Originally published in Contemporary Psychology: APA Review of Books, 1994, Vol 39(2), 225. Reviews the book, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion by John Zaller (1992). The author's commendable effort to specify a model of mass opinion formation offers readers an introduction to the prevailing vi

The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion.

Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age

The Economic Effects of Constitutions. By Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2003. 320p. $35.00.Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini have produced the most ambitious study yet that attempts to identify and estimate the effects of constitutional design on economic outcomes. They draw on data from more than 80 countries and control for demographic, historical, regional, and economic characteristics. The purpose is to determine whether the shape of political institutions has measurable impact on economic policies (e.g., fiscal balance, social welfare spending), on government performance (e.g., corruption indices, protection of property rights), and on direct measures of economic performance (e.g., productivity of capital and labor). The political institutions that draw the most attention are constitutional regime type and the method of electing legislators.

The Economic Effects of Constitutions

We study how ex-government ocials benet from the personal connections acquired during public service. Lobbyists with experience in the oce of a US Senator suer a 24% drop in generated revenue when that Senator leaves oce. The eect is immediate, discontinuous around the exit period, and long-lasting. Consistent with the notion that lobbyists sell access to powerful politicians, the drop in revenue is increasing in the committee assignments power held by the exiting politician.

/pdf/revolving-door-lobbyists-560flesv76.pdf

Revolving Door Lobbyists

Making Votes Count

https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w12921/w12921.pdf

Political careers or career politicians

Like voters (the represented), politicians (the representees) are the heart and soul of representative democracy But isnt being a politician just like any other job? After we get past the rhetoric, is politics any different than other occupations? In the political sector, voters, parties and politicians represent the counterparts of consumers, firms and workers/managers in the market sector In fact, the analogy is much deeper than it may appear at first sight In the market sector, consumers determine to a large extent the success of a firm and ultimately the managements fate However, managers are chosen by the firms, which typically have an objective that is different from those of consumers and managers Likewise, while in all democratic systems the voters ultimately determine who is elected, it is typically the case that political parties nominate candidates for public office Furthermore, the objectives of voters and parties with respect to the selection of candidates may differ, and are constrained by the career ambitions of individuals with political aspirations But then, what really makes a career in the political sector different from a career in any other economic sector? There are at least three distinctive features that characterize the labor market in the political sector First, politicians are typically under the spotlight, receiving the attention of the media and of a variety of citizens organizations This makes politics a showcase, where politicians in office can display their political skills, while it might be more difficult for individuals working in the market sector to reveal their market ability Second, inter-party competition for potential politicians is likely to be of secondary importance, as ideological preferences are more likely to attract individuals toward specific parties at the beginning of their political careers Third, it is often the case that political parties take care of their losers by reserving partys positions to defeated incumbents As a result, while individual careers within the political sector are inevitably linked to the opportunities available within parties, the extent to which individual endowments of political and market skills are correlated, or experience in the political (market) sector is also valuable in the market (political) sector, links the labor markets of the two sectors This link affects the selection of politicians, the politicians careers, and the relationship between parties and voters

https://mercury.smu.edu.sg/rsrchpubupload/13448/Italian_politicians.pdf

The Labor Market of Italian Politicians

I show that shares currently traded on U.S. stock markets can be used to hedge political uncertainty. Focusing on the 2000 U.S. presidential election, I construct two “presidential portfolios” composed of selected stocks anticipated to fare differently under a Bush versus a Gore presidency. To construct these portfolios I use data on campaign contributions by publicly traded corporations and identify the major contributors on each side. Using daily observations for the six months before the election took place, I show that the excess returns of these portfolios with respect to overall market movements are significantly related to changes in electoral polls.

/pdf/can-we-insure-against-political-uncertainty-evidence-from-5cmegx37hb.pdf

Can we insure against political uncertainty? Evidence from the U.S. stock market

We analyze the effect of turnout requirements in referenda in the context of a group turnout model. We show that a participation quorum requirement may reduce the turnout so severely that it generates a "quorum paradox": in equilibrium, the expected turnout exceeds the participation quorum only if this requirement is not imposed. Moreover, a participation quorum does not necessarily imply a bias for the status quo. We also show that in order to induce a given expected turnout, the quorum should be set at a level that is lower than half the target, and the effect of a participation quorum on welfare is ambiguous. On the one hand, the quorum decreases voters' welfare by misrepresenting the will of the majority. On the other hand, it might also reduce the total cost of voting. Finally, we show that an approval quorum is essentially equivalent to a participation quorum.

Quorum and Turnout in Referenda

We analyze the effect of turnout requirements in referenda in the context of a group turnout model. We show that a participation quorum requirement may reduce the turnout so severely that it generates a “quorum paradox”: In equilibrium, the expected turnout exceeds the participation quorum only if this requirement is not imposed. Furthermore, a participation quorum does not necessarily imply a bias for the status quo. We also show that in order to induce a given expected turnout and avoid the quorum paradox, the quorum should be set at a level that is lower than half the target. Finally, we argue that a super majority requirement to overturn the status quo is never equivalent to a participation quorum. (JEL: D72)

Andrea Mattozzi

Papers

Political careers or career politicians

The Labor Market of Italian Politicians

Can we insure against political uncertainty? Evidence from the U.S. stock market

Quorum and Turnout in Referenda

Quorum and Turnout in Referenda