Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

A positive temperature coefficient is the term which has been used to indicate that an increase in solubility occurs as the temperature is raised, whereas a negative coefficient indicates a decrease in solubility with rise in temperature.

Effect of Temperature

In this chapter, you will see how the simplex method simplifies when it is applied to a class of optimization problems that are known as “network flow models.” You will also see that if a network flow model has “integer-valued data,” the simplex method finds an optimal solution that is integer-valued.

Flows in Networks

Transportation research. part c, emerging technologies

Stephen J. Hartley Oxford University Press, New York, 1998, 260 pp. ISBN 0-19-511315-2, $45.00 Concurrent Programming  is a thorough treatment of Java multi-threaded programming for both a stand-alone and distributed environment. Designed mostly for students in concurrent or parallel programming classes, the text is also an excellent reference for the practicing professional developing multi-threaded programs or applets. Hartley first provides a complete explanation of the features of Java necessary to write concurrent programs, including topics such as exception handling, interfaces, and packages. He then gives the reader a solid background to write multi-threaded programs and also presents the problems introduced when writing concurrent programs—namely race conditions, mutual exclusion, and deadlock. Hartley also provides several software solutions that do not require the use of common process and thread mechanisms. Once the groundwork is laid for writing concurrent programs, Hartley then takes a different approach than most Java references. Rather than presenting how Java handles mutual exclusion with the  synchronized  keyword (although it is covered later), he first looks at semaphore-based solutions to classic concurrent problems such as bounded-buffer, readers-writers, and the dining philosophers. Hartley also uses the same approach to develop Java classes for monitors and message passing. This unique approach to introducing concurrency allows the readers to both understand how Java threads are synchronized and how the basic synchronization mechanism can be used to construct more abstract tools such as semaphores. If there is a shortcoming with the text it is with the lack of sufficient coverage of remote method invocation (RMI), although there is a section covering RMI. This is quite understandable as RMI is a fairly recent phenomenon with the Java community. Also, the classes that Hartley provides could easily implement RMI rather than sockets to handle communication. The strengths of the book include its ease in reading, several examples at the end of chapters, a package similar to Xtango that provides algorithm animation, and a supportive web site by the author (see  www.mcs.drexel.edu/~shartley/ConcProgJava/index.html ) including compressed source code. As Java becomes more dominant on the server side of multi-tier applications, writing thread-safe concurrent applications becomes even more important.  Concurrent Programming  is a strong step towards teaching students and professionals such skills. Greg Gagne, Westminster College of Salt Lake City Salt Lake City, Utah

Distributed Computing: Fundamentals, Simulations and Advanced Topics

We study probabilistic single-item second-price auctions where the item is characterized by a set of attributes. The auctioneer knows the actual instantiation of all the attributes, but he may choose to reveal only a subset of these attributes to the bidders. Our model is an abstraction of the following Ad auction scenario. The website (auctioneer) knows the demographic information of its impressions, and this information is in terms of a list of attributes (e.g., age, gender, country of location). The website may hide certain attributes from its advertisers (bidders) in order to create thicker market, which may lead to higher revenue. We study how to hide attributes in an optimal way. We show that it is NP-hard to solve for the optimal attribute hiding scheme. We then derive a polynomial-time solvable upper bound on the optimal revenue. Finally, we propose two heuristic-based attribute hiding schemes. Experiments show that revenue achieved by these schemes is close to the upper bound.

Revenue Maximization via Hiding Item Attributes

In an $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium, a player can gain at most $\epsilon$ by unilaterally changing his behaviour. For two-player (bimatrix) games with payoffs in $[0,1]$, the best-known$\epsilon$ achievable in polynomial time is 0.3393. In general, for $n$-player games an $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time for an $\epsilon$ that is an increasing function of $n$ but does not depend on the number of strategies of the players. For three-player and four-player games the corresponding values of $\epsilon$ are 0.6022 and 0.7153, respectively. Polymatrix games are a restriction of general $n$-player games where a player's payoff is the sum of payoffs from a number of bimatrix games. There exists a very small but constant $\epsilon$ such that computing an $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium of a polymatrix game is \PPAD-hard. Our main result is that a $(0.5+\delta)$-Nash equilibrium of an $n$-player polymatrix game can be computed in time polynomial in the input size and $\frac{1}{\delta}$. Inspired by the algorithm of Tsaknakis and Spirakis, our algorithm uses gradient descent on the maximum regret of the players. We also show that this algorithm can be applied to efficiently find a $(0.5+\delta)$-Nash equilibrium in a two-player Bayesian game.

Computing Approximate Nash Equilibria in Polymatrix Games

We study heterogeneous k -facility location games on a real line segment. In this model there are k facilities to be placed on a line segment where each facility serves a different purpose. Thus, the preferences of the agents over the facilities can vary arbitrarily. Our goal is to design strategy proof mechanisms that locate the facilities in a way to maximize the minimum utility among the agents. For $k=1$, if the agents' locations are known, we prove that the mechanism that locates the facility on an optimal location is strategy proof. For $k \geq 2$, we prove that there is no optimal strategy proof mechanism, deterministic or randomized, even when $k=2$ and there are only two agents with known locations. We derive inapproximability bounds for deterministic and randomized strategy proof mechanisms. Finally, we provide strategy proof mechanisms that achieve constant approximation. All of our mechanisms are simple and communication efficient. As a byproduct we show that some of our mechanisms can be used to achieve constant factor approximations for other objectives as the social welfare and the happiness.

Heterogeneous Facility Location Games

We present a new, distributed method to compute approximate Nash equilibria in bimatrix games. In contrast to previous approaches that analyze the two payoff matrices at the same time (for example, by solving a single LP that combines the two players payoffs), our algorithm first solves two independent LPs, each of which is derived from one of the two payoff matrices, and then compute approximate Nash equilibria using only limited communication between the players. 
Our method has several applications for improved bounds for efficient computations of approximate Nash equilibria in bimatrix games. First, it yields a best polynomial-time algorithm for computing \emph{approximate well-supported Nash equilibria (WSNE)}, which guarantees to find a 0.6528-WSNE in polynomial time. Furthermore, since our algorithm solves the two LPs separately, it can be used to improve upon the best known algorithms in the limited communication setting: the algorithm can be implemented to obtain a randomized expected-polynomial-time algorithm that uses poly-logarithmic communication and finds a 0.6528-WSNE. The algorithm can also be carried out to beat the best known bound in the query complexity setting, requiring $O(n \log n)$ payoff queries to compute a 0.6528-WSNE. Finally, our approach can also be adapted to provide the best known communication efficient algorithm for computing \emph{approximate Nash equilibria}: it uses poly-logarithmic communication to find a 0.382-approximate Nash equilibrium.

/pdf/distributed-methods-for-computing-approximate-equilibria-1bv5h6hqkh.pdf

Argyrios Deligkas

Papers

Revenue Maximization via Hiding Item Attributes

Computing Approximate Nash Equilibria in Polymatrix Games

Heterogeneous Facility Location Games

Distributed Methods for Computing Approximate Equilibria

Computing exact solutions of consensus halving and the Borsuk-Ulam theorem