Data Mining Practical Machine Learning Tools and Techniques

1. Introduction. Control System Design Steps. Adaptive Control. A Brief History. 2. Models for Dynamic Systems. Introduction. State-Space Models. Input/Output Models. Plant Parametric Models. Problems. 3. Stability. Introduction. Preliminaries. Input/Output Stability. Lyapunov Stability. Positive Real Functions and Stability. Stability of LTI Feedback System. Problems. 4. On-Line Parameter Estimation. Introduction. Simple Examples. Adaptive Laws with Normalization. Adaptive Laws with Projection. Bilinear Parametric Model. Hybrid Adaptive Laws. Summary of Adaptive Laws. Parameter Convergence Proofs. Problems. 5. Parameter Identifiers and Adaptive Observers. Introduction. Parameter Identifiers. Adaptive Observers. Adaptive Observer with Auxiliary Input. Adaptive Observers for Nonminimal Plant Models. Parameter Convergence Proofs. Problems. 6. Model Reference Adaptive Control. Introduction. Simple Direct MRAC Schemes. MRC for SISO Plants. Direct MRAC with Unnormalized Adaptive Laws. Direct MRAC with Normalized Adaptive Laws. Indirect MRAC. Relaxation of Assumptions in MRAC. Stability Proofs in MRAC Schemes. Problems. 7. Adaptive Pole Placement Control. Introduction. Simple APPC Schemes. PPC: Known Plant Parameters. Indirect APPC Schemes. Hybrid APPC Schemes. Stabilizability Issues and Modified APPC. Stability Proofs. Problems. 8. Robust Adaptive Laws. Introduction. Plant Uncertainties and Robust Control. Instability Phenomena in Adaptive Systems. Modifications for Robustness: Simple Examples. Robust Adaptive Laws. Summary of Robust Adaptive Laws. Problems. 9. Robust Adaptive Control Schemes. Introduction. Robust Identifiers and Adaptive Observers. Robust MRAC. Performance Improvement of MRAC. Robust APPC Schemes. Adaptive Control of LTV Plants. Adaptive Control for Multivariable Plants. Stability Proofs of Robust MRAC Schemes. Stability Proofs of Robust APPC Schemes. Problems. Appendices. Swapping Lemmas. Optimization Techniques. Bibliography. Index. License Agreement and Limited Warranty.

Robust adaptive control

From the Publisher: 
The accessible presentation of this book gives both a general view of the entire computer vision enterprise and also offers sufficient detail to be able to build useful applications. Users learn techniques that have proven to be useful by first-hand experience and a wide range of mathematical methods. A CD-ROM with every copy of the text contains source code for programming practice, color images, and illustrative movies. Comprehensive and up-to-date, this book includes essential topics that either reflect practical significance or are of theoretical importance. Topics are discussed in substantial and increasing depth. Application surveys describe numerous important application areas such as image based rendering and digital libraries. Many important algorithms broken down and illustrated in pseudo code. Appropriate for use by engineers as a comprehensive reference to the computer vision enterprise.

Computer vision : a modern approach = 计算机视觉 : 一种现代的方法

Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

In the last years, wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have gained increasing attention from both the research community and actual users. As sensor nodes are generally battery-powered devices, the critical aspects to face concern how to reduce the energy consumption of nodes, so that the network lifetime can be extended to reasonable times. In this paper we first break down the energy consumption for the components of a typical sensor node, and discuss the main directions to energy conservation in WSNs. Then, we present a systematic and comprehensive taxonomy of the energy conservation schemes, which are subsequently discussed in depth. Special attention has been devoted to promising solutions which have not yet obtained a wide attention in the literature, such as techniques for energy efficient data acquisition. Finally we conclude the paper with insights for research directions about energy conservation in WSNs.

/pdf/energy-conservation-in-wireless-sensor-networks-a-survey-1bl7d2obnm.pdf

Energy conservation in wireless sensor networks: A survey

http://www.eecs.northwestern.edu/~peters/references/LocalizationTechniquesMaoAustralia.pdf

Wireless sensor network localization techniques

Preface Acknowledgements List of acronyms 1. Introduction 2. Parametric models 3. Parameter identification: continuous time 4. Parameter identification: discrete time 5. Continuous-time model reference adaptive control 6. Continuous-time adaptive pole placement control 7. Adaptive control for discrete-time systems 8. Adaptive control of nonlinear systems Appendix Bibliography Index.

Adaptive control tutorial

This article sets out the rudiments of a theory for analyzing and creating architectures appropriate to the control of formations of autonomous vehicles. The theory rests on ideas of rigid graph theory, some but not all of which are old. The theory, however, has some gaps in it, and their elimination would help in applications. Some of the gaps in the relevant graph theory are as follows. First, there is as yet no analogue for three-dimensional graphs of Laman's theorem, which provides a combinatorial criterion for rigidity in two-dimensional graphs. Second, for three-dimensional graphs there is no analogue of the two-dimensional Henneberg construction for growing or deconstructing minimally rigid graphs although there are conjectures. Third, global rigidity can easily be characterized for two-dimensional graphs, but not for three-dimensional graphs.

Rigid graph control architectures for autonomous formations

Optimality analysis of sensor-target localization geometries

https://openresearch-repository.anu.edu.au/bitstream/1885/30443/2/01_Mao_Path_Loss_Exponent_Estimation_2007.pdf

Baris Fidan

Papers

Wireless sensor network localization techniques

Adaptive control tutorial

Rigid graph control architectures for autonomous formations

Optimality analysis of sensor-target localization geometries

Path loss exponent estimation for wireless sensor network localization