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Andrew J. Yates
Researcher at University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Publications - 78
Citations - 1811
Andrew J. Yates is an academic researcher from University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. The author has contributed to research in topics: CONTEST & Electricity. The author has an hindex of 23, co-authored 73 publications receiving 1518 citations. Previous affiliations of Andrew J. Yates include Wake Forest University & University of Richmond.
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Are There Environmental Benefits from Driving Electric Vehicles? The Importance of Local Factors
TL;DR: In this article, the authors combine a theoretical discrete-choice model of vehicle purchases, an econometric analysis of electricity emissions, and the AP2 air pollution model to estimate the geographic variation in the environmental benefits from driving electric vehicles.
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Testing Contest Theory: Evidence from Best-of-Three Tennis Matches
David A. Malueg,Andrew J. Yates +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the authors study the strategic choice of effort in best-of-three tennis matches between equally skilled players and find that players strategically adjust their efforts during a best of three tennis match.
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Risk Taking in Decision Making for Others Versus the Self
TL;DR: The authors examined people's level of risk taking when making monetary decisions for other people rather than for themselves and found that regret concerns led to increased risk avoidance both when participants made decisions for others as well as when making decisions for themselves.
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Sent Seeking With Private Values
David A. Malueg,Andrew J. Yates +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors study a rent-seeking contest in which the players' valuations of the prize are private information and determine a Bayesian equilibrium and give conditions under which the equilibrium exists.
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Best-of-three contest experiments: Strategic versus psychological momentum
TL;DR: The authors conducted an experimental analysis of a best-of-three Tullock contest and found that players' efforts and the probability that a contest ends in two rounds are consistent with strategic momentum, i.e., a momentum generated due to strategic incentives inherent in the contest.