Showing papers in "The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science in 2016"
TL;DR: It is demonstrated that the Born rule is the uniquely rational way of apportioning credence in Everettian quantum mechanics, based on a single key principle: changes to the environment alone do not affect the probabilities one ought to assign to measurement outcomes in a local subsystem.
Abstract: A longstanding issue in attempts to understand the Everett (many-worlds) approach to quantum mechanics is the origin of the Born rule: why is the probability given by the square of the amplitude? Following Vaidman, we note that observers are in a position of self-locating uncertainty during the period between the branches of the wave function splitting via decoherence and the observer registering the outcome of the measurement. In this period, it is tempting to regard each branch as equiprobable, but we argue that the temptation should be resisted. Applying lessons from this analysis, we demonstrate (using methods similar to those of Zurek’s envariance-based derivation) that the Born rule is the uniquely rational way of apportioning credence in Everettian quantum mechanics. In doing so, we rely on a single key principle: changes to the environment alone do not affect the probabilities one ought to assign to measurement outcomes in a local subsystem. We arrive at a method for assigning probabilities in cases that involve both classical and quantum self-locating uncertainty. This method provides unique answers to quantum Sleeping Beauty problems, as well as a well-defined procedure for calculating probabilities in quantum cosmological multiverses with multiple similar observers.
95 citations
TL;DR: It turns out that this modified theoretical embedding of MM makes it impossible to produce empirical evidence for constitutive relations, so an additional criterion—the fat-handedness criterion—is suggested, which, when combined with MM, generates indirect empirical evidencefor constitutive relevance.
Abstract: The first part of this article argues that if Craver’s ([2007a], [2007b]) popular mutual manipulability account (MM) of mechanistic constitution is embedded within Woodward’s ([2003]) inter...
85 citations
TL;DR: The notion of symmetry is an epistemic notion twice over as mentioned in this paper, which is why symmetry is a guide to reality, but what is less well known is how to reason about reality from epistemic lemmas.
Abstract: Symmetriesinphysicsareaguidetoreality.Thatmuchiswellknown.Butwhatislesswell known is why symmetry is a guide to reality. What justifies inferences that draw conclusionsaboutrealityfrompremisesaboutsymmetries?Iarguethatansweringthisquestion reveals that symmetry is an epistemic notion twice over. First, these inferences must proceed via epistemic lemmas: premises about symmetries in the first instance justify epistemic lemmas about our powers of detection, and only from those epistemic lemmascanwedrawconclusionsaboutreality.Second,inordertojustifythoseepistemic lemmas, the notion of symmetry must be defined partly in epistemic terms.
80 citations
TL;DR: A unified, explanatory account of diversity in RAs is proposed, truer to actual cases of RA in science; moreover, this account affords a helpful new foothold on the logic undergirding RAs.
Abstract: When scientists seek further confirmation of their results, they often attempt to duplicate the results using diverse means. To the extent that they are successful in doing so, their result...
78 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the ontological nature of mechanistic explanations of constitutive mechanistic phenomena has been investigated, i.e. phenomena that are explained in a constitutive mechanism.
Abstract: The central aim of this article is to specify the ontological nature of constitutive mechanistic phenomena (that is, of phenomena that are explained in constitutive mechanistic explanations...
69 citations
TL;DR: This paper argued that the hole argument is based on a misleading use of the mathematical formalism of general relativity and that if one is attentive to mathematical practice, the Hole Argument is blocked.
Abstract: I argue that the Hole Argument is based on a misleading use of the mathematical formalism of general relativity. If one is attentive to mathematical practice, I will argue, the Hole Argument is blocked.
68 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the evolution of social behavior has been studied in the context of multilevel selection and kin selection. But the relation between which has long been a source of controversy.
Abstract: Kin selection and multilevel selection are alternative approaches for studying the evolution of social behaviour, the relation between which has long been a source of controversy. Many rec...
67 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors developed a big picture of the evolution of human cooperation, and contrast it to an alternative based on group selection, and the crucial claim is that hominin history has see...
Abstract: In this article I develop a big picture of the evolution of human cooperation, and contrast it to an alternative based on group selection. The crucial claim is that hominin history has see...
58 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors define well-being, health, and freedom as "many phenomena of interest to science whose definitions rely on a normative standard" and present empirically generalizations about them.
Abstract: Well–being, health and freedom are some of the many phenomena of interest to science whose definitions rely on a normative standard. Empirical generalizations about them thus present a spec...
52 citations
TL;DR: This article pointed out that those who comment on modern scientific institutions are often quick to praise institutional structures that leave scientists to their own devices, revealing an underlying presumption that "science should be left to its own devices".
Abstract: Those who comment on modern scientific institutions are often quick to praise institutional structures that leave scientists to their own devices. These comments reveal an underlying presumption th...
51 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors developed a model-based account of the standardization of physical measurement, taking the contemporary standardisation of time as its central case study, and used it to standardize the measurement system.
Abstract: This article develops a model-based account of the standardization of physical measurement, taking the contemporary standardization of time as its central case study. To standardize the me...
TL;DR: The philosophical motivation for a particular choice of axioms for a non-Archimedean probability theory and some philosophical objections that have been raised against infinitesimal probabilities in general are discussed.
Abstract: Non-Archimedean probability functions allow us to combine regularity with perfect additivity. We discuss the philosophical motivation for a particular choice of axioms for a non-Archimedean probability theory and answer some philosophical objections that have been raised against infinitesimal probabilities in general. 1 Introduction 2 The Limits of Classical Probability Theory 2.1 Classical probability functions 2.2 Limitations 2.3 Infinitesimals to the rescue? 3 NAP Theory 3.1 First four axioms of NAP 3.2 Continuity and conditional probability 3.3 The final axiom of NAP 3.4 Infinite sums 3.5 Definition of NAP functions via infinite sums 3.6 Relation to numerosity theory 4 Objections and Replies 4.1 Cantor and the Archimedean property 4.2 Ticket missing from an infinite lottery 4.3 Williamson’s infinite sequence of coin tosses 4.4 Point sets on a circle 4.5 Easwaran and Pruss 5 Dividends 5.1 Measure and utility 5.2 Regularity and uniformity 5.3 Credence and chance 5.4 Conditional probability 6 General Considerations 6.1 Non-uniqueness 6.2 Invariance Appendix 1 Introduction 2 The Limits of Classical Probability Theory 2.1 Classical probability functions 2.2 Limitations 2.3 Infinitesimals to the rescue? 2.1 Classical probability functions 2.2 Limitations 2.3 Infinitesimals to the rescue? 3 NAP Theory 3.1 First four axioms of NAP 3.2 Continuity and conditional probability 3.3 The final axiom of NAP 3.4 Infinite sums 3.5 Definition of NAP functions via infinite sums 3.6 Relation to numerosity theory 3.1 First four axioms of NAP 3.2 Continuity and conditional probability 3.3 The final axiom of NAP 3.4 Infinite sums 3.5 Definition of NAP functions via infinite sums 3.6 Relation to numerosity theory 4 Objections and Replies 4.1 Cantor and the Archimedean property 4.2 Ticket missing from an infinite lottery 4.3 Williamson’s infinite sequence of coin tosses 4.4 Point sets on a circle 4.5 Easwaran and Pruss 4.1 Cantor and the Archimedean property 4.2 Ticket missing from an infinite lottery 4.3 Williamson’s infinite sequence of coin tosses 4.4 Point sets on a circle 4.5 Easwaran and Pruss 5 Dividends 5.1 Measure and utility 5.2 Regularity and uniformity 5.3 Credence and chance 5.4 Conditional probability 5.1 Measure and utility 5.2 Regularity and uniformity 5.3 Credence and chance 5.4 Conditional probability 6 General Considerations 6.1 Non-uniqueness 6.2 Invariance 6.1 Non-uniqueness 6.2 Invariance Appendix
TL;DR: This work demonstrates that it is possible to individuate digits in non-representational computing mechanisms, and considers the implications that the non- representational individuation of digits would have for the broader theory of computing mechanisms.
Abstract: Shagrir ([2001]) and Sprevak ([2010]) explore the apparent necessity of representation for the individuation of digits (and processors) in computational systems.1 I will first offer a respo...
TL;DR: The interventionist account of causal explanation, in the version presented by Woodward ( [2003] ), has been recently claimed capable of buttressing the widely felt, though poorly understablished, causal explanation as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: The interventionist account of causal explanation, in the version presented by Woodward ( [2003] ), has been recently claimed capable of buttressing the widely felt, though poorly understo...
TL;DR: In this paper, the main candidates for a definition of climate and climate change are discussed, and five definitions are discussed: climate as distribution over time for constant external conditions, climate as distributions over time when the external conditions vary as in reality; climate as the ensemble distribution for constant and varying external conditions; and the third definition is novel and is introduced as a response to problems with existing definitions.
Abstract: The aim of the paper is to provide a clear and thorough conceptual analysis of the main candidates for a definition of climate and climate change. Five desiderata on a definition of climate are presented: it should be empirically applicable, it should correctly classify different climates, it should not depend on our knowledge, is should be applicable to the past, present and future and it should be mathematically well-defined. Then five definitions are discussed: climate as distribution over time for constant external conditions, climate as distribution over time when the external conditions vary as in reality, climate as distribution over time relative to regimes of varying external conditions, climate as the ensemble distribution for constant external conditions, and climate as the ensemble distribution when the external conditions vary as in reality. The third definition is novel and is introduced as a response to problems with existing definitions. The conclusion is that most definitions encounter serious problems and that the third definition is most promising.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors suggest that instead of trying to decide what the "right" topology is for all problems, one should let the details of particular types of problems guide the choice of an appropriate topology.
Abstract: Stephen Hawking, among others, has proposed that the topological stability of a property of spacetime is a necessary condition for it to be physically significant. What counts as stable, however, depends crucially on the choice of topology. Some physicists have thus suggested that one should find a canonical topology, a single “right” topology for every inquiry. While certain such choices might be initially motivated, some little-discussed examples of Geroch and some propositions of my own show that the main candidates—and each possible choice, to some extent—faces the horns of a no-go result. I suggest that instead of trying to decide what the “right” topology is for all problems, one should let the details of particular types of problems guide the choice of an appropriate topology.
TL;DR: This work shows how life-history theory clarifies the status of so-called diseases of old age and argues that the selected effect account of function deserves a more prominent place in the philosophy of medicine than it currently occupies.
Abstract: Some ‘naturalist’ accounts of disease employ a biostatistical account of dysfunction, whilst others use a ‘selected effect’ account. Several recent authors have argued that the biostatistic...
TL;DR: It is argued that the fine-grained causal relations that could constitute membership in a biological population are huge in number and many are manifested by degree, and thus population membership can be construe as being defined by massively multidimensional constructs, the differences between which are largely arbitrary.
Abstract: I defend a radical interpretation of biological populations—what I call population pluralism—which holds that there are many ways that a particular grouping of individuals can be related s...
TL;DR: We are moral apes, a difference between humans and our relatives that has received significant recent attention in the evolutionary literature as mentioned in this paper, and it has been identified as a major obstacle to human morality.
Abstract: We are moral apes, a difference between humans and our relatives that has received significant recent attention in the evolutionary literature. Evolutionary accounts of morality have often ...
TL;DR: Analysis of elaborated and systematized delusions emerging in the context of schizophrenia leads to a more complex view of the epistemic status of delusions than is found in the contemporary philosophical literature and has some implications for clinical practice.
Abstract: In this article I ask whether elaborated and systematized delusions emerging in the context of schizophrenia have the potential for epistemic innocence. Cognitions are epistemically innocent if they have significant epistemic benefits that could not be attained otherwise. In particular, I propose that a cognition is epistemically innocent if it delivers some significant epistemic benefit to a given agent at a given time, and if alternative cognitions delivering the same epistemic benefit are unavailable to that agent at that time. Elaborated and systematized delusions in schizophrenia are typically false and exemplify failures of rationality and self-knowledge. Empirical studies suggest that they may have psychological benefits by relieving anxiety and enhancing meaningfulness. Moreover, these delusions have been considered as adaptive in virtue of the fact that they enable automated learning to resume after a significant disruption caused by incorrect prediction-error signalling. I argue that such psychological benefits and adaptive features also have positive epistemic consequences. More precisely, delusions can be a means to restoring epistemic functionality in agents who are overwhelmed by hypersalient experiences in the prodromal stage of psychosis. The analysis leads to a more complex view of the epistemic status of delusions than is found in the contemporary philosophical literature and has some implications for clinical practice. 1 Introduction2 Types of Delusions3 What Is Wrong with Elaborated and Systematized Delusions?4 Finding Life Meaningful5 Learning Resumed6 Epistemic Innocence7 Epistemic Benefit8 No Alternatives9 Conclusions and Implications.
TL;DR: Well-defined causal models that underlie standard equations in evolutionary genetics are built, based on minimal and biologically plausible hypotheses about selection and reproduction, and generate statistics to predict evolutionary changes.
Abstract: The causal nature of evolution is one of the central topics in the philosophy of biology. It has been discussed whether equations used in evolutionary genetics point to some causal processes or are purely phenomenological patterns. To address this question the present paper builds well-defined causal models that underlie standard equations in evolutionary genetics. These models are based on minimal and biologically-plausible hypotheses about selection and reproduction, and generate statistics to predict evolutionary changes. The causal reconstruction of the evolutionary principles shows adaptive evolution as a genuine causal process, where fitness and selection are both causes of evolution.
TL;DR: It is argued that while there are elements of indirect representation in both Volterra's and Lotka’s modelling approaches, they are largely due to two other features of contemporary model construction processes that Weisberg does not explicitly consider: the methods-drivenness and outcome-orientedness of modelling.
Abstract: Is there something specific about modelling that distinguishes it from many other theoretical endeavours? We consider Michael Weisberg’s ([2007], [2013]) thesis that modelling is a form of ...
TL;DR: It is shown that a novel and exotic notion of becoming is compatible with causal sets, and while not answering to the typical A-theoretic demands, is global and objective.
Abstract: Unlike the relativity theory it seeks to replace, causal set theory has been interpreted to leave space for a substantive, though perhaps ‘localized’, form of ‘becoming’. The possibility of fundamental becoming is nourished by the fact that the analogue of Stein’s theorem from special relativity does not hold in causal set theory. Despite this, we find that in many ways, the debate concerning becoming parallels the well-rehearsed lines it follows in the domain of relativity. We present, however, some new twists and challenges. In particular, we show that a novel and exotic notion of becoming is compatible with causal sets. In contrast to the ‘localized’ becoming considered compatible with the dynamics of causal set theory by its advocates, our novel kind of becoming, while not answering to the typical A-theoretic demands, is ‘global’ and objective.
TL;DR: In this paper, a division of the literature on natural kinds into metaphysical worries, semantic worries, and methodological worries is proposed, and the latter set of worries concern how cl....
Abstract: I propose a division of the literature on natural kinds into metaphysical worries, semantic worries, and methodological worries. I argue that the latter set of worries, which concern how cl...
TL;DR: In this article, the Bohmian approach in terms of persisting particles that move on continuous trajectories following a deterministic law can be literally applied to QFT, by means of the Dirac sea model, exemplified in the electron sector of the standard model neglecting radiation.
Abstract: We show that the Bohmian approach in terms of persisting particles that move on continuous trajectories following a deterministic law can be literally applied to QFT. By means of the Dirac sea model – exemplified in the electron sector of the standard model neglecting radiation – we explain how starting from persisting particles, one is led to standard QFT employing creation and annihilation operators when tracking the dynamics with respect to a reference state, the so-called vacuum. Since on the level of wave functions, both formalisms are mathematically equivalent, this proposal provides for an ontology of QFT that includes a dynamics of individual processes, solves the measurement problem and explains the appearance of creation and annihilation events.
TL;DR: An analysis of the strategies deployed in experimental research supports the conclusion that while results from validated surrogate models are treated as a legitimate line of evidence supporting claims about target systems, the overall structure of research projects also demonstrates that extrapolative inferences are not considered definitive or sufficient evidence, but only partially justified hypotheses subjected to further testing.
Abstract: Both clinical research and basic science rely on the epistemic practice of extrapolation from surrogate models, to the point that explanatory accounts presented in review papers and biology textboo...
TL;DR: Among several possibilities for what reality could be like in view of the empirical facts of quantum mechanics, one is provided by theories of spontaneous wave function collapse, the best known theory for quantum mechanics.
Abstract: Among several possibilities for what reality could be like in view of the empirical facts of quantum mechanics, one is provided by theories of spontaneous wave function collapse, the best ...
TL;DR: In this paper, Kingma argued that Boorse's biostatistical theory of health (BST) is unable to accommodate diseases that are the normal result of harmful environments.
Abstract: In (Kingma [2010]), I argued that Boorse's ([1977], [1997]) biostatistical theory of health (BST) is unable to accommodate diseases that are the normal result of harmful environments. Hausman ([2011]) disagrees: if the BST compares normal dispositional function against the whole population or reference class, rather than against organisms in similar circumstances as I proposed, then my ([2010]) challenge can be avoided. In this paper, I argue that Hausman's response fails: his proposal cannot accommodate a series of common physiological processes, such as sleep and those involved in reproduction. In the course of this argument, I also offer a detailed discussion of the concept of functional efficiency (Hausman [2011], [2012]), and reveal a link between the problem of environments (Kingma [2010]) and that of reference classes (Kingma [2007]). 1 Introduction 2 Kingma on Boorse 3 Hausman on Kingma 4 Response to Hausman 5 Three Possible Replies 5.1 Reference classes 5.2 Temporary pathologies 5.3 Adequacy of function 6 Concluding Discussion
TL;DR: A finer-grained delineation of a given explanandum reveals a nexus of closely related causal and non-causal explanations, complementing one another in ways that yield further explanatory tr...
Abstract: A finer-grained delineation of a given explanandum reveals a nexus of closely related causal and non-causal explanations, complementing one another in ways that yield further explanatory tr...
TL;DR: In this paper, Chakravartty et al. argue that scientific realism is immune to unconceived alternatives, insofar as it is only committed to those scientific posits of which we have causal knowledge, and apply this strategy to the case of Jean Perrin's experimental work on the atomic hypothesis.
Abstract: I argue that scientific realism, insofar as it is only committed to those scientific posits of which we have causal knowledge, is immune to Kyle Stanford’s argument from unconceived alternatives. This causal strategy (previously introduced, but not worked out in detail, by Anjan Chakravartty) is shown not to repeat the shortcomings of previous realist responses to Stanford’s argument. Furthermore, I show that the notion of causal knowledge underlying it can be made sufficiently precise by means of conceptual tools recently introduced into the debate on scientific realism. Finally, I apply this strategy to the case of Jean Perrin’s experimental work on the atomic hypothesis, disputing Stanford’s claim that the problem of unconceived alternatives invalidates a realist interpretation of this historical episode.