Gender disparities in wages and attainment caused by employer discrimination can come about by three very different processes: allocative discrimination, within‐job wage discrimination, and valuative discrimination. For the United States, it has been established that within‐job wage discrimination no longer is a major source of wage differences, while valuative discrimination potentially is. Less known is the role of allocative discrimination, especially in the hiring process, which we identify as the point where discrimination is most feasible. Our analysis uses personnel data on all entrants into a large U.S. service organization in the period 1978–86, focusing on managerial, administrative, and professional employees. We study the placement at initial hire and then follow job levels, wages, promotions, as well as departures, in years subsequent to hire.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/378536

The Opportunity Structure for Discrimination.

Majority-minority voting districts have been advanced as a remedy to the underrepresentation of minority interests in the political process. Yet, their efficacy in furthering the substantive goals of minority constituents has been questioned because they may dilute minority influence in surrounding areas and lead to an overall decrease in support for minority-sponsored legislation. Thus, there may be a trade-off between increasing the number of minority officeholders and enacting legislation that furthers the interests of the minority community. Using nonlinear estimation techniques, we simulate the districting strategies that maximize substantive minority representation, and find that such a trade-off does exist. We also find that, outside of the South, dividing minority voters equally across districts maximizes substantive representation; inside the South the optimal scheme creates concentrated districts on the order of 47% black voting age population. In addition, minority candidates may have a substantial chance of being elected from districts with less than 50% minority voters.

Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?

DETAILED CONTENTS ix LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS xv LIST OF TABLES xvii PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xix CHAPTER 1. Taking Consequences Seriously: Introduction 1 PART I: PROCESSES OF GOVERNMENT: VOTING, BARGAINING, ADMINISTERING 15 CHAPTER 2. Voting 17 CHAPTER 3. Bargaimng 51 CHAPTER 4. Administering 79 PART II: THE OPTIMAL NUMBER OF GOVERNMENTS 101 CHAPTER 5. Intergovernmental Relations CHAPTER 6. Government Competition 127 CHAPTER 7. Ministries and Agencies PART III: OPTIMAL DIVISION OF POWERS CHAPTER 8. Specialization 173 CHAPTER 9. Separation of Powers 211 PART IV: OPTIMAL RIGHTS 241 CHAPTER 10. The Value of Rights 243 CHAPTER 11. Philosophies of Rights: Liberty and Redistribution 261 CHAPTER 12. Property Rights 279 CHAPTER 13. Free Speech 309 CHAPTER 14. Civil Rights 333 CHAPTER 15. Summary and Conclusion 359 BIBLIOGRAPHY 381 GENERAL INDEX 399 INDEX OF NAMES 409

The Strategic Constitution

This article presents an examination of the diversity principle in communications policy. Given the Federal Communication Commission's recent emphasis on diversity as a policy objective, diversity assessments must return to the forefront of communications policy analysis. To provide an analytical framework for such research, the diversity principle is broken into three distinct components (source, content, and exposure diversity), and multiple subcomponents. In the spirit of the FCC's empirical commitment to the diversity principle, this analysis focuses on diversity as a measurable concept, with potentially interacting dimensions and numerous means of assessment.

Deconstructing the diversity principle

Separating lesbian theory from feminist theory the gender closet the shape of lesbian and gay subordination defending marriage construction lesbians and gay men as family's outlaws

Feminism, the Family, and the Politics of the Closet: Lesbian and Gay Displacement

This paper addresses partisan gerrymandering and proposes a formal remedy. In addition to adhering to criteria which mandate that representational districts be composed of contiguous territories and have equal populations, we suggest that those who define district boundaries must also be required to respect a third criterion, the constraint of compactness.

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The Third Criterion: Compactness as a Procedural Safeguard Against Partisan Gerrymandering

/pdf/the-third-criterion-compactness-as-a-procedural-safeguard-1otzu5qu70.pdf

A fundamental problem of our representative democracy is this: how far may a legislature go in controlling who is elected to it? The compactness of districts is pertinent to this inquiry. We argue that compactness in some sense is ordinarily a property of single-member territorial districts. We offer proof that gerrymandering - whether it is conducted under the auspices of the Voting Rights Act or its freelance legislative tinkering - can spoil the game for representation by single-member districts. In order to avoid that destiny, an antigerrymandering principle must be defined and administered outside normal political channels.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2927713_code2415334.pdf?abstractid=2927713&type=2

Ugly: An Inquiry into the Problem of Racial Gerrymandering Under the Voting Rights Act

If you have to ask, you can't afford it. Attributed to J.P. Morgan1 How ugly is too ugly? Shaw v. Reno2 examines that important question in the course of rejecting North Carolina's 1990 effort to comply with the preclearance provisions in section 5 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA).3 But the problem presented is a general one that is apt to arise perennially in any territory-based system of representative democracy. What has "shape" to do with representation? Quite a lot, as we hope to demonstrate. In Shaw, North Carolina's congressional redistricting map ugly enough as first proposed4 was made uglier to accommodate the creation of a second "safe" district for an African-American representative.5 In the jargon of electoral districting, an "ugly" map is one filled with irregular, uncompact shapes that do not evidently correspond to established political or natural boundaries. An ugly map implies that a human ambition of some kind, with politically strategic ulterior motives, has been hard at work. Pared to its simplest form, the question is this: Why does an effort to comply with conditions set by the Attorney General for

/pdf/ugly-an-inquiry-into-the-problem-of-racial-gerrymandering-1l6dp67gqz.pdf

Ugly: An Inquiry Into the Problem of Racial Gerrymandering Under the Voting Rights Act

The Supreme Court’s decision in Bob Jones University v. the United States may have been undoubtedly a blow to racial discrimination, but, its worthiness as a precedent is limited by its failure to decide the issue presented on the narrow but relatively firm ground of statutory interpretation instead of the broad, open-ended and potentially mischievous theory it adopted in upholding the IRS’s decision that Bob Jones University should lose its tax exemption.

Daniel D. Polsby

Papers

The Third Criterion: Compactness as a Procedural Safeguard Against Partisan Gerrymandering

The Third Criterion: Compactness as a Procedural Safeguard Against Partisan Gerrymandering

Ugly: An Inquiry into the Problem of Racial Gerrymandering Under the Voting Rights Act

Ugly: An Inquiry Into the Problem of Racial Gerrymandering Under the Voting Rights Act

Race, Religion, and Public Policy: Bob Jones University v. United States