Introduction 1. Woman's Place in Man's Life Cycle 2. Images of Relationship 3. Concepts of Self and Morality 4. Crisis and Transition 5. Women's Rights and Women's Judgment 6. Visions of Maturity References Index of Study Participants General Index

In a Different Voice. Psychological Theory and Women’s Development. Cambridge, MA (Harvard University Press) 1982.

Preface 1. Revolution and Counter-revolution: The Introduction 2. The American Ideology 3. The Canandian Identity 4. Literature and Myths: Canadian Perspectives 5. The Impact of Religion 6. Law and Deviance 7. Economic Behaviour and Culture 8. Government, Welfare, and Philanthropy 9. Social Stratification, Trade Unions, and Politics 10. Mosaic and Melting Pot 11. Center Periphery 12. Still Whig, Still Tory Notes Bibliography Index

Continental Divide: The Values and Institutions of the United States and Canada.

The premise of this paper is that while the comparative study of courts can address some vitally important questions in judicial politics, these gains will not be secured without a valid and reliable measure of judge preferences that is comparable within and across courts. Party affiliation of judges is a commonly used but weak substitute that suffers from pronounced equivalence problems. We develop a contextually based, party-adjusted surrogate judge ideology measure (PAJID) and subject this measure to an extensive array of validity tests. We also consider the measure's stability in predicting judge behavior over the course of the judicial career. As the results illustrate, PAJID offers a valid, stable measure of judge preferences in state supreme courts that is demonstrably superior to party affiliation in analyses of judicial decision-making across areas of law and across 52 state high courts.

Measuring the Preferences of State Supreme Court Judges

This article assesses the development of theories of judicial behavior in the United States in the past few decades. It is argued that the study of judicial behavior has been relatively balkanized, with some advances within particular theoretical contexts, but with little successful effort at integrating different approaches within a comprehensive theory. Although I develop no such comprehensive theory in this article, I do argue that the predominant frameworks for analyzing judicial behavior—attitude theory, fact pattern theory, role theory, small group theory, organization theory, and environmental theories—are not incompatible and can be at least partially integrated. In order to accomplish the desired integration, there are three desiderata:
 Thus, theories of judicial behavior must become more complex if they are to achieve a higher level of explanation and prediction.

FROM SIMPLICITY TO COMPLEXITY: The Development of Theory in The Study of Judicial Behavior

Although scholars have made considerable progress on a number of important research questions by relaxing assumptions commonly used to divide political science into subfields, rigid boundaries remain in some contexts. In this essay, we suggest that the assumption that international politics is characterized by anarchy whereas domestic politics is characterized by hierarchy continues to divide research on the conditions under which governments are constrained by courts, international or domestic. We contend that we will learn more about the process by which courts constrain governments, and do so more quickly, if we relax the assumption and recognize the substantial similarities between domestic and international research on this topic. We review four recent books that highlight contemporary theories of the extent to which domestic and international law binds states, and discuss whether a rigid boundary between international and domestic scholarship can be sustained on either theoretical or empirical grounds.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/S0020818311000130

Judicial Power in Domestic and International Politics

Analysis of nearly two hundred federal district court decisions in cases involving the exercise of presidential power during the postwar era reveals two very different models of judicial decision making. In cases concerning presidential control of foreign and military policy, judicial decision making appears to be dominated by the recognition of fixed rules. So clear are these rules of deference to the executive that identification of the policy-making area alone constitutes an excellent predictor of case outcomes. By contrast, the statistical importance of such predictor variables as presidential prestige and whether the judge was appointed by the same president as that whose powers are at issue in the case suggests much greater relativism in the judicial response when the president is challenged as a domestic policymaker. As far as the federal district courts are concerned, presidential power over foreign and military affairs may aptly be called "the power to command," while the executive's power in dom...

Federal District Judges and Presidential Power During the Postwar Era

This article assesses whether the same attitudinal dimension that dominates judicial decision-making in the United States-liberalism/conservatism-is also prominent in the Canadian context. Specifically, the study examines the voting behavior of Canadian Supreme Court Justices in non-unanimous post-Charter cases decided during the first five terms of the Lamer Court (1991-95). After employing factor analysis, which disclosed three principal dimensions underlying the voting behavior of the justices, we closely examined the cases scoring most positively and most negatively on each of the factors. The principal dimensions underlying the Charter rulings suggest three prominent attitudinal conflicts dominate this Court period: communitarianism versus libertarianism, fair trial and criminal due process disputes, and judicial activism versus judicial self-restraint. These dimensions corroborate the findings of studies that have tracked the development of the Canadian Court in post-- Charter years. Few relationships have been as frequently investigated or reported at greater length in the empirical study of public law than that between political attitudes and judges' decisions. Scholars of judicial behavior have built an entire field of the political science discipline on the thoroughly familiar premises gleaned from the writings of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (1881, 1897) and other rule skeptics (Fisher, Horowitz, and Reed 1993). The central premise of this body of literature is that rules contained in precedents simply provide cover for the justices' own attitudes and values (Holmes 1897; Frank 1930; Pritchett 1941; Schubert 1974, 1965; Segal and Spaeth 1993, Chap. 2; Epstein and Knight 1998: 25). In essence, the attitudinal model now dominates public law research in the United States. The attitudinal model so prominent in the literature today can trace its origins to the seminal research of Glendon Schubert (1974, 1965). Schubert's application of psychometric scaling techniques uncovered multiple attitudinal dimensions at work on the U.S. Supreme Court (Schubert 1974, 1965). This groundbreaking work on the U.S. court inspired him to conduct further research on judicial behavior in Switzerland, Australia, and South Africa (Schubert 1969a, 1969b, 1977, 1980). Other researchers who followed in his footsteps also found that attitudinal conflicts were at the crux of the decision making process of courts throughout the world, including the Philippines (Samonte 1969; Flango and Schubert 1969; Tate 1995); Italy (DiFrederico and Guarnieir 1988); Japan (Dator 1969; Kawashima 1969; Danelski 1969); Australia (Blackshield 1972; Galligan and Slater 1995; Power 1995); and Canada (Fouts 1969; Peck 1967a, 1967b, 1969; Tate and Sittiwong 1989; Morton, Russell, and Withey 1991; Russell 1995; Epp 1996; Wetstein and Ostberg 1999). These studies confirm that the political nature of judicial decision-making is not endemic to any one culture. Although research has shown that attitudes and values clearly influence the decisionmaking process in a variety of national high courts, the question remains whether the voting patterns that demonstrate attitudinal conflict are structured in a similar fashion across those courts. In the Canadian context, Fouts found in the 1950s and 1960s that the "decisional philosophy" of the Canadian justices was "strikingly similar to that espoused in the U.S. Court a generation earlier" (Fouts 1969: 284). He and Sidney Peck (1969) found the same liberal-conservative ideological conflicts in the U.S. were at work in Canada as well. The methodology used by these scholars presumed that the cases they analyzed could be analyzed using the same liberal-conservative continua on civil liberties, economics, and criminal cases that Schubert and others had used in studying the United States Supreme Court. Our study begins from a different premise. We start from the assumption that there might be different attitudinal issues at work in the minds of Canadian judges than simply liberalism-conservatism. …

Attitudinal Dimensions of Supreme Court Decision Making in Canada: The Lamer Court, 1991-1995

This article examines the voting behavior of the justices in nonunanimous economic cases decided during three terms of the early and three terms of the later Burger Court. After employing factor analysis, which disclosed three principal dimensions underlying the justices' voting behavior in the first court and two in the second, we carefully examined cases scoring most positively and those scoring most negatively on each of the factors and analyzed the outcomes associated with the decision of each case. The principal dimension underlying the decision of economic cases by the early Burger Court appeared to be economic liberalism-conservatism. Also implicated as lesser factors were deference to the discretion of administrative agencies and either attitude toward business or economic due process. By contrast, the justices' voting behavior in economic cases during the later Burger Court appeared to be best explained by regard for federalism and only secondarily by economic liberalism-conservatism. Only analys...

Dimensions Underlying Economic Policymaking in the Early and Later Burger Courts

THE VIEW OF JUDGES as political actors whose attitudes toward subtantive policy issues often influence their decisions is the cornerstone of judicial behavioralism. The assumption is that there is ". . . a kind of stare deciks underlying the Supreme Court's decisions but that it is based on personal rather than institutional precedents."' Voting records of individual justices are examined to uncover regularities in behavior and to provide the basis for inferring the attitudes of judges toward the substantive issues raised. Of course, if each justice were merely following his conscience on a case by case basis, a random, rather that a persistent, coalitional pattern of voting would emerge. Evidence derived both from observations of voting patterns and from interviews with judges seems

Toward an Integration of Public Law and Judicial Behavior

Historically, the debate regarding the proper point of balance between judicial expertise and judicial accountability has found its most common expression in the debate over methods of judicial selection.2 Appointive procedures are usually favored by those desiring the quality of expertise, while elective procedures are preferred by people who value responsiveness and accessibility (accountability). Rooted in this conflict between the values of expertise and accountability, the debate over which method of selection is best depends upon the debaters' views of the role of courts in society. Accordingly, the debate is bound to be polemical, with each side proceeding to build a case for the selection procedure most congenial to its respective ideology.

Craig R. Ducat

Papers

Federal District Judges and Presidential Power During the Postwar Era

Attitudinal Dimensions of Supreme Court Decision Making in Canada: The Lamer Court, 1991-1995

Dimensions Underlying Economic Policymaking in the Early and Later Burger Courts

Toward an Integration of Public Law and Judicial Behavior

WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES METHOD OF JUDICIAL SELECTION MAKE? Selection Procedures in State Courts of Last Resort