Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

Introduction to stochastic programming

: Significant progress has been made with solution of location problems and in preprocessing and decomposition for discrete optimization. There has also been research on the application of techniques from combinational optimization to nonlinear problems.

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a273552.pdf

Discrete Applied Mathematics

The rapidly growing field of computational social choice, at the intersection of computer science and economics, deals with the computational aspects of collective decision making. This handbook, written by thirty-six prominent members of the computational social choice community, covers the field comprehensively. Chapters devoted to each of the field's major themes offer detailed introductions. Topics include voting theory (such as the computational complexity of winner determination and manipulation in elections), fair allocation (such as algorithms for dividing divisible and indivisible goods), coalition formation (such as matching and hedonic games), and many more. Graduate students, researchers, and professionals in computer science, economics, mathematics, political science, and philosophy will benefit from this accessible and self-contained book.

/pdf/handbook-of-computational-social-choice-12i1xbv1b8.pdf

Handbook of Computational Social Choice

The next few years will be exciting as prototype universal quantum processors emerge, enabling implementation of a wider variety of algorithms. Of particular interest are quantum heuristics, which require experimentation on quantum hardware for their evaluation, and which have the potential to significantly expand the breadth of quantum computing applications. A leading candidate is Farhi et al.'s Quantum Approximate Optimization Algorithm, which alternates between applying a cost-function-based Hamiltonian and a mixing Hamiltonian. Here, we extend this framework to allow alternation between more general families of operators. The essence of this extension, the Quantum Alternating Operator Ansatz, is the consideration of general parametrized families of unitaries rather than only those corresponding to the time-evolution under a fixed local Hamiltonian for a time specified by the parameter. This ansatz supports the representation of a larger, and potentially more useful, set of states than the original formulation, with potential long-term impact on a broad array of application areas. For cases that call for mixing only within a desired subspace, refocusing on unitaries rather than Hamiltonians enables more efficiently implementable mixers than was possible in the original framework. Such mixers are particularly useful for optimization problems with hard constraints that must always be satisfied, defining a feasible subspace, and soft constraints whose violation we wish to minimize. More efficient implementation enables earlier experimental exploration of an alternating operator approach to a wide variety of approximate optimization, exact optimization, and sampling problems. Here, we introduce the Quantum Alternating Operator Ansatz, lay out design criteria for mixing operators, detail mappings for eight problems, and provide brief descriptions of mappings for diverse problems.

From the Quantum Approximate Optimization Algorithm to a Quantum Alternating Operator Ansatz.

A common way of dealing with the paradoxes of preference aggregation consists in restricting the domain of admissible preferences. The most well-known such restriction is single-peakedness. In this paper we focus on the problem of determining whether a given profile is single-peaked with respect to some axis, and on the computation of such an axis. This problem has already been considered in [2]; we give here a more efficient algorithm and address some related issues, such as the number of orders that may be compatible with a given profile, or the communication complexity of preference aggregation under the single-peakedness assumption.

/pdf/single-peaked-consistency-and-its-complexity-3bo44l85uv.pdf

Single-peaked consistency and its complexity

Reoptimization of minimum and maximum traveling salesman's tours

We first propose a method, called “bottom-up method” that, informally, “propagates” improvement of the worst-case complexity for “sparse” instances to “denser” ones and we show an easy though non-trivial application of it to the min set cover problem. We then tackle max independent set. Here, we propagate improvements of worst-case complexity from graphs of average degree d to graphs of average degree greater than d. Indeed, using algorithms for max independent set in graphs of average degree 3, we successively solve max independent set in graphs of average degree 4, 5 and 6. Then, we combine the bottom-up technique with measure and conquer techniques to get improved running times for graphs of maximum degree 5 and 6 but also for general graphs. The computation bounds obtained for max independent set are O ∗(1.1571 n ), O ∗(1.1895 n ) and O ∗(1.2050 n ), for graphs of maximum (or more generally average) degree 4, 5 and 6 respectively, and O ∗(1.2114 n ) for general graphs. These results improve upon the best known results for these cases for polynomial space algorithms.

/pdf/fast-algorithms-for-max-independent-set-l3m13zr78x.pdf

Fast Algorithms for max independent set

In this survey the following model is considered. We assume that an instance I of a computationally hard optimization problem has been solved and that we know the optimum solution of such instance. Then a new instance I′ is proposed, obtained by means of a slight pertur- bation of instance I. How can we exploit the knowledge we have on the solution of instance I to compute a (approximate) solution of instance I′ in an efficient way? This computation model is called reoptimization and is of practical interest in various circumstances. In this article we first discuss what kind of performance we can expect for specific classes of problems and then we present some classical optimization problems (i.e. Max Knapsack, Min Steiner Tree, Scheduling) in which this approach has been fruitfully applied. Subsequently, we address vehicle routing prob- lems and we show how the reoptimization approach can be used to obtain good approximate solution in an efficient way for some of these problems.

/pdf/complexity-and-approximation-in-reoptimization-1kilbbvpv4.pdf

Complexity and Approximation in Reoptimization

https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00178912/document

Bruno Escoffier

Papers

Single-peaked consistency and its complexity

Reoptimization of minimum and maximum traveling salesman's tours

Fast Algorithms for max independent set

Complexity and Approximation in Reoptimization

Complexity and approximation results for the connected vertex cover problem in graphs and hypergraphs