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Bo Yang
Researcher at New York University
Publications - 16
Citations - 865
Bo Yang is an academic researcher from New York University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Hash function & Universal hashing. The author has an hindex of 7, co-authored 16 publications receiving 820 citations.
Papers
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Proceedings ArticleDOI
Scan based side channel attack on dedicated hardware implementations of Data Encryption Standard
Bo Yang,Kaijie Wu,Ramesh Karri +2 more
TL;DR: It is shown that scan chains can be used as a side channel to recover secret keys from a hardware implementation of the Data Encryption Standard (DES) by loading pairs of known plaintexts with one-bit difference in the normal mode and scanning out the internal state in the test mode.
Journal ArticleDOI
Secure Scan: A Design-for-Test Architecture for Crypto Chips
Bo Yang,Kaijie Wu,Ramesh Karri +2 more
TL;DR: The authors used a hardware implementation of the advanced encryption standard to show that the traditional scan DFT scheme can compromise the secret key, and showed that by using secure-scan DFT, neither thesecret key nor the testability of the AES implementation is compromised.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Secure scan: a design-for-test architecture for crypto chips
Bo Yang,Kaijie Wu,Ramesh Karri +2 more
TL;DR: The authors used a hardware implementation of the advanced encryption standard to show that the traditional scan DFT scheme can compromise the secret key, and showed that by using secure-scan DFT, neither thesecret key nor the testability of the AES implementation is compromised.
Posted Content
A High Speed Architecture for Galois/Counter Mode of Operation (GCM).
TL;DR: It is shown that GCM encryption circuit and GCM authentication circuit have similar critical path delays resulting in an efficient pipeline structure and the proposed GCM architecture yields a throughput of 34 Gbps running at 271 MHz using a 0.18 μm CMOS standard cell library.
Posted Content
Scan Based Side Channel Attack on Data Encryption Standard.
Bo Yang,Kaijie Wu,Ramesh Karri +2 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors show that scan chains can be used as a side channel to recover secret keys from a hardware implementation of the Data Encryption Standard (DES) by loading pairs of known plaintexts with one-bit difference in the normal mode and then scanning out the internal state in the test mode, determining the position of all scan elements in the scan chain.