In October of '86, the Internet had the first of what became a series of 'congestion collapses'. During this period, the data throughput from LBL to UC Berkeley (sites separated by 400 yards and three IMP hops) dropped from 32 Kbps to 40 bps. Mike Karels1 and I were fascinated by this sudden factor-of-thousand drop in bandwidth and embarked on an investigation of why things had gotten so bad. We wondered, in particular, if the 4.3BSD (Berkeley UNIX) TCP was mis-behaving or if it could be tuned to work better under abysmal network conditions. The answer to both of these questions was “yes”.Since that time, we have put seven new algorithms into the 4BSD TCP: round-trip-time variance estimationexponential retransmit timer backoffslow-startmore aggressive receiver ack policydynamic window sizing on congestionKarn's clamped retransmit backofffast retransmit Our measurements and the reports of beta testers suggest that the final product is fairly good at dealing with congested conditions on the Internet.This paper is a brief description of (i) - (v) and the rationale behind them. (vi) is an algorithm recently developed by Phil Karn of Bell Communications Research, described in [KP87]. (viii) is described in a soon-to-be-published RFC.Algorithms (i) - (v) spring from one observation: The flow on a TCP connection (or ISO TP-4 or Xerox NS SPP connection) should obey a 'conservation of packets' principle. And, if this principle were obeyed, congestion collapse would become the exception rather than the rule. Thus congestion control involves finding places that violate conservation and fixing them.By 'conservation of packets' I mean that for a connection 'in equilibrium', i.e., running stably with a full window of data in transit, the packet flow is what a physicist would call 'conservative': A new packet isn't put into the network until an old packet leaves. The physics of flow predicts that systems with this property should be robust in the face of congestion. Observation of the Internet suggests that it was not particularly robust. Why the discrepancy?There are only three ways for packet conservation to fail: The connection doesn't get to equilibrium, orA sender injects a new packet before an old packet has exited, orThe equilibrium can't be reached because of resource limits along the path. In the following sections, we treat each of these in turn.

/pdf/congestion-avoidance-and-control-5b0pxljiwg.pdf

Congestion avoidance and control

Despite the apparent randomness of the Internet, we discover some surprisingly simple power-laws of the Internet topology. These power-laws hold for three snapshots of the Internet, between November 1997 and December 1998, despite a 45% growth of its size during that period. We show that our power-laws fit the real data very well resulting in correlation coefficients of 96% or higher.Our observations provide a novel perspective of the structure of the Internet. The power-laws describe concisely skewed distributions of graph properties such as the node outdegree. In addition, these power-laws can be used to estimate important parameters such as the average neighborhood size, and facilitate the design and the performance analysis of protocols. Furthermore, we can use them to generate and select realistic topologies for simulation purposes.

/pdf/on-power-law-relationships-of-the-internet-topology-19fp34v7ee.pdf

On power-law relationships of the Internet topology

The Internet has led to the creation of a digital society, where (almost) everything is connected and is accessible from anywhere. However, despite their widespread adoption, traditional IP networks are complex and very hard to manage. It is both difficult to configure the network according to predefined policies, and to reconfigure it to respond to faults, load, and changes. To make matters even more difficult, current networks are also vertically integrated: the control and data planes are bundled together. Software-defined networking (SDN) is an emerging paradigm that promises to change this state of affairs, by breaking vertical integration, separating the network's control logic from the underlying routers and switches, promoting (logical) centralization of network control, and introducing the ability to program the network. The separation of concerns, introduced between the definition of network policies, their implementation in switching hardware, and the forwarding of traffic, is key to the desired flexibility: by breaking the network control problem into tractable pieces, SDN makes it easier to create and introduce new abstractions in networking, simplifying network management and facilitating network evolution. In this paper, we present a comprehensive survey on SDN. We start by introducing the motivation for SDN, explain its main concepts and how it differs from traditional networking, its roots, and the standardization activities regarding this novel paradigm. Next, we present the key building blocks of an SDN infrastructure using a bottom-up, layered approach. We provide an in-depth analysis of the hardware infrastructure, southbound and northbound application programming interfaces (APIs), network virtualization layers, network operating systems (SDN controllers), network programming languages, and network applications. We also look at cross-layer problems such as debugging and troubleshooting. In an effort to anticipate the future evolution of this new paradigm, we discuss the main ongoing research efforts and challenges of SDN. In particular, we address the design of switches and control platforms—with a focus on aspects such as resiliency, scalability, performance, security, and dependability—as well as new opportunities for carrier transport networks and cloud providers. Last but not least, we analyze the position of SDN as a key enabler of a software-defined environment.

https://publications.uni.lu/bitstream/10993/20596/1/survey_on_SDN.pdf

Software-Defined Networking: A Comprehensive Survey

This paper describes a new replication algorithm that is able to tolerate Byzantine faults. We believe that Byzantinefault-tolerant algorithms will be increasingly important in the future because malicious attacks and software errors are increasingly common and can cause faulty nodes to exhibit arbitrary behavior. Whereas previous algorithms assumed a synchronous system or were too slow to be used in practice, the algorithm described in this paper is practical: it works in asynchronous environments like the Internet and incorporates several important optimizations that improve the response time of previous algorithms by more than an order of magnitude. We implemented a Byzantine-fault-tolerant NFS service using our algorithm and measured its performance. The results show that our service is only 3% slower than a standard unreplicated NFS.

/pdf/practical-byzantine-fault-tolerance-58gb0de0hd.pdf

Practical Byzantine fault tolerance

This memo discusses a proposed extension to the Internet architecture and protocols to provide integrated services, i.e., to support real- time as well as the current non-real-time service of IP. This extension is necessary to meet the growing need for real-time service for a variety of new applications, including teleconferencing, remote seminars, telescience, and distributed simulation.

Integrated Services in the Internet Architecture: an Overview

Traces of Internet packets from the past two years show that between 1 packet in 1,100 and 1 packet in 32,000 fails the TCP checksum, even on links where link-level CRCs should catch all but 1 in 4 billion errors. For certain situations, the rate of checksum failures can be even higher: in one hour-long test we observed a checksum failure of 1 packet in 400. We investigate why so many errors are observed, when link-level CRCs should catch nearly all of them.We have collected nearly 500,000 packets which failed the TCP or UDP or IP checksum. This dataset shows the Internet has a wide variety of error sources which can not be detected by link-level checks. We describe analysis tools that have identified nearly 100 different error patterns. Categorizing packet errors, we can infer likely causes which explain roughly half the observed errors. The causes span the entire spectrum of a network stack, from memory errors to bugs in TCP.After an analysis we conclude that the checksum will fail to detect errors for roughly 1 in 16 million to 10 billion packets. From our analysis of the cause of errors, we propose simple changes to several protocols which will decrease the rate of undetected error. Even so, the highly non-random distribution of errors strongly suggests some applications should employ application-level checksums or equivalents.

/pdf/when-the-crc-and-tcp-checksum-disagree-1wvlxo5bdj.pdf

When the CRC and TCP checksum disagree

Smart Packets is a DARPA-funded Active Networks project focusing on applying active networks technology to network management and monitoring without placing undue burden on the nodes in the network. Messages in active networks are programs that are executed at nodes on the path to one or more target hosts. Smart Packets programs are written in a tightly-encoded, safe language specifically designed to support network management and avoid dangerous constructs and accesses. Smart Packets improves the management of large complex networks by (1) moving management decision points closer to the node being managed, (2) targeting specific aspects of the node for information rather than exhaustive collection via polling, and (3) abstracting the management concepts to language constructs, allowing nimble network control. This paper introduces Smart Packets and describes the Smart Packet architecture, the packet formats, the language and its design goals, and security considerations.

Smart Packets for active networks

A traffic auditor ( 130 ) analyzes traffic in a communications network ( 100 ). The traffic auditor ( 130 ) performs traffic analysis on traffic in the communications network ( 100 ) and develops a model of expected traffic behavior based on the traffic analysis. The traffic auditor ( 130 ) analyzes traffic in the communications network ( 100 ) to identify a deviation from the expected traffic behavior model.

Systems and methods for identifying anomalies in network data streams

This paper studies methods of quantitatively measuring semantic information in communication. We review existing work on quantifying semantic information, then investigate a model-theoretical approach for semantic data compression and reliable semantic communication. We relate our approach to the statistical measurement of information by Shannon, and show that Shannon's source and channel coding theorems have semantic counterparts.

Towards a theory of semantic communication

This article introduces Smart Packets and describes the smart Packets architecture, the packet formats, the language and its design goals, and security considerations. Smart Packets is an Active Networks project focusing on applying active networks technology to network management and monitoring. Messages in active networks are programs that are executed at nodes on the path to one or more target hosts. Smart Packets programs are written in a tightly encoded, safe language specifically designed to support network management and avoid dangerous constructs and accesses. Smart Packets improves the management of large complex networks by (1) moving management decision points closer to the node being managed, (2) targeting specific aspects of the node for information rather than exhaustive collection via polling, and (3) abstracting the management concepts to language constructs, allowing nimble network control.

Craig Partridge

Papers

When the CRC and TCP checksum disagree

Smart Packets for active networks

Systems and methods for identifying anomalies in network data streams

Towards a theory of semantic communication

Smart packets: applying active networks to network management