抗原变异可使得多种致病微生物易于逃避宿主免疫应答。表达在感染红细胞表面的恶性疟原虫红细胞表面蛋白1（PfPMP1）与感染红细胞、内皮细胞、树突状细胞以及胎盘的单个或多个受体作用，在黏附及免疫逃避中起关键的作用。每个单倍体基因组var基因家族编码约60种成员，通过启动转录不同的var基因变异体为抗原变异提供了分子基础。

疟原虫var基因转换速率变化导致抗原变异[英]／Paul H, Robert P, Christodoulou Z, et al//Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A

Behavioral scientists routinely publish broad claims about human psychology and behavior in the world's top journals based on samples drawn entirely from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) societies. Researchers - often implicitly - assume that either there is little variation across human populations, or that these "standard subjects" are as representative of the species as any other population. Are these assumptions justified? Here, our review of the comparative database from across the behavioral sciences suggests both that there is substantial variability in experimental results across populations and that WEIRD subjects are particularly unusual compared with the rest of the species - frequent outliers. The domains reviewed include visual perception, fairness, cooperation, spatial reasoning, categorization and inferential induction, moral reasoning, reasoning styles, self-concepts and related motivations, and the heritability of IQ. The findings suggest that members of WEIRD societies, including young children, are among the least representative populations one could find for generalizing about humans. Many of these findings involve domains that are associated with fundamental aspects of psychology, motivation, and behavior - hence, there are no obvious a priori grounds for claiming that a particular behavioral phenomenon is universal based on sampling from a single subpopulation. Overall, these empirical patterns suggests that we need to be less cavalier in addressing questions of human nature on the basis of data drawn from this particularly thin, and rather unusual, slice of humanity. We close by proposing ways to structurally re-organize the behavioral sciences to best tackle these challenges.

/pdf/the-weirdest-people-in-the-world-480wr4m3kb.pdf

The WEIRDest People in the World

http://www.ece.uvic.ca/~bctill/papers/facerec/HaxHofGob2000.pdf

The distributed human neural system for face perception.

General guidelines for use of wild mammal species are updated from the 1998 version approved by the American Society of Mammalogists (ASM) and expanded to include additional resources. Included are details on marking, housing, trapping, and collecting mammals. These guidelines cover current professional techniques and regulations involving mammals used in research. Institutional animal care and use committees, regulatory agencies, and investigators should review and approve procedures concerning use of vertebrates at any particular institution. These guidelines were prepared and approved by the ASM, whose collective expertise provides a broad and comprehensive understanding of the biology of nondomesticated mammals in their natural environments.

/pdf/guidelines-of-the-american-society-of-mammalogists-for-the-2g7v778e1f.pdf

Guidelines of the american society of mammalogists for the use of wild mammals in research

We propose that the crucial difference between human cognition and that of other species is the ability to participate with others in collaborative activities with shared goals and intentions: shared intentionality. Participation in such activities requires not only especially powerful forms of intention reading and cultural learning, but also a unique motivation to share psychological states with oth- ers and unique forms of cognitive representation for doing so. The result of participating in these activities is species-unique forms of cultural cognition and evolution, enabling everything from the creation and use of linguistic symbols to the construction of social norms and individual beliefs to the establishment of social institutions. In support of this proposal we argue and present evidence that great apes (and some children with autism) understand the basics of intentional action, but they still do not participate in activities involving joint intentions and attention (shared intentionality). Human children's skills of shared intentionality develop gradually during the first 14 months of life as two ontogenetic pathways intertwine: (1) the general ape line of understanding others as animate, goal-directed, and intentional agents; and (2) a species-unique motivation to share emotions, experience, and activities with other persons. The develop- mental outcome is children's ability to construct dialogic cognitive representations, which enable them to participate in earnest in the collectivity that is human cognition.

/pdf/understanding-and-sharing-intentions-the-origins-of-cultural-4ndpnm3ov3.pdf

Understanding and sharing intentions: The origins of cultural cognition

Humans have many cognitive skills not possessed by their nearest primate relatives. The cultural intelligence hypothesis argues that this is mainly due to a species-specific set of social-cognitive skills, emerging early in ontogeny, for participating and exchanging knowledge in cultural groups. We tested this hypothesis by giving a comprehensive battery of cognitive tests to large numbers of two of humans' closest primate relatives, chimpanzees and orangutans, as well as to 2.5-year-old human children before literacy and schooling. Supporting the cultural intelligence hypothesis and contradicting the hypothesis that humans simply have more "general intelligence," we found that the children and chimpanzees had very similar cognitive skills for dealing with the physical world but that the children had more sophisticated cognitive skills than either of the ape species for dealing with the social world.

/pdf/humans-have-evolved-specialized-skills-of-social-cognition-3xm6665ikl.pdf

Humans Have Evolved Specialized Skills of Social Cognition: The Cultural Intelligence Hypothesis

Dogs are more skillful than great apes at a number of tasks in which they must read human communicative signals indicating the location of hidden food. In this study, we found that wolves who were raised by humans do not show these same skills, whereas domestic dog puppies only a few weeks old, even those that have had little human contact, do show these skills. These findings suggest that during the process of domestication, dogs have been selected for a set of social-cognitive abilities that enable them to communicate with humans in unique ways.

/pdf/the-domestication-of-social-cognition-in-dogs-2hfp8g8p05.pdf

The Domestication of Social Cognition in Dogs

https://courses.washington.edu/ccab/Hare%20et%20al%20on%20chimps%20-%20AB%202001.pdf

Do chimpanzees know what conspecifics know

https://www.chd.ucsd.edu/_files/winter2009/hare.tomasello.dogs.2005.pdf

Human-like social skills in dogs?

https://evolutionaryanthropology.duke.edu/sites/evolutionaryanthropology.duke.edu/files/site-images/Hare%20et%20al_%202000_%20Chimpanzees%20know%20what%20conspecifics%20do%20and%20do%20not%20see.pdf

Brian Hare

Papers

Humans Have Evolved Specialized Skills of Social Cognition: The Cultural Intelligence Hypothesis

The Domestication of Social Cognition in Dogs

Do chimpanzees know what conspecifics know

Human-like social skills in dogs?

Chimpanzees know what conspecifics do and do not see