D
Dmitry Khovratovich
Researcher at University of Luxembourg
Publications - 90
Citations - 4540
Dmitry Khovratovich is an academic researcher from University of Luxembourg. The author has contributed to research in topics: Block cipher & Cryptanalysis. The author has an hindex of 25, co-authored 77 publications receiving 3832 citations. Previous affiliations of Dmitry Khovratovich include Microsoft & university of lille.
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Book ChapterDOI
Biclique cryptanalysis of the full AES
TL;DR: This paper presents the novel technique of block cipher cryptanalysis with bicliques, which leads to the following results: the first key recovery method for the full AES-128 with computational complexity 2126.1.4 and key recovery methods with lower complexity for the reduced-round versions of AES not considered before.
Book ChapterDOI
Related-Key Cryptanalysis of the Full AES-192 and AES-256
TL;DR: This paper shows the first key recovery attack that works for all the keys and has 299.5 time and data complexity, while the recent attack by Biryukov-Khovratovich-Nikolic works for a weak key class and has much higher complexity.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Deanonymisation of Clients in Bitcoin P2P Network
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present an efficient method to deanonymize Bitcoin users, which allows to link user pseudonyms to the IP addresses where the transactions are generated, and also show that a natural countermeasure of using Tor or other anonymity services can be cut-off by abusing anti-DoS countermeasures of the Bitcoin network.
Posted Content
Deanonymisation of clients in Bitcoin P2P network
TL;DR: This work presents an efficient method to deanonymize Bitcoin users, which allows to link user pseudonyms to the IP addresses where the transactions are generated and shows that a natural countermeasure of using Tor or other anonymity services can be cut-off by abusing anti-DoS countermeasures of the Bitcoin network.
Book ChapterDOI
Distinguisher and Related-Key Attack on the Full AES-256
TL;DR: In this paper, a related-key attack on the full 256-bit key AES was presented, which works for one out of every 235 keys with 2120 data and time complexity and negligible memory.