Showing papers in "Psychonomic Bulletin & Review in 2016"

Optimizing performance through intrinsic motivation and attention for learning: The OPTIMAL theory of motor learning

Abstract: Effective motor performance is important for surviving and thriving, and skilled movement is critical in many activities. Much theorizing over the past few decades has focused on how certain practice conditions affect the processing of task-related information to affect learning. Yet, existing theoretical perspectives do not accommodate significant recent lines of evidence demonstrating motivational and attentional effects on performance and learning. These include research on (a) conditions that enhance expectancies for future performance, (b) variables that influence learners' autonomy, and (c) an external focus of attention on the intended movement effect. We propose the OPTIMAL (Optimizing Performance through Intrinsic Motivation and Attention for Learning) theory of motor learning. We suggest that motivational and attentional factors contribute to performance and learning by strengthening the coupling of goals to actions. We provide explanations for the performance and learning advantages of these variables on psychological and neuroscientific grounds. We describe a plausible mechanism for expectancy effects rooted in responses of dopamine to the anticipation of positive experience and temporally associated with skill practice. Learner autonomy acts perhaps largely through an enhanced expectancy pathway. Furthermore, we consider the influence of an external focus for the establishment of efficient functional connections across brain networks that subserve skilled movement. We speculate that enhanced expectancies and an external focus propel performers' cognitive and motor systems in productive "forward" directions and prevent "backsliding" into self- and non-task focused states. Expected success presumably breeds further success and helps consolidate memories. We discuss practical implications and future research directions.

The fallacy of placing confidence in confidence intervals

Abstract: Interval estimates – estimates of parameters that include an allowance for sampling uncertainty – have long been touted as a key component of statistical analyses. There are several kinds of interval estimates, but the most popular are confidence intervals (CIs): intervals that contain the true parameter value in some known proportion of repeated samples, on average. The width of confidence intervals is thought to index the precision of an estimate; CIs are thought to be a guide to which parameter values are plausible or reasonable; and the confidence coefficient of the interval (e.g., 95 %) is thought to index the plausibility that the true parameter is included in the interval. We show in a number of examples that CIs do not necessarily have any of these properties, and can lead to unjustified or arbitrary inferences. For this reason, we caution against relying upon confidence interval theory to justify interval estimates, and suggest that other theories of interval estimation should be used instead.

Hidden multiplicity in exploratory multiway ANOVA: Prevalence and remedies.

Abstract: Many psychologists do not realize that exploratory use of the popular multiway analysis of variance harbors a multiple-comparison problem. In the case of two factors, three separate null hypotheses are subject to test (i.e., two main effects and one interaction). Consequently, the probability of at least one Type I error (if all null hypotheses are true) is 14 % rather than 5 %, if the three tests are independent. We explain the multiple-comparison problem and demonstrate that researchers almost never correct for it. To mitigate the problem, we describe four remedies: the omnibus F test, control of the familywise error rate, control of the false discovery rate, and preregistration of the hypotheses.

GRAPES—Grounding representations in action, perception, and emotion systems: How object properties and categories are represented in the human brain

Abstract: In this article, I discuss some of the latest functional neuroimaging findings on the organization of object concepts in the human brain. I argue that these data provide strong support for viewing concepts as the products of highly interactive neural circuits grounded in the action, perception, and emotion systems. The nodes of these circuits are defined by regions representing specific object properties (e.g., form, color, and motion) and thus are property-specific, rather than strictly modality-specific. How these circuits are modified by external and internal environmental demands, the distinction between representational content and format, and the grounding of abstract social concepts are also discussed.

Underpowered samples, false negatives, and unconscious learning

Abstract: The scientific community has witnessed growing concern about the high rate of false positives and unreliable results within the psychological literature, but the harmful im- pact offalse negatives has been largely ignored. False negatives are particularly concerning in research areas where demonstrat- ing the absence of an effect is crucial, such as studies of uncon- scious or implicit processing. Research on implicit processes seeks evidence of above-chance performance on some implicit behavioral measure at the same time as chance-level perfor- mance (that is, a null result) on an explicit measure of aware- ness. A systematic review of 73 studies of contextual cuing, a popular implicit learning paradigm, involving 181 statistical analyses of awareness tests, reveals how underpowered studies can lead to failure to reject a false null hypothesis. Among the studies that reported sufficient information, the meta-analytic effect size across awareness tests was dz = 0.31 (95 % CI 0.24- 0.37), showing that participants' learning in these experiments was conscious. The unusually large number of positive results in this literature cannot be explained by selective publication. Instead, our analyses demonstrate that these tests are typically insensitive and underpowered to detect medium to small, but true, effects in awareness tests. These findings challenge a widespread and theoretically important claim about the extent of unconscious human cognition.

On Staying Grounded and Avoiding Quixotic Dead Ends

Abstract: The 15 articles in this special issue on The Representation of Concepts illustrate the rich variety of theoretical positions and supporting research that characterize the area. Although much agreement exists among contributors, much disagreement exists as well, especially about the roles of grounding and abstraction in conceptual processing. I first review theoretical approaches raised in these articles that I believe are Quixotic dead ends, namely, approaches that are principled and inspired but likely to fail. In the process, I review various theories of amodal symbols, their distortions of grounded theories, and fallacies in the evidence used to support them. Incorporating further contributions across articles, I then sketch a theoretical approach that I believe is likely to be successful, which includes grounding, abstraction, flexibility, explaining classic conceptual phenomena, and making contact with real-world situations. This account further proposes that (1) a key element of grounding is neural reuse, (2) abstraction takes the forms of multimodal compression, distilled abstraction, and distributed linguistic representation (but not amodal symbols), and (3) flexible context-dependent representations are a hallmark of conceptual processing.

Putting concepts into context

Abstract: At first glance, conceptual representations (e.g., our internal notion of the object “lemon”) seem static; we have the impression that there is something that the concept lemon “means” (a sour, yellow, football-shaped citrus fruit) and that this meaning does not vary. Research in semantic memory has traditionally taken this “static” perspective. Consequently, only effects demonstrated across a variety of contexts have typically been considered informative regarding the architecture of the semantic system. In this review, we take the opposite approach: We review instances of context-dependent conceptual activation at many different timescales—from long-term experience, to recent experience, to the current task goals, to the unfolding process of conceptual activation itself—and suggest that the pervasive effects of context across all of these timescales indicate that rather than being static, conceptual representations are constantly changing and are inextricably linked to their contexts.

Situation models, mental simulations, and abstract concepts in discourse comprehension

Abstract: This article sets out to examine the role of symbolic and sensorimotor representations in discourse comprehension. It starts out with a review of the literature on situation models, showing how mental representations are constrained by linguistic and situational factors. These ideas are then extended to more explicitly include sensorimotor representations. Following Zwaan and Madden (2005), the author argues that sensorimotor and symbolic representations mutually constrain each other in discourse comprehension. These ideas are then developed further to propose two roles for abstract concepts in discourse comprehension. It is argued that they serve as pointers in memory, used (1) cataphorically to integrate upcoming information into a sensorimotor simulation, or (2) anaphorically integrate previously presented information into a sensorimotor simulation. In either case, the sensorimotor representation is a specific instantiation of the abstract concept.

There is no convincing evidence that working memory training is effective: A reply to Au et al. (2014) and Karbach and Verhaeghen (2014)

Abstract: The possible cognitive benefits of working memory training programs have been the subject of intense interest and controversy. Recently two meta-analyses have claimed that working memory training can be effective in enhancing cognitive skills in adulthood (Au et al. Behavioural Brain Research 228:(1) 107-115, 2014) and stemming cognitive decline in old age (Karbach & Verhaeghen Psychological Science 25:2027–2037, 2014). The current article critically evaluates these claims. We argue that these meta-analyses produce misleading results because of (1) biases in the studies included, (2) a failure to take account of baseline differences when calculating effect sizes, and (3) a failure to emphasize the difference between studies with treated versus untreated control groups. We present new meta-analyses and conclude that there is no convincing evidence that working memory training produces general cognitive benefits.

In defense of abstract conceptual representations

Abstract: An extensive program of research in the past 2 decades has focused on the role of modal sensory, motor, and affective brain systems in storing and retrieving concept knowledge. This focus has led in some circles to an underestimation of the need for more abstract, supramodal conceptual representations in semantic cognition. Evidence for supramodal processing comes from neuroimaging work documenting a large, well-defined cortical network that responds to meaningful stimuli regardless of modal content. The nodes in this network correspond to high-level “convergence zones” that receive broadly crossmodal input and presumably process crossmodal conjunctions. It is proposed that highly conjunctive representations are needed for several critical functions, including capturing conceptual similarity structure, enabling thematic associative relationships independent of conceptual similarity, and providing efficient “chunking” of concept representations for a range of higher order tasks that require concepts to be configured as situations. These hypothesized functions account for a wide range of neuroimaging results showing modulation of the supramodal convergence zone network by associative strength, lexicality, familiarity, imageability, frequency, and semantic compositionality. The evidence supports a hierarchical model of knowledge representation in which modal systems provide a mechanism for concept acquisition and serve to ground individual concepts in external reality, whereas broadly conjunctive, supramodal representations play an equally important role in concept association and situation knowledge.

Twenty years of load theory—Where are we now, and where should we go next?

Abstract: Selective attention allows us to ignore what is task-irrelevant and focus on what is task-relevant. The cognitive and neural mechanisms that underlie this process are key topics of investigation in cognitive psychology. One of the more prominent theories of attention is perceptual load theory, which suggests that the efficiency of selective attention is dependent on both perceptual and cognitive load. It is now more than 20 years since the proposal of load theory, and it is a good time to evaluate the evidence in support of this influential model. The present article supplements and extends previous reviews (Lavie, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 9, 75-82. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2004.12.004 , 2005, Current Directions in Psychological Science, 19, 143-148. doi: 10.1177/0963721410370295 , 2010) by examining more recent research in what appears to be a rapidly expanding area. The article comprises five parts, examining (1) evidence for the effects of perceptual load on attention, (2) cognitive load, (3) individual differences under load, (4) alternative theories and criticisms, and (5) the future of load theory. We argue that the key next step for load theory will be the application of the model to real-world tasks. The potential benefits of applied attention research are numerous, and there is tentative evidence that applied research would provide strong support for the theory itself, as well as real-world benefits related to activities in which attention is crucial, such as driving and education.

The poverty of embodied cognition

Abstract: In recent years, there has been rapidly growing interest in embodied cognition, a multifaceted theoretical proposition that (1) cognitive processes are influenced by the body, (2) cognition exists in the service of action, (3) cognition is situated in the environment, and (4) cognition may occur without internal representations. Many proponents view embodied cognition as the next great paradigm shift for cognitive science. In this article, we critically examine the core ideas from embodied cognition, taking a "thought exercise" approach. We first note that the basic principles from embodiment theory are either unacceptably vague (e.g., the premise that perception is influenced by the body) or they offer nothing new (e.g., cognition evolved to optimize survival, emotions affect cognition, perception-action couplings are important). We next suggest that, for the vast majority of classic findings in cognitive science, embodied cognition offers no scientifically valuable insight. In most cases, the theory has no logical connections to the phenomena, other than some trivially true ideas. Beyond classic laboratory findings, embodiment theory is also unable to adequately address the basic experiences of cognitive life.

Is neuroimaging measuring information in the brain

Abstract: Psychology moved beyond the stimulus response mapping of behaviorism by adopting an information processing framework. This shift from behavioral to cognitive science was partly inspired by work demonstrating that the concept of information could be defined and quantified (Shannon, 1948). This transition developed further from cognitive science into cognitive neuroscience, in an attempt to measure information in the brain. In the cognitive neurosciences, however, the term information is often used without a clear definition. This paper will argue that, if the formulation proposed by Shannon is applied to modern neuroimaging, then numerous results would be interpreted differently. More specifically, we argue that much modern cognitive neuroscience implicitly focuses on the question of how we can interpret the activations we record in the brain (experimenter-as-receiver), rather than on the core question of how the rest of the brain can interpret those activations (cortex-as-receiver). A clearer focus on whether activations recorded via neuroimaging can actually act as information in the brain would not only change how findings are interpreted but should also change the direction of empirical research in cognitive neuroscience.

Media multitasking and memory: Differences in working memory and long-term memory

Abstract: Increasing access to media in the 21st century has led to a rapid rise in the prevalence of media multitasking (simultaneous use of multiple media streams). Such behavior is associated with various cognitive differences, such as difficulty filtering distracting information and increased trait impulsivity. Given the rise in media multitasking by children, adolescents, and adults, a full understanding of the cognitive profile of media multitaskers is imperative. Here we investigated the relationship between chronic media multitasking and working memory (WM) and long-term memory (LTM) performance. Four key findings are reported (1) heavy media multitaskers (HMMs) exhibited lower WM performance, regardless of whether external distraction was present or absent; (2) lower performance on multiple WM tasks predicted lower LTM performance; (3) media multitasking-related differences in memory reflected differences in discriminability rather than decision bias; and (4) attentional impulsivity correlated with media multitasking behavior and reduced WM performance. These findings suggest that chronic media multitasking is associated with a wider attentional scope/higher attentional impulsivity, which may allow goal-irrelevant information to compete with goal-relevant information. As a consequence, heavy media multitaskers are able to hold fewer or less precise goal-relevant representations in WM. HMMs’ wider attentional scope, combined with their diminished WM performance, propagates forward to yield lower LTM performance. As such, chronic media multitasking is associated with a reduced ability to draw on the past—be it very recent or more remote—to inform present behavior.

Media multitasking in adolescence.

Abstract: Media use has been on the rise in adolescents overall, and in particular, the amount of media multitasking-multiple media consumed simultaneously, such as having a text message conversation while watching TV-has been increasing. In adults, heavy media multitasking has been linked with poorer performance on a number of laboratory measures of cognition, but no relationship has yet been established between media-multitasking behavior and real-world outcomes. Examining individual differences across a group of adolescents, we found that more frequent media multitasking in daily life was associated with poorer performance on statewide standardized achievement tests of math and English in the classroom, poorer performance on behavioral measures of executive function (working memory capacity) in the laboratory, and traits of greater impulsivity and lesser growth mindset. Greater media multitasking had a relatively circumscribed set of associations, and was not related to behavioral measures of cognitive processing speed, implicit learning, or manual dexterity, or to traits of grit and conscientiousness. Thus, individual differences in adolescent media multitasking were related to specific differences in executive function and in performance on real-world academic achievement measures: More media multitasking was associated with poorer executive function ability, worse academic achievement, and a reduced growth mindset.

Three symbol ungrounding problems: Abstract concepts and the future of embodied cognition.

Abstract: A great deal of research has focused on the question of whether or not concepts are embodied as a rule. Supporters of embodiment have pointed to studies that implicate affective and sensorimotor systems in cognitive tasks, while critics of embodiment have offered nonembodied explanations of these results and pointed to studies that implicate amodal systems. Abstract concepts have tended to be viewed as an important test case in this polemical debate. This essay argues that we need to move beyond a pretheoretical notion of abstraction. Against the background of current research and theory, abstract concepts do not pose a single, unified problem for embodied cognition but, instead, three distinct problems: the problem of generalization, the problem of flexibility, and the problem of disembodiment. Identifying these problems provides a conceptual framework for critically evaluating, and perhaps improving upon, recent theoretical proposals.

Rhythmic entrainment: Why humans want to, fireflies can’t help it, pet birds try, and sea lions have to be bribed

Abstract: Until recently, the literature on rhythmic ability took for granted that only humans are able to synchronize body movements to an external beat-to entrain. This assumption has been undercut by findings of beat-matching in various species of parrots and, more recently, in a sea lion, several species of primates, and possibly horses. This throws open the question of how widespread beat-matching ability is in the animal kingdom. Here we reassess the arguments and evidence for an absence of beat-matching in animals, and conclude that in fact no convincing case against beat-matching in animals has been made. Instead, such evidence as there is suggests that this capacity could be quite widespread. Furthermore, mutual entrainment of oscillations is a general principle of physical systems, both biological and nonbiological, suggesting that entrainment of motor systems by sensory systems may be a default rather than an oddity. The question then becomes, not why a few privileged species are able to beat-match, but why species do not always do so-why they vary in both spontaneous and learned beat-matching. We propose that when entrainment is not driven by fixed, mandatory connections between input and output (as in the case of, e.g., fireflies entraining to each others' flashes), it depends on voluntary control over, and voluntary or learned coupling of, sensory and motor systems, which can paradoxically lead to apparent failures of entrainment. Among the factors that affect whether an animal will entrain are sufficient control over the motor behavior to be entrained, sufficient perceptual sophistication to extract the entraining beat from the overall sensory environment, and the current cognitive state of the animal, including attention and motivation. The extent of entrainment in the animal kingdom potentially has widespread implications, not only for understanding the roots of human dance, but also for understanding the neural and cognitive architectures of animals.

Model comparison in ANOVA

Abstract: Analysis of variance (ANOVA), the workhorse analysis of experimental designs, consists of F-tests of main effects and interactions. Yet, testing, including traditional ANOVA, has been recently critiqued on a number of theoretical and practical grounds. In light of these critiques, model comparison and model selection serve as an attractive alternative. Model comparison differs from testing in that one can support a null or nested model vis-a-vis a more general alternative by penalizing more flexible models. We argue this ability to support more simple models allows for more nuanced theoretical conclusions than provided by traditional ANOVA F-tests. We provide a model comparison strategy and show how ANOVA models may be reparameterized to better address substantive questions in data analysis.

Time discounting and time preference in animals: A critical review

Abstract: Animals are an important model for studies of impulsivity and self-control. Many studies have made use of the intertemporal choice task, which pits small rewards available sooner against larger rewards available later (typically several seconds), repeated over many trials. Preference for the sooner reward is often taken to indicate impulsivity and/or a failure of self-control. This review shows that very little evidence supports this assumption; on the contrary, ostensible discounting behavior may reflect a boundedly rational but not necessarily impulsive reward-maximizing strategy. Specifically, animals may discount weakly, or even adopt a long-term rate-maximizing strategy, but fail to fully incorporate postreward delays into their choices. This failure may reflect learning biases. Consequently, tasks that measure animal discounting may greatly overestimate the true discounting and may be confounded by processes unrelated to time preferences. If so, animals may be much more patient than is widely believed; human and animal intertemporal choices may reflect unrelated mental operations; and the shared hyperbolic shape of the human and animal discount curves, which is used to justify cross-species comparisons, may be coincidental. The discussion concludes with a consideration of alternative ways to measure self-control in animals.

On the relation between motivation and retention in educational contexts: The role of intentional and unintentional mind wandering.

Abstract: Highly motivated students often exhibit better academic performance than less motivated students. However, to date, the specific cognitive mechanisms through which motivation increases academic achievement are not well understood. Here we explored the possibility that mind wandering mediates the relation between motivation and academic performance, and additionally, we examined possible mediation by both intentional and unintentional forms of mind wandering. We found that participants reporting higher motivation to learn in a lecture-based setting tended to engage in less mind wandering, and that this decrease in mind wandering was in turn associated with greater retention of the lecture material. Critically, we also found that the influence of motivation on retention was mediated by both intentional and unintentional types of mind wandering. Not only do the present results advance our theoretical understanding of the mechanisms underlying the relation between motivation and academic achievement, they also provide insights into possible methods of intervention that may be useful in improving student retention in educational settings.

Metaphor: Bridging embodiment to abstraction

Abstract: Embodied cognition accounts posit that concepts are grounded in our sensory and motor systems An important challenge for these accounts is explaining how abstract concepts, which do not directly call upon sensory or motor information, can be informed by experience We propose that metaphor is one important vehicle guiding the development and use of abstract concepts Metaphors allow us to draw on concrete, familiar domains to acquire and reason about abstract concepts Additionally, repeated metaphoric use drawing on particular aspects of concrete experience can result in the development of new abstract representations These abstractions, which are derived from embodied experience but lack much of the sensorimotor information associated with it, can then be flexibly applied to understand new situations

There is no convincing evidence that working memory training is NOT effective: A reply to Melby-Lervåg and Hulme (2015).

Abstract: Our recent meta-analysis concluded that training on working memory can improve performance on tests of fluid intelligence (Au et al., Psychon Bull Rev, 22(2), 366-377, 2015). Melby-Lervag and Hulme (Psychon Bull Rev, doi: 10.3758/s13423-015-0862-z ) challenge this conclusion on the grounds that it did not take into consideration baseline differences on a by-study level and that the effects were primarily driven by purportedly less rigorous studies that did not include active control groups. Their re-analysis shows that accounting for baseline differences produces a statistically significant, but considerably smaller, overall effect size (g = 0.13 vs g = 0.24 in Au et al.), which loses significance after excluding studies without active controls. The present report demonstrates that evidence of impact variation by the active/passive nature of control groups is ambiguous and also reveals important discrepancies between Melby-Lervag and Hulme's analysis and our original meta-analysis in terms of the coding and organization of data that account for the discrepant effect sizes. We demonstrate that there is in fact no evidence that the type of control group per se moderates the effects of working memory training on measures of fluid intelligence and reaffirm the original conclusions in Au et al., which are robust to multiple methods of calculating effect size, including the one proposed by Melby-Lervag and Hulme.

Mobile technology habits: patterns of association among device usage, intertemporal preference, impulse control, and reward sensitivity

Abstract: Mobile electronic devices are playing an increasingly pervasive role in our daily activities. Yet, there has been very little empirical research investigating how mobile technology habits might relate to individual differences in cognition and affect. The research presented in this paper provides evidence that heavier investment in mobile devices is correlated with a relatively weaker tendency to delay gratification (as measured by a delay discounting task) and a greater inclination toward impulsive behavior (i.e., weaker impulse control, assessed behaviorally and through self-report) but is not related to individual differences in sensitivity to reward. Analyses further demonstrated that individual variation in impulse control mediates the relationship between mobile technology usage and delay of gratification. Although based on correlational results, these findings lend some backing to concerns that increased use of portable electronic devices could have negative impacts on impulse control and the ability to appropriately valuate delayed rewards.

Reevaluating the effectiveness of n-back training on transfer through the Bayesian lens: Support for the null

Abstract: A recent meta-analysis by Au et al. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 22, 366-377, (2015) reviewed the n-back training paradigm for working memory (WM) and evaluated whether (when aggregating across existing studies) there was evidence that gains obtained for training tasks transferred to gains in fluid intelligence (Gf). Their results revealed an overall effect size of g = 0.24 for the effect of n-back training on Gf. We reexamine the data through a Bayesian lens, to evaluate the relative strength of the evidence for the alternative versus null hypotheses, contingent on the type of control condition used. We find that studies using a noncontact (passive) control group strongly favor the alternative hypothesis that training leads to transfer but that studies using active-control groups show modest evidence in favor of the null. We discuss these findings in the context of placebo effects.

The principals of meaning: Extracting semantic dimensions from co-occurrence models of semantics

Abstract: Notable progress has been made recently on computational models of semantics using vector representations for word meaning (Mikolov, Chen, Corrado, & Dean, 2013; Mikolov, Sutskever, Chen, Corrado, & Dean, 2013). As representations of meaning, recent models presumably hone in on plausible organizational principles for meaning. We performed an analysis on the organization of the skip-gram model's semantic space. Consistent with human performance (Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957), the skip-gram model primarily relies on affective distinctions to organize meaning. We showed that the skip-gram model accounts for unique variance in behavioral measures of lexical access above and beyond that accounted for by affective and lexical measures. We also raised the possibility that word frequency predicts behavioral measures of lexical access due to the fact that word use is organized by semantics. Deconstruction of the semantic representations in semantic models has the potential to reveal organizing principles of human semantics.

Narrative theory and the dynamics of popular movies

Abstract: Popular movies grab and hold our attention. One reason for this is that storytelling is culturally important to us, but another is that general narrative formulae have been honed over millennia and that a derived but specific filmic form has developed and has been perfected over the last century. The result is a highly effective format that allows rapid processing of complex narratives. Using a corpus analysis I explore a physical narratology of popular movies-narrational structure and how it impacts us-to promote a theory of popular movie form. I show that movies can be divided into 4 acts-setup, complication, development, and climax-with two optional subunits of prolog and epilog, and a few turning points and plot points. In 12 studies I show that normative aspects in patterns of shot durations, shot transitions, shot scale, shot motion, shot luminance, character introduction, and distributions of conversations, music, action shots, and scene transitions reduce to 5 correlated stylistic dimensions of movies and can litigate among theories of movie structure. In general, movie narratives have roughly the same structure as narratives in any other domain-plays, novels, manga, folktales, even oral histories-but with particular runtime constraints, cadences, and constructions that are unique to the medium.

Consolidating behavioral and neurophysiologic findings to explain the influence of contextual interference during motor sequence learning.

Abstract: Motor sequence learning under high levels of contextual interference (CI) disrupts initial performance but supports delayed test and transfer performance when compared to learning under low CI. Integrating findings from early behavioral work and more recent experimental efforts that incorporated neurophysiologic measures led to a novel account of the role of CI during motor sequence learning. This account focuses on important contributions from two neural regions—the dorsal premotor area and the SMA complex—that are recruited earlier and more extensively during the planning of a motor sequence in a high CI context. It is proposed that activation of these regions is critical to early adaptation of sequence structure amenable to long-term storage. Moreover, greater CI enhances access to newly acquired motor sequence knowledge through (1) the emergence of temporary functional connectivity between neural sites previously described as crucial to successful long-term performance of sequential behaviors, and (2) heightened excitability of M1—a key constituent of the temporary coupled neural circuits, and the primary candidate for storage of motor memory

Arguments about the nature of concepts: Symbols, embodiment, and beyond

Abstract: How are the meanings of words, events, and objects represented and organized in the brain? This question, perhaps more than any other in the field, probes some of the deepest and most foundational puzzles regarding the structure of the mind and brain. Accordingly, it has spawned a field of inquiry that is diverse and multidisciplinary, has led to the discovery of numerous empirical phenomena, and has spurred the development of a wide range of theoretical positions. This special issue brings together the most recent theoretical developments from the leaders in the field, representing a range of viewpoints on issues of fundamental significance to a theory of meaning representation. Here we introduce the special issue by way of pulling out some key themes that cut across the contributions that form this issue and situating those themes in the broader literature. The core issues around which research on conceptual representation can be organized are representational format, representational content, the organization of concepts in the brain, and the processing dynamics that govern interactions between the conceptual system and sensorimotor representations. We highlight areas in which consensus has formed; for those areas in which opinion is divided, we seek to clarify the relation of theory and evidence and to set in relief the bridging assumptions that undergird current discussions.

The influence of contextual diversity on word learning

Abstract: In a series of analyses over mega datasets, Jones, Johns, and Recchia (Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology, 66(2), 115-124, 2012) and Johns et al. (Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, 132:2, EL74-EL80, 2012) found that a measure of contextual diversity that takes into account the semantic variability of a word's contexts provided a better fit to both visual and spoken word recognition data than traditional measures, such as word frequency or raw context counts. This measure was empirically validated with an artificial language experiment (Jones et al.). The present study extends the empirical results with a unique natural language learning paradigm, which allows for an examination of the semantic representations that are acquired as semantic diversity is varied. Subjects were incidentally exposed to novel words as they rated short selections from articles, books, and newspapers. When novel words were encountered across distinct discourse contexts, subjects were both faster and more accurate at recognizing them than when they were seen in redundant contexts. However, learning across redundant contexts promoted the development of more stable semantic representations. These findings are predicted by a distributional learning model trained on the same materials as our subjects.

Absolutely relative or relatively absolute: violations of value invariance in human decision making

Abstract: Making decisions based on relative rather than absolute information processing is tied to choice optimality via the accumulation of evidence differences and to canonical neural processing via accumulation of evidence ratios These theoretical frameworks predict invariance of decision latencies to absolute intensities that maintain differences and ratios, respectively While information about the absolute values of the choice alternatives is not necessary for choosing the best alternative, it may nevertheless hold valuable information about the context of the decision To test the sensitivity of human decision making to absolute values, we manipulated the intensities of brightness stimuli pairs while preserving either their differences or their ratios Although asked to choose the brighter alternative relative to the other, participants responded faster to higher absolute values Thus, our results provide empirical evidence for human sensitivity to task irrelevant absolute values indicating a hard-wired mechanism that precedes executive control Computational investigations of several modelling architectures reveal two alternative accounts for this phenomenon, which combine absolute and relative processing One account involves accumulation of differences with activation dependent processing noise and the other emerges from accumulation of absolute values subject to the temporal dynamics of lateral inhibition The potential adaptive role of such choice mechanisms is discussed