世界経済・社会統計 = World development indicators

We investigate whether income inequality affects subsequent growth in a cross-country sample for 1965-90, using the models of Barro (1997), Bleaney and Nishiyama (2002) and Sachs and Warner (1997), with negative results. We then investigate the evolution of income inequality over the same period and its correlation with growth. The dominating feature is inequality convergence across countries. This convergence has been significantly faster amongst developed countries. Growth does not appear to influence the evolution of inequality over time. Outline

https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/81822/1/02-28.pdf

Economic growth and income inequality

We examine the empirical role of difierent explanations for the lack of ∞ows of capital from rich to poor countries|the \Lucas Paradox." The theoretical explanations include difierences in fundamentals across countries and capital market imperfections. We show that during 1970i2000 low institutional quality is the leading explanation. For example, improving Peru’s institutional quality to Australia’s level, implies a quadrupling of foreign investment. Recent studies emphasize the role of institutions for achieving higher levels of income, but remain silent on the speciflc mechanisms. Our results indicate that foreign investment might be a channel through which institutions afiect long-run development.

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Why Doesn't Capital Flow from Rich to Poor Countries? An Empirical Investigation

This paper describes the correlations between inequality and the growth rates in cross-country data. Using non-parametric methods, we show that the growth rate is an inverted U-shaped function of net changes in inequality: Changes in inequality (in any direction) are associated with reduced growth in the next period. The estimated relationship is robust to variations in control variables and estimation methods. This inverted U-curve is consistent with a simple political economy model, although, as we point out, efforts to interpret this model causally run into difficult identification problems. We show that this non-linearity is sufficient to explain why previous estimates of the relationship between the level of inequality and growth are so different from one another.

Inequality and Growth: What Can the Data Say?

Business cycles are both less volatile and more synchronized with the world cycle in rich countries than in poor ones. We develop two alternative explanations based on the idea that comparative advantage causes rich countries to specialize in industries that use new technologies operated by skilled workers, while poor countries specialize in industries that use traditional technologies operated by unskilled workers. Since new technologies are difficult to imitate, the industries of rich countries enjoy more market power and face more inelastic product demands than those of poor countries. Since skilled workers are less likely to exit employment as a result of changes in economic conditions, industries in rich countries face more inelastic labour supplies than those of poor countries. We show that either asymmetry in industry characteristics can generate cross-country differences in business cycles that resemble those we observe in the data. We are grateful to Daron Acemoglu and Fabrizio Perri for useful comments. The views expressed here are the authors' and do not necessarily reflect those of The World Bank. Business cycles are not the same in rich and poor countries. A first difference is that fluctuations in per capita income growth are smaller in rich countries than in poor ones, in the top panel of Figure 1 , we plot the standard deviation of per capita income growth against the level of (log) per capita income for a large sample of countries. We refer to this relationship as the volatility graph and note that it slopes downwards. A second difference is that fluctuations in per capita income growth are more synchronized with the world cycle in rich countries than in poor ones. In the bottom panel of Figure 1 , we plot the correlation of per capita income growth rates with world average per capita income growth, excluding the country in question, against the level of (log) per capita income for the same set of countries. We refer to this relationship as the comovement graph and note that it slopes upwards. Table 1 , which is self-explanatory, shows that these facts apply within different sub-samples of countries and years. 1 Why are business cycles less volatile and more synchronized with the world cycle in rich countries than in poor ones? Part of the answer must be that poor countries exhibit more political and policy instability, they are less open or more distant from the geographical center, and they also have a higher share of their economy devoted to the production of agricultural products and the extraction of minerals. Table 1 shows that, in a statistical sense, these factors explain a substantial fraction of the variation in the volatility of income growth, although they do not explain much of the variation in the comovement of income growth. More important for our purposes, the strong relationship between income and the properties of business cycles reported in Table 1 is still present after we control for these variables. In short, there must be other factors behind the strong patterns depicted in Figure 1 beyond differences in political instability, remoteness and the importance of natural resources. With the exception that the comovement graph seems to be driven by differences between rich and poor countries and not within each group. Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) also present the volatility graph. They provide an explanation for it based on the observation that rich countries have more diversified production structures. We are unaware of any previous reference to the comovement graph. In this paper, we develop two alternative but non-competing explanations for why business cycles are less volatile and more synchronized with the world in rich countries than in poor ones. Both explanations rely on the idea that comparative advantage causes rich countries to specialize in industries that require new technologies operated by skilled workers, while poor countries specialize in industries that require traditional technologies operated by unskilled workers. This pattern of specialization opens up the possibility that cross-country differences in business cycles are the result of asymmetries between these types of industries. In particular, both of the explanations advanced here predict that industries that use traditional technologies operated by unskilled workers will be more sensitive to country-specific shocks. Ceteris paribus, these industries will not only be more volatile but also less synchronized with the world cycle since the relative importance of global shocks is lower. To the extent that the business cycles of countries reflect those of their industries, differences in industrial structure could potentially explain the patterns in Figure 1 . One explanation of why industries react differently to shocks is based on the idea that firms using new technologies face more inelastic product demands than those using traditional technologies. New technologies are difficult to imitate quickly for technical reasons and also because of legal patents. This difficulty confers a cost advantage on technological leaders that shelters them from potential entrants and gives them monopoly power in world markets. Traditional technologies are easier to imitate because enough time has passed since their adoption and also because patents have expired or have been circumvented. This implies that incumbent firms face tough competition from potential entrants and enjoy little or no monopoly power in world markets. The price-elasticity of product demand affects how industries react to shocks. Consider, for instance, the effects of country-specific shocks that encourage production in all industries. In industries that use new technologies, firms have monopoly power and face inelastic demands for their products. As a result, fluctuations in supply lead to opposing changes in prices that tend to stabilize industry income. In industries that use traditional technologies, firms face stiff competition from abroad and therefore face elastic demands for their products. As a result, fluctuations in supply have little or no effect on their prices and industry income is more volatile. To the extent that this asymmetry in the degree of product-market competition is important, incomes of industries that use new technologies are likely to be less sensitive to country-specific shocks than those of industries that use traditional technologies. Another explanation for why industries react differently to shocks is based on the idea that the supply of unskilled workers is more elastic than the supply of skilled workers. A first reason for this asymmetry is that non-market activities are relatively more attractive to unskilled workers whose market wage is lower than that of skilled ones. Changes in labour demand might induce some unskilled workers to enter or abandon the labour force, but are not likely to affect the participation of skilled workers. A second reason for the asymmetry in labour supply across skill categories is the imposition of a minimum wage. Changes in labour demand might force some unskilled workers in and out of unemployment, but are not likely to affect the employment of skilled workers. The wage-elasticity of the labour supply also has implications for how industries react to shocks. Consider again the effects of country-specific shocks that encourage production in all industries and therefore raise the labour demand. Since the supply of unskilled workers is elastic, these shocks lead to large fluctuations in employment of unskilled workers. In industries that use them, fluctuations in supply are therefore magnified by increases in employment that make industry income more volatile. Since the supply of skilled workers is inelastic, the same shocks have little or no effects on the employment of skilled workers. In industries that use them, fluctuations in supply are not magnified and industry income is less volatile. To the extent that this asymmetry in the elasticity of labour supply is important, incomes of industries that use unskilled workers are likely to be more sensitive to country-specific shocks than those of industries that use skilled workers To study these hypotheses we construct a stylized world equilibrium model of the cross-section of business cycles. Inspired by the work of Davis (1995), we consider in section one a world in which differences in both factor endowments a la Heckscher-Ohlin and industry technologies a la Ricardo combine to determine a country's comparative advantage and, therefore, the patterns of specialization and trade. To generate business cycles, we subject this world economy to the sort of productivity fluctuations that have been emphasized by Kydland and Prescott (1982). 2 In section two, we characterize the cross-section of business cycles and show how asymmetries in the elasticity of product demand and/or labour supply can be used to explain the evidence in Figure 1 . Using available microeconomic estimates of the key parameters, we calibrate the model and find that: (i) The model exhibits slightly less than two-thirds and one-third of the observed cross-country variation in volatility and comovement, respectively; and (ii) The asymmetry in the elasticity of product demand seems to have a quantitatively stronger effect on the slopes of the volatility and comovement graphs, than the elasticity in the labour supply. We explore these results further in sections three and four. In section three, we extend the model to allow for monetary shocks that have real effects since firms face cash-in-advance constraints. We use the model to study how cross-country variation in monetary policy and financial development affect the cross-section of business cycles. Once these factors are considered, the calibrated version of the model exhibits roughly the same cross-country variation in volatility and about 40 percent of the variation in comovement as the data. In section four, we show th

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/BF01322868.pdf

Business cycles: A methodological approach

Does distributive conflict diminish during the course of economic development? This article outlines a model in which distribution, the tax rate and growth evolve endogenously over time. When voting occurs over a tax on capital, we show that the growth rate is maximized at the political equilibrium in the long run. When voting occurs over a general income tax, we show that the growth rate is maximized at the political equilibrium in both the short and long run. These results suggest that the transitional dynamics of growth models with redistributive politics lead to growth-maximizing outcomes, as distributive conflict diminishes in the course of development. This implies that the democratic process leads to greater consensus over policy choices, with a perfect convergence of interest across individuals with respect to the tax rate.

Endogenous Distribution and Equilibrium Growth: A Note

In Ghate & Wright Journal of Development Economics, vol. 99 (2012) pp 58–67, we noted that there was considerable variation in the extent to which different Indian states participated in the Great Growth Turnaround. In this paper we investigate whether there was any systematic relationship between participation in the turnaround and the characteristics of Indian states, using the robustness approach originally proposed by Sali-i-Martin (1997). We supplement our robustness analysis by asking whether more recent (post-sample) experience is consistent with our results.

http://icrier.org/pdf/working_paper_261.pdf

Why was the participation of Indian states in the Growth Turnaround so patchy? Some evidence based on robustness analysis

Responding to the Crisis and Restoring Growth: Global Cooperation Among G20 Countries:

This short note provides some supplementary analysis to the regressions in Section 5 of Ghate and Wright (forthcoming), that was carried out after the refereeing process for that paper was completed, and hence could not be included in the published version. It is not a free-standing paper, but is intended to be read in conjunction with the published paper.

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Chetan Ghate

Papers

Endogenous Distribution and Equilibrium Growth: A Note

Why was the participation of Indian states in the Growth Turnaround so patchy? Some evidence based on robustness analysis

Endogenous Distribution and Equilibrium Growth: A Note

Responding to the Crisis and Restoring Growth: Global Cooperation Among G20 Countries:

Correlates of statewise participation in the great Indian growth turnaround: some preliminary robustness results