically identified, since there are suppletive roots, and they cannot be semantically identified, since there are roots with highly variable semantic content, analogous to ‘semantic suppletion'. And yet, they must be individuated in the syntax, since without such individuation, suppletive competition would be impossible. Roots must therefore be individuated purely abstractly, as independent indices on the √ node in the syntactic computation that serves as the linkage between a particular set of spell-out instructions and a particular set of interpretive instructions. It is further argued that the syntactic √node behaves in a syntactically unexceptional way, merging with complement phrases and projecting a √P. The correct formulation of locality restrictions on idiosyncratic phonological and semantic interpretations are also discussed.

On the identity of roots

Accessing the unsaid: the role of scalar alternatives in children's pragmatic inference.

Comparative judgments for mass and count nouns yield two generalizations. First, all words that can be used in both mass and count syntax (e.g., rock, string, apple, water) always denote individuals when used in count syntax but never when used in mass syntax (e.g. too many rocks vs. too much rock). Second, some mass nouns denote individuals (e.g., furniture) while others do not (e.g., water). In this article, we show that no current theory of mass-count semantics can capture these two facts and argue for an alternative theory that can. We propose that lexical roots are not specified as mass or count. Rather, a root becomes a mass noun or count noun by combining with a functional head. Some roots have denotations with individuals while others do not. The count head is interpreted as a function that maps denotations without individuals to those with individuals. The mass head is interpreted as an identity function making the interpretation of a mass noun equivalent to the interpretation of the root. As a result, all count nouns have individuals in their denotation, whereas mass counterparts of count nouns do not. Also, some roots that have individuals in their denotations can be used as mass nouns to denote individuals.

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The Interpretation of Functional Heads: Using Comparatives to Explore the Mass/Count Distinction

Comparative constructions form two classes, those that permit direct comparisons (comparisons of measurements as in Seymour is taller than he is wide) and those that only allow indirect comparisons (comparisons of relative positions on separate scales as in Esme is more beautiful than Einstein is intelligent). In contrast with other semantic theories, this paper proposes that the interpretation of the comparative morpheme remains the same whether it appears in sentences that compare individuals directly or indirectly. To develop a unified account, I suggest that all comparisons (whether in terms of height, intelligence or beauty) involve a scale of universal degrees that are isomorphic to the rational (fractional) numbers between 0 and 1. Crucial to a unified treatment, the connection between the individuals being compared and universal degrees involves two steps. First individuals are mapped to a value on a primary scale that ranks individuals with respect to the gradable property (whether it be height, beauty or intelligence). Second, the value on the primary scale is mapped to a universal degree that encodes the value’s relative position on the primary scale. Direct comparison results if measurements such as seven feet participate in the primary scale (as in Seven feet is tall). Otherwise the result is an indirect comparison.

A universal scale of comparison

Journal of Semantics Advance Access published December 4, 2014 Journal of Semantics, 0, 2014: 1–29 doi:10.1093/jos/ffu015 LARA HOCHSTEIN University of California, San Diego ALAN BALE Concordia University DANNY FOX The Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Massachusetts Institute of Technology DAVID BARNER University of California, San Diego Abstract Unlike adults, children as old as 9 years of age often fail to infer that a sentence like, ‘Some of the children slept’ implies the falsity of its stronger alternative, ‘All of the children slept’—an inference referred to as a ‘scalar implicature’. Several explanations have been proposed to account for children’s failures with scalar implicature, including domain-general processing limitations, pragmatic deficits or an inability to access the relevant alternatives in a lexical scale (e.g. all as an alternative to some). Our study focused on the role of Gricean epistemic reasoning in children’s failures by testing their ability to compute ‘ignorance implicatures’, which require reasoning about speaker knowledge and informativeness but which differ from scalar implicature with respect to the alternative statements that are involved. We administered two matched tasks to 4- and 5-year-old children: one that assessed their ability to compute ignorance implicatures, and another that assessed their ability to compute scalar implicatures. Five-year-olds successfully computed ignorance implicatures despite failing to compute scalar implicatures, while 4-year-olds failed at both types of inference. These results suggest that 5-year-olds are able to reason about speaker knowledge and informative- ness, and thus that it is difficult to explain their deficit with scalar implicature via these factors. We speculate about other possible sources of their difficulties, including pro- cessing limits and children’s access to the specific scalar alternatives required by scalar implicature. s The Author 2014. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com Downloaded from http://jos.oxfordjournals.org/ at University of California, San Diego on December 5, 2014 Ignorance and Inference: Do Problems with Gricean Epistemic Reasoning Explain Children’s Difficulty with Scalar Implicature?

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Ignorance and Inference: Do Problems with Gricean Epistemic Reasoning Explain Children’s Difficulty with Scalar Implicature?

Inspired by Partee (2010), this paper defends a broad thesis that all modifiers, including numeral modifiers, are restrictive in the sense that they can only restrict the denotation of the NP or VP they modify. However, the paper concentrates more narrowly on numeral modification, demonstrating that the evidence that motivated Ionin & Matushansky (2006) to assign non-restrictive, privative interpretations to numerals – assigning them functions that map singular sets to sets containing groups – is in fact consistent with restrictive modification. Ionin & Matushansky (2006)’s argument for this type of interpretation is partly based on the distribution of Turkish numerals which exclusively combine with singular bare nouns. Section 2 demonstrates that Turkish singular bare nouns are not semantically singular, but rather are unspecified for number. Western Armenian has similar characteristics. Building on some of the observations in section 2, section 3 demonstrates that restrictive modification can account for three different types of languages with respect to the distribution of numerals and plural nouns: (i) languages where numerals exclusively combine with plural nouns (e.g., English), (ii) languages where they exclusively combine with singular bare nouns (e.g., Turkish), (iii) languages where they optionally combine with either type of noun (e.g., Western Armenian). Accounting for these differences crucially involves making a distinction between two kinds of restrictive modification among the numerals: subsective vs. intersective modification. Section 3 also discusses why privative interpretations of numerals have trouble accounting for these different language types.

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Alan Bale

Papers

Accessing the unsaid: the role of scalar alternatives in children's pragmatic inference.

The Interpretation of Functional Heads: Using Comparatives to Explore the Mass/Count Distinction

A universal scale of comparison

Ignorance and Inference: Do Problems with Gricean Epistemic Reasoning Explain Children’s Difficulty with Scalar Implicature?

Cross-linguistic representations of numerals and number marking