concepts ("freedom") differ from concrete ones ("cat"), as they do not have a bounded, identifiable, and clearly perceivable referent. The way in which abstract concepts are represented has recently become a topic of intense debate, especially because of the spread of the embodied approach to cognition. Within this framework concepts derive their meaning from the same perception, motor, and emotional systems that are involved in online interaction with the world. Most of the evidence in favor of this view, however, has been gathered with regard to concrete concepts. Given the relevance of abstract concepts for higher-order cognition, we argue that being able to explain how they are represented is a crucial challenge that any theory of cognition needs to address. The aim of this article is to offer a critical review of the latest theories on abstract concepts, focusing on embodied ones. Starting with theories that question the distinction between abstract and concrete concepts, we review theories claiming that abstract concepts are grounded in metaphors, in situations and introspection, and in emotion. We then introduce multiple representation theories, according to which abstract concepts evoke both sensorimotor and linguistic information. We argue that the most promising approach is given by multiple representation views that combine an embodied perspective with the recognition of the importance of linguistic and social experience. We conclude by discussing whether or not a single theoretical framework might be able to explain all different varieties of abstract concepts. (PsycINFO Database Record

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The challenge of abstract concepts.

A New Unifying Account of the Roles of Neuronal Entrainment

The 15 articles in this special issue on The Representation of Concepts illustrate the rich variety of theoretical positions and supporting research that characterize the area. Although much agreement exists among contributors, much disagreement exists as well, especially about the roles of grounding and abstraction in conceptual processing. I first review theoretical approaches raised in these articles that I believe are Quixotic dead ends, namely, approaches that are principled and inspired but likely to fail. In the process, I review various theories of amodal symbols, their distortions of grounded theories, and fallacies in the evidence used to support them. Incorporating further contributions across articles, I then sketch a theoretical approach that I believe is likely to be successful, which includes grounding, abstraction, flexibility, explaining classic conceptual phenomena, and making contact with real-world situations. This account further proposes that (1) a key element of grounding is neural reuse, (2) abstraction takes the forms of multimodal compression, distilled abstraction, and distributed linguistic representation (but not amodal symbols), and (3) flexible context-dependent representations are a hallmark of conceptual processing.

/pdf/on-staying-grounded-and-avoiding-quixotic-dead-ends-12hw8rpj0q.pdf

On Staying Grounded and Avoiding Quixotic Dead Ends

The Gesture as Simulated Action (GSA) framework was proposed to explain how gestures arise from embodied simulations of the motor and perceptual states that occur during speaking and thinking (Hostetter & Alibali, Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 15, 495-514, 2008). In this review, we revisit the framework's six main predictions regarding gesture rates, gesture form, and the cognitive cost of inhibiting gesture. We find that the available evidence largely supports the main predictions of the framework. We also consider several challenges to the framework that have been raised, as well as several of the framework's limitations as it was originally proposed. We offer additional elaborations of the framework to address those challenges that fall within the framework's scope, and we conclude by identifying key directions for future work on how gestures arise from an embodied mind.

/pdf/gesture-as-simulated-action-revisiting-the-framework-2pohu98ox1.pdf

Gesture as simulated action: Revisiting the framework

When asked to identify 2 visual targets (T1 and T2 for the 1st and 2nd targets, respectively) embedded in a sequence of distractors, observers will often fail to identify T2 when it appears within 200-500 ms of T1--an effect called the attentional blink. Recent work shows that attention does not blink when the task is to encode a sequence of consecutive targets, suggesting that distractor interference plays a causal role in the attentional blink. Here, however, the authors show that an attentional blink occurs even in the absence of distractors, with 2 letter targets separated by a blank interval. In addition, the authors found that the impairment for identification of the 2nd of 2 targets separated by a blank interval is substantially attenuated either when the intertarget interval is filled with additional target items or when the 2nd target is precued by an additional target. These findings show that the root cause of the blink lies in the difficulty of engaging attention twice within a short period of time for 2 temporally discrete target events.

Unmasking the attentional blink

In recent years, there has been rapidly growing interest in embodied cognition, a multifaceted theoretical proposition that (1) cognitive processes are influenced by the body, (2) cognition exists in the service of action, (3) cognition is situated in the environment, and (4) cognition may occur without internal representations. Many proponents view embodied cognition as the next great paradigm shift for cognitive science. In this article, we critically examine the core ideas from embodied cognition, taking a "thought exercise" approach. We first note that the basic principles from embodiment theory are either unacceptably vague (e.g., the premise that perception is influenced by the body) or they offer nothing new (e.g., cognition evolved to optimize survival, emotions affect cognition, perception-action couplings are important). We next suggest that, for the vast majority of classic findings in cognitive science, embodied cognition offers no scientifically valuable insight. In most cases, the theory has no logical connections to the phenomena, other than some trivially true ideas. Beyond classic laboratory findings, embodiment theory is also unable to adequately address the basic experiences of cognitive life.

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The poverty of embodied cognition

Magicians exploit a host of psychological principles in deceiving their audiences. Psychologists have recently attempted to pinpoint the most common psychological tendencies exploited by magicians. This paper highlights two co-occurring principles that appear to be the basis for many popular magic tricks: accidental alignment and good continuation.

http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1068/p6766

The Exploitation of Gestalt Principles by Magicians

Handwritten word recognition is a field of study that has largely been neglected in the psychological literature, despite its prevalence in society. Whereas studies of spoken word recognition almost exclusively employ natural, human voices as stimuli, studies of visual word recognition use synthetic typefaces, thus simplifying the process of word recognition. The current study examined the effects of handwriting on a series of lexical variables thought to influence bottom-up and top-down processing, including word frequency, regularity, bidirectional consistency, and imageability. The results suggest that the natural physical ambiguity of handwritten stimuli forces a greater reliance on top-down processes, because almost all effects were magnified, relative to conditions with computer print. These findings suggest that processes of word perception naturally adapt to handwriting, compensating for physical ambiguity by increasing top-down feedback.

/pdf/interpreting-chicken-scratch-lexical-access-for-handwritten-2t46afxygk.pdf

Interpreting Chicken-Scratch: Lexical Access for Handwritten Words

Recently, performance magic has become a source of insight into the processes underlying awareness. Magicians have highlighted a set of variables that can create moments of visual attentional suppression, which they call “off-beats.” One of these variables is akin to the phenomenon psychologists know as attentional entrainment. The current experiments, inspired by performance magic, explore the extent to which entrainment can occur across sensory modalities. Across two experiments using a difficult dot probe detection task, we find that the mere presence of an auditory rhythm can bias when visual attention is deployed, speeding responses to stimuli appearing in phase with the rhythm. However, the extent of this cross-modal influence is moderated by factors such as the speed of the entrainers and whether their frequency is increasing or decreasing. In Experiment 1, entrainment occurred for rhythms presented at .67 Hz, but not at 1.5 Hz. In Experiment 2, entrainment only occurred for rhythms that were slowing from 1.5 Hz to .67 Hz, not speeding. The results of these experiments challenge current models of temporal attention.

/pdf/cross-modal-attentional-entrainment-insights-from-magicians-2mjz6sywmi.pdf

Cross-modal attentional entrainment: Insights from magicians

Recent studies (e.g., Kuhn & Tatler, 2005) have suggested that magic tricks can provide a powerful and compelling domain for the study of attention and perception. In particular, many stage illusions involve attentional misdirection, guiding the observer’s gaze to a salient object or event, while another critical action, such as sleight of hand, is taking place. Even if the critical action takes place in full view, people typically fail to see it due to inattentional blindness. In an eye-tracking experiment, participants watched videos of a new magic trick, wherein a coin placed beneath a napkin disappears, reappearing under a different napkin. Appropriately deployed attention would allow participants to detect the “secret” event that underlies the illusion (a moving coin), as it happens in full view and is visible for approximately 550 ms. Nevertheless, we observed high rates of inattentional blindness. Unlike prior research, eye-movements during the critical event showed different patterns for participants, depending upon whether they saw the moving coin. The results also showed that when participants watched several “practice” videos without any moving coin, they became far more likely to detect the coin in the critical trial. Taken together, the findings are consistent with perceptual load theory (Lavie & Tsal, 1994).

/pdf/blinded-by-magic-eye-movements-reveal-the-misdirection-of-42akhuz2jq.pdf

Anthony S. Barnhart

Papers

The poverty of embodied cognition

The Exploitation of Gestalt Principles by Magicians

Interpreting Chicken-Scratch: Lexical Access for Handwritten Words

Cross-modal attentional entrainment: Insights from magicians

Blinded by magic: eye-movements reveal the misdirection of attention.