Showing papers in "Games and Economic Behavior in 1999"

TL;DR: A variant of the game-playing algorithm is proved to be optimal in a very strong sense and a new, simple proof of the min–max theorem, as well as a provable method of approximately solving a game.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors consider an environment with widespread externalities, and assume that bind- ing agreements can be written, and they study coalition formation in such a setting and establish the existence of a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium for such a game.

TL;DR: In this paper, a range of problems from a variety of disciplines can be framed in this way, and the main results obtained, as well as some of their applications, are surveyed.

TL;DR: In this paper, it was shown that despite anonymous interaction a preference for punishing unfair offers is an evolutionarily successful strategy if players interact in small groups, which leads players to split the resource equally almost always.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors study a logical system where non-full awareness is possible, and prove that a satisfactory solution to the problem can be found by introducing limited reasoning ability of the subject.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors consider a two-stage game in which each player can either commit to a quantity in stage 1 or wait till stage 2, and they show that committing is more risky for the high cost firm and that, consequently, risk dominance considerations, as in Harsanyi and Selten (1988), allow the conclusion that only the low cost firm will choose to commit.

TL;DR: In this article, Stackelberg's classical critique of the Cournot duopoly, in the framework of endogenous timing for two-player games, was revisited, and different sets of minimal conditions, directly on the demand and cost functions, yielding respectively the simultaneous and the two sequential modes of play.

TL;DR: For 2 × 2 games with countably many Nash distribution equilibria, it was shown in this article that sample paths converge almost surely, and for Jordan's 3 × 2 matching game there are robust parameter values giving probability 0 of convergence.

TL;DR: In this paper, a class of procedures that assign observations to categories, and prescribe a simple randomized variation of fictitious play within each category, are discussed, and conditionally consistent, in the sense that yielding almost as high a time-average payoff as could be obtained if the player chose knowing the conditional distributions of actions given categories.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors developed a model which reflects the tendency of people to simplify the decision problems they face, and showed that such behavior leads to maxmin choices, where the decision maker chooses among alternate strategies only on the basis of the payoff she assesses she would obtain from them.

TL;DR: In this article, the equilibrium in two transaction mechanisms: auctions and posted prices is determined, and it is shown that the selling mechanisms are practically equivalent, and that posted price markets dominate bargaining markets similarly.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate the relationship between the continuous time best response dynamic, its perturbed version, and evolutionary dynamics in relation to mixed strategy equilibria and find that as the level of noise approaches zero, the perturbed best response has the same qualitative properties as a broad class of evolutionary dynamics.

TL;DR: In this article, the effect of imperfect commitment in noncooperative two-person bargaining games was studied and the set of equilibria was shown to be small and agreement may be reached immediately despite the possibility of stubbornness.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider the problem of minimizing regret in repeated games with differential information on one side, and give a simple condition describing the approachable set, which is based on the regret minimization problem formulated by J. Hannan.

TL;DR: A procedure is a specific way of making this association; a procedure is optimal if the sequence of choices it generates converges to the action that maximizes the expected payoff.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors analyzed simultaneous sealed bid auctions of heterogeneous objects and showed that any efficient allocation can be implemented as a pure strategy Nash equilibrium outcome if a Walrasian equilibrium exists.

TL;DR: In this article, the notions of superadditivity and convexity were extended to stochastic cooperative games, and it was shown that convex games are superadditive and have nonempty cores.

TL;DR: In this article, the relating equilibrium characterization and selection questions are formulated and solved in terms of anonymous games with a continuum of players facing a binary decision problem, and the game is solved by a game theoretic approach.

TL;DR: In this paper, it was shown that K -initialized myopic strategies are approximately calibrated when K is large, which is a refinement of an idea first introduced by David Blackwell in 1955.

TL;DR: The paper summarizes the results of 41 experiments which were conducted during an undergraduate course in game theory in 1998 and argues that the crude experimental methods produced results which are not substantially different from those obtained at much higher cost using stricter experimental methods.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors consider the Poorman variant of the Richman game, in which the high bidder pays a third party (rather than the other player) instead of alternating moves, and expand upon their previous work by considering games with infinitely many positions.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a new value of a cooperative game for the case of limited communication between players, where only pairwise meetings can occur and some of them are not permitted.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors propose a solution to the hold-up problem, where the parties in a contract can avoid the inefficiencies caused by the possibility of opportunistic behavior and implement the first best level of investment if they make their investment decision sequentially, one party observing the choice made by the other party before making his own choice.

TL;DR: In this paper, the question if every exact game has a large core was answered for TU games with three or four players, and the answer was negative for games with five or more players.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors relate and unify several results that appeared in the following domains: merging of probabilities, perturbed games and reputation phenomena, and repeated games with incomplete information.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors generalize Nash equilibrium in finite extensive form games to allow for preferences conforming to the multiple priors model developed by Gilboa and Schmeidler, and the implications of this generalization for strategy choices and welfare are studied.

TL;DR: Foster and Levine as mentioned in this paper proposed an algorithm that only randomizes between two forecasts that are very close to each other (either p or p + ǫ), which only hides the last digit of the forecast.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined the convergence and divergence of a large population where agents are repeatedly randomly matched and showed that the aggregation of this learning behavior can be qualitatively different from learning at the level of the individual.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors established a β-core existence result in a large class of normal form TU games and showed that the TU α-core is always equal to TU βcore.

TL;DR: In this article, a simple two-sided incomplete information game with a full support prior was used to explain non-Nash equilibrium outcomes observed in the centipede game experiments.