Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

Coordinated supply chain management

https://epublications.marquette.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1270&context=mgmt_fac

Qualitative case studies in operations management: Trends, research outcomes, and future research implications

Supply chain integration and performance: The effects of long-term relationships, information technology and sharing, and logistics integration

Supply chain coordination: Perspectives, empirical studies and research directions

In organisations, dealing with projects, multiple projects are run simultaneously sharing a common pool of resources. The resources in such a multi-project environment are generally transferred between the projects, consuming significant amounts of both time and cost. In most of the existing models for multi-project planning and scheduling, however, these transfers are implicitly assumed to occur instantaneously with no extra cost. This assumption of instantaneous resource transfers, in most of the practical situations, is not valid and thus may lead to unrealistic schedules. This article is aimed at modelling of these transfers of resources in multi-project scheduling. A generalised model for inter-project resource transfers is presented and an integer linear program is proposed for minimising the penalty/reward for tardy/early projects, and the cost of idleness and transfer of the resources. A heuristic procedure is also developed and computational results are reported.

Scheduling of multiple projects with resource transfers

A network flow procedure for project crashing with penalty nodes

The manufacturing function in most companies represents the bulk of its assets and the majority of its people. A healthy manufacturing function gives the company the strength to withstand competitive pressures. It gives the endurance to maintain a steady improvement in competitive performance, and also provides the operational suppleness to respond to increasingly volatile markets and competition. In this paper, flexibility and quality are examined as two major strategic aspects of manufacturing that affect the cost and the delivery performance of its output(s). The issues related to these have been identified and surveyed in Indian industries in the context of increasing challenges due to globalisation and enhanced competition.

Aspects of flexibility and quality in Indian manufacturing management practices: a survey

This article proposes a methodology for supply chain planning in small and medium enterprises (SMEs). The proposed framework integrates the use of selected well-proven techniques such as quality function deployment (QFD), interpretive structural modeling (ISM), analytic network process (ANP), and zero one goal programming (ZOGP) to incorporate conflicting supply chain objectives and interrelationships among various critical success factors to identify business requirements that enable supply chain planning in SMEs. The use of an integrated approach can benefit : a) QFD can help SMEs to opt for planning and translating business needs (internal or external) into measurable supply chain technical requirements. (2) ISM offers an opportunity to establish interrelationships between business needs and supply chain requirements. (3) The direct utility of ISM results in real-life decision making is complex. Complementary use of ISM and ANP improves the utility of findings. (4) ZOGP methodology incorporates goals s...

A Decision Framework for Supply Chain Planning in SMEs: A QFD-ISM-enabled ANP-GP Approach

The purpose of this paper is to describe the usefulness of Six Sigma model in services and education, in particular. This paper aims to explore the benefits and implementation challenges of Six Sigma for a case of educational services. Interactive sessions and unstructured interviews with academic experts and top management were considered as the source of inputs. The present work prioritises the barriers or challenges to Six Sigma implementation in education using Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP). Further, this paper suggests the remedial actions to prioritised challenges, based on Alderfer's motivation model. The paper delivers tentative Define-Measure-Analysis-Improve-Control (DMAIC) measures for educational services. Services are more subjective compared to manufacturing, and gaps always exist in sensation and perceptions of various entities. Sometimes, this demands motivation-based behavioural changes in the attitude of associated people. This paper develops a conceptual model, suggesting remedies to the behavioural aspects when Six Sigma is applied to educational services. The novelty of this work lies in addressing various Six Sigma implementation issues, in the context of education, from operational as well as behavioural viewpoint. The paper concludes by highlighting the benefits of Six Sigma approach in services like education.

Arun Kanda

Papers

Scheduling of multiple projects with resource transfers

A network flow procedure for project crashing with penalty nodes

Aspects of flexibility and quality in Indian manufacturing management practices: a survey

A Decision Framework for Supply Chain Planning in SMEs: A QFD-ISM-enabled ANP-GP Approach

Implementing Six Sigma in service sector using AHP and Alderfer's motivational model - a case of educational services