Showing papers by "Christopher Blattman published in 2013"

Economic Shocks and Conflict: Evidence from Commodity Prices

Abstract: Higher national incomes are correlated with lower political instability. We test three theories linking income to conflict using a new database of export price shocks. Price shocks have no effect on new conflicts, even large shocks in high-risk nations. Rising prices, however, lead to shorter, less intense wars. This evidence contradicts the theory that rising state revenues incentivize attempts at capture, but accords with two theories: that rising revenues improve state counter-insurgency capacity and reduce individual incentives to fight in existing conflicts. Conflict onset and continuation follow different processes. Ignoring this time dependence generates mistaken conclusions about income and instability.

The Logic of Child Soldiering and Coercion

Abstract: Why do armed groups recruit large numbers of children as fighters, often coercively? The international community has tried to curb these crimes by sham- ing and punishing leaders who commit them—in short, making the crimes costlier+ Are these policies effective and sufficient? The answer lies in more attention to the strategic interaction between rebel leaders and recruits+ We adapt theories of indus- trial organization to rebellious groups and show how, being less able fighters, chil- dren are attractive recruits if and only if they are easier to intimidate, indoctrinate, and misinform than adults+ This ease of manipulation interacts with the costliness of war crimes to influence rebel leaders' incentives to coerce children into war+ We use a case study and a novel survey of former child recruits in Uganda to illustrate this argument and provide hard evidence not only that children are more easily manipu- lated in war, but also how—something often asserted but never demonstrated+ Our theory, as well as a new "cross-rebel" data set, also support the idea that costliness matters: foreign governments, international organizations, diasporas, and local pop- ulations can discourage child recruitment by withholding resources or punishing offenders ~or, conversely, encourage these crimes by failing to act!+ But punishing war crimes has limitations, and can only take us so far+ Children's reintegration oppor- tunities must be at least as great as adults' ~something that demobilization programs sometimes fail to do!+ Also, indoctrination and misinformation can be directly influ- enced+ We observe grassroots innovations in Uganda that could be models for the prevention and curbing of child soldiering and counterinsurgency generally+

Building women’s economic and social empowerment through enterprise: an experimental assessment of the Women’s Income Generating Support (WINGS) Program in Uganda.

Abstract: This study investigates an attempt to economically and socially empower some of the poorest and most vulnerable young women in one of the poorest and most fragile places in the world: northern Uganda. Investing in women is said to be a key to development. Educate her, buy her a cow or goat, or help her start a business and great things will follow: sustained increases in income, greater empowerment and social inclusion, health and education for the children, and (especially in war-affected regions) mental health and happiness. This report provides provisional answers to these questions based on data collected from April 2009 to August 2012. The questions will continue to be explored and analyzed in academic papers in future, but the authors attempt to draw out the key findings and policy lessons as close to the end of the intervention and data collection as possible.

Reintegrating and Employing High Risk Youth in Liberia: Lessons from a randomized evaluation of a Landmine Action an agricultural training program for ex-combatants

Abstract: This brief summarizes the results of a gender impact evaluation study, entitled Reintegrating and employing high risk youth in Liberia : lessons from a randomized evaluation of a landmine action an agricultural training program for ex-combatants, conducted between 2009 and 2011 in Liberia. The study observed the impact of landmine action an agricultural training program on ex-combatants and other high-risk youth on the individual level. The program has a large and significant impact on engagement in agricultural activities. The program had little impact on illicit activities like mining, but those who participated in the program spent fewer hours engaged in illicit activities. The program led to no significant changes in crime or aggression, but the participants are less likely to be interested in or mobilized into violence after the election in Cote d'Ivoire. Funding for the study derived from the United Nations Peace Building Fund, Yale University, Spanish Impact Evaluation Fund, and Italian Children and Youth Trust Fund.

Credit constraints, occupational choice and the process of development : long run evidence from cash transfers in Uganda

Abstract: This brief summarizes the results of a gender impact evaluation study, entitled Credit constraints, occupational choice and the process of development : long run evidence from cash transfers in Uganda, conducted in the year 2008 in Uganda. The study observed that poor, unemployed men are commonly associated with social dislocation and unrest, and governments routinely justify employment programs on reducing such risks. Despite huge economic effects, we see little impact on cohesion, aggression, and collective action. The treated youth invest most of the grant in skills and business assets. After four years, they are 65 percent more likely to practice a skilled trade, mainly small scale industry. The gains are the largest amongst those with the fewest assets. Women earn higher returns than men compared to control (84 percent for women, 31 percent for men). Funding for the study derived from Uganda Social Action Fund, Spanish Impact Evaluation Fund.

Generating Skilled Self-Employment in Developing Countries: Experimental Evidence from Uganda

Abstract: We study a government program in Uganda designed to help the poor and unemployed become self-employed artisans, increase incomes, and thus promote social stability. Young adults in Uganda’s conflict-affected north were invited to form groups and submit grant proposals for vocational training and business start-up. Funding was randomly assigned among screened and eligible groups. Treatment groups received unsupervised grants of $382 per member. Grant recipients invest some in skills training but most in tools and materials. After four years half practice a skilled trade. Relative to the control group, the program increases business assets by 57%, work hours by 17%, and earnings by 38%. Many also formalize their enterprises and hire labor. We see no impact, however, on social cohesion, anti-social behavior, or protest. Impacts are similar by gender, but are qualitatively different for women because they begin poorer (meaning the impact is larger relative to their starting point) and because women’s work and earnings stagnate without the program but take off with it. The patterns we observe are consistent with credit-constraints.

How to Promote Order and Property Rights Under Weak Rule of Law? An Experiment in Changing Dispute Resolution Behavior Through Community Education

Abstract: Dispute resolution institutions help reach agreements and preserve the peace whenever property rights are imperfect. In weak states, strengthening formal institutions can take decades, and so state and aid interventions also try to shape informal practices and norms governing disputes. Their goal is to improve bargaining and commitment, thus limiting disputes and violence. Mass education campaigns that promote alternative dispute resolution (ADR) are common examples. We study short-term impacts of one such campaign in Liberia, where property disputes are endemic. From 246 towns, 86 randomly received training in ADR practices and norms, training 15% of adults. One year later, treated towns have higher resolution of land disputes and lower violence. Impacts spill over to untrained residents. We also see unintended consequences: more extrajudicial punishment and (weakly) more non-violent disagreements. Results imply mass education can change high-stakes behaviors, and improving informal bargaining and en-forcement behavior can promote order in weak states.