From the Publisher:
A valuable reference for the novice as well as for the expert who needs a wider scope of coverage within the area of cryptography, this book provides easy and rapid access of information and includes more than 200 algorithms and protocols; more than 200 tables and figures; more than 1,000 numbered definitions, facts, examples, notes, and remarks; and over 1,250 significant references, including brief comments on each paper.

Handbook of Applied Cryptography

1. The Advanced Encryption Standard Process.- 2. Preliminaries.- 3. Specification of Rijndael.- 4. Implementation Aspects.- 5. Design Philosophy.- 6. The Data Encryption Standard.- 7. Correlation Matrices.- 8. Difference Propagation.- 9. The Wide Trail Strategy.- 10. Cryptanalysis.- 11. Related Block Ciphers.- Appendices.- A. Propagation Analysis in Galois Fields.- A.1.1 Difference Propagation.- A.l.2 Correlation.- A. 1.4 Functions that are Linear over GF(2).- A.2.1 Difference Propagation.- A.2.2 Correlation.- A.2.4 Functions that are Linear over GF(2).- A.3.3 Dual Bases.- A.4.2 Relationship Between Trace Patterns and Selection Patterns.- A.4.4 Illustration.- A.5 Rijndael-GF.- B. Trail Clustering.- B.1 Transformations with Maximum Branch Number.- B.2 Bounds for Two Rounds.- B.2.1 Difference Propagation.- B.2.2 Correlation.- B.3 Bounds for Four Rounds.- B.4 Two Case Studies.- B.4.1 Differential Trails.- B.4.2 Linear Trails.- C. Substitution Tables.- C.1 SRD.- C.2 Other Tables.- C.2.1 xtime.- C.2.2 Round Constants.- D. Test Vectors.- D.1 KeyExpansion.- D.2 Rijndael(128,128).- D.3 Other Block Lengths and Key Lengths.- E. Reference Code.

The Design of Rijndael: AES - The Advanced Encryption Standard

As sensor networks edge closer towards wide-spread deployment, security issues become a central concern. So far, much research has focused on making sensor networks feasible and useful, and has not concentrated on security.We present a suite of security building blocks optimized for resource-constrained environments and wireless communication. SPINS has two secure building blocks: SNEP and mTESLA SNEP provides the following important baseline security primitives: Data confidentiality, two-party data authentication, and data freshness. A particularly hard problem is to provide efficient broadcast authentication, which is an important mechanism for sensor networks. mTESLA is a new protocol which provides authenticated broadcast for severely resource-constrained environments. We implemented the above protocols, and show that they are practical even on minimal hardware: the performance of the protocol suite easily matches the data rate of our network. Additionally, we demonstrate that the suite can be used for building higher level protocols.

http://www.csl.mtu.edu/cs5461/www/Reading/Perrig02.pdf

SPINS: security protocols for sensor networks

National Institute of Standards and Technology における超伝導研究及び生活

Blockchain, the foundation of Bitcoin, has received extensive attentions recently. Blockchain serves as an immutable ledger which allows transactions take place in a decentralized manner. Blockchain-based applications are springing up, covering numerous fields including financial services, reputation system and Internet of Things (IoT), and so on. However, there are still many challenges of blockchain technology such as scalability and security problems waiting to be overcome. This paper presents a comprehensive overview on blockchain technology. We provide an overview of blockchain architechture firstly and compare some typical consensus algorithms used in different blockchains. Furthermore, technical challenges and recent advances are briefly listed. We also lay out possible future trends for blockchain.

An Overview of Blockchain Technology: Architecture, Consensus, and Future Trends

In this paper we present a new cryptanalytic technique, based on impossible differentials, and use it to show that Skipjack reduced from 32 to 31 rounds can be broken by an attack which is faster than exhaustive search.

/pdf/cryptanalysis-of-skipjack-reduced-to-31-rounds-using-3218wexyln.pdf

Cryptanalysis of Skipjack reduced to 31 rounds using impossible differentials

A5/1 is the strong version of the encryption algorithm used by about 130 million GSM customers in Europe to protect the over-the-air privacy of their cellular voice and data communication. The best published attacks against it require between 240 and 245 steps. This level of security makes it vulnerable to hardware-based attacks by large organizations, but not to software-based attacks on multiple targets by hackers.

In this paper we describe new attacks on A5/1, which are based on subtle flaws in the tap structure of the registers, their noninvertible clocking mechanism, and their frequent resets. After a 248 parallelizable data preparation stage (which has to be carried out only once), the actual attacks can be carried out in real time on a single PC.

The first attack requires the output of the A5/1 algorithm during the first two minutes of the conversation, and computes the key in about one second. The second attack requires the output of the A5/1 algorithm during about two seconds of the conversation, and computes the key in several minutes. The two attacks are related, but use different types of time-memory tradeoffs. The attacks were verified with actual implementations, except for the preprocessing stage which was extensively sampled rather than completely executed.

REMARK: We based our attack on the version of the algorithm which was derived by reverse engineering an actual GSM telephone and published at http://www.scard.org. We would like to thank the GSM organization for graciously confirming to us the correctness of this unofficial description. In addition, we would like to stress that this paper considers the narrow issue of the cryptographic strength of A5/1, and not the broader issue of the practical security of fielded GSM systems, about which we make no claims.

/pdf/real-time-cryptanalysis-of-a5-1-on-a-pc-3zjw8hhwxk.pdf

Real Time Cryptanalysis of A5/1 on a PC

In 1980 Hellman introduced a general technique for breaking arbitrary block ciphers with N possible keys in time T and memory M related by the tradeoff curve TM2 = N2 for 1 ≤ T ≤ N. Recently, Babbage and Golic pointed out that a different TM = N tradeoff attack for 1 ≤ T ≤ D is applicable to stream ciphers, where D is the amount of output data available to the attacker. In this paper we show that a combination of the two approaches has an improved time/memory/data tradeoff for stream ciphers of the form TM2D2 = N2 for any D2 ≤ T ≤ N. In addition, we show that stream ciphers with low sampling resistance have tradeoff attacks with fewer table lookups and a wider choice of parameters.

/pdf/cryptanalytic-time-memory-data-tradeoffs-for-stream-ciphers-1ztpcfjsrw.pdf

Cryptanalytic Time/Memory/Data Tradeoffs for Stream Ciphers

Background TheData Encryption Standard (DES) [] has been around for more than  years. During this time, the standard was revised three times: as FIPS-- in , as FIPS-- in , and as FIPS-- in . DES was an outcome of a call for primitives in , which did not result in many serious candidates except for a predecessor of DES, Lucifer [, ] designed by IBM around . It took another year for a joint IBM–NSA effort to turn Lucifer intoDES.The structure of Lucifer was significantly altered: Since the design rationale was never made public and the secret key size was reduced from -bit to -bits, this initially resulted in controversy, and some distrust among the public. After some delay, FIPS- was published by NBS (National Bureau of Standards) – nowNIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) – on January ,  [] (see [] for a discussion of the standardization process). However, in spite of all the controversy it is hard to underestimate the role of DES []. DES was one of the first commercially developed (as opposed to government developed) ciphers whose structure was fully published. This effectively created a community of researchers who could analyze it and propose their own designs. This led to a wave of public interest in cryptography, from which much of the cryptography as we know it today was born.

/pdf/data-encryption-standard-des-o0z14oqp69.pdf

Data Encryption Standard (DES)

In this paper we present two related-key attacks on the full AES. For AES-256 we show the first key recovery attack that works for all the keys and has 299.5 time and data complexity, while the recent attack by Biryukov-Khovratovich-Nikolic works for a weak key class and has much higher complexity. The second attack is the first cryptanalysis of the full AES-192. Both our attacks are boomerang attacks, which are based on the recent idea of finding local collisions in block ciphers and enhanced with the boomerang switching techniques to gain free rounds in the middle.

The extended version of this paper is available at http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/317.pdf .

/pdf/related-key-cryptanalysis-of-the-full-aes-192-and-aes-256-3o7qjcymx4.pdf

Alex Biryukov

Papers

Cryptanalysis of Skipjack reduced to 31 rounds using impossible differentials

Real Time Cryptanalysis of A5/1 on a PC

Cryptanalytic Time/Memory/Data Tradeoffs for Stream Ciphers

Data Encryption Standard (DES)

Related-Key Cryptanalysis of the Full AES-192 and AES-256