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Benjamin Eva

Researcher at University of Konstanz

Publications -  27
Citations -  163

Benjamin Eva is an academic researcher from University of Konstanz. The author has contributed to research in topics: Topos theory & Argument. The author has an hindex of 5, co-authored 24 publications receiving 108 citations. Previous affiliations of Benjamin Eva include Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich & University of Bristol.

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Bayesian Argumentation and the Value of Logical Validity

TL;DR: A major generalization of extant Bayesian approaches to argumentation is presented that utilizes a new class of Bayesian learning methods that are better suited to modeling dynamic and conditional inferences than standard Bayesian conditionalization.
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Learning from Conditionals

TL;DR: It is argued that a core set of widely accepted Bayesian norms is sufficient to uniquely identify a single rational updating procedure for this kind of learning and justifies a privileged formalisation of the notion of `epistemic conservativity'.
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Principles of Indifference

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present an alternative rehabilitation of the principle of indifference in terms of the epistemology of comparative confidence judgements of the form ''I am more confident in the truth of p than I am in truth q'' or "I am equally confident in p and q''.
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Topos Theoretic Quantum Realism

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined the extent to which TQT can really be characterised as a realist formulation of the theory, and examined the question of whether the kind of realism that is provided by Topos Quantum Theory satisfies the philosophical motivations that are usually associated with the search for realist reformulation of quantum theory.
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Causal Explanatory Power

TL;DR: The authors introduce a probabilistic approach to measure the explanatory power that a given explanans exerts over a corresponding explanandum, which does not capture the way in which the causal explanatory power of a given explanatory power varies with background knowledge.