Computer systems cannot improve organizational performance if they aren't used. Unfortunately, resistance to end-user systems by managers and professionals is a widespread problem. To better predict, explain, and increase user acceptance, we need to better understand why people accept or reject computers. This research addresses the ability to predict peoples' computer acceptance from a measure of their intentions, and the ability to explain their intentions in terms of their attitudes, subjective norms, perceived usefulness, perceived ease of use, and related variables. In a longitudinal study of 107 users, intentions to use a specific system, measured after a one-hour introduction to the system, were correlated 0.35 with system use 14 weeks later. The intention-usage correlation was 0.63 at the end of this time period. Perceived usefulness strongly influenced peoples' intentions, explaining more than half of the variance in intentions at the end of 14 weeks. Perceived ease of use had a small but significant effect on intentions as well, although this effect subsided over time. Attitudes only partially mediated the effects of these beliefs on intentions. Subjective norms had no effect on intentions. These results suggest the possibility of simple but powerful models of the determinants of user acceptance, with practical value for evaluating systems and guiding managerial interventions aimed at reducing the problem of underutilized computer technology.

User Acceptance of Computer Technology: A Comparison of Two Theoretical Models

抗原变异可使得多种致病微生物易于逃避宿主免疫应答。表达在感染红细胞表面的恶性疟原虫红细胞表面蛋白1（PfPMP1）与感染红细胞、内皮细胞、树突状细胞以及胎盘的单个或多个受体作用，在黏附及免疫逃避中起关键的作用。每个单倍体基因组var基因家族编码约60种成员，通过启动转录不同的var基因变异体为抗原变异提供了分子基础。

疟原虫var基因转换速率变化导致抗原变异[英]／Paul H, Robert P, Christodoulou Z, et al//Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A

A hypothesized need to form and maintain strong, stable interpersonal relationships is evaluated in light of the empirical literature. The need is for frequent, nonaversive interactions within an ongoing relational bond. Consistent with the belongingness hypothesis, people form social attachments readily under most conditions and resist the dissolution of existing bonds. Belongingness appears to have multiple and strong effects on emotional patterns and on cognitive processes. Lack of attachments is linked to a variety of ill effects on health, adjustment, and well-being. Other evidence, such as that concerning satiation, substitution, and behavioral consequences, is likewise consistent with the hypothesized motivation. Several seeming counterexamples turned out not to disconfirm the hypothesis. Existing evidence supports the hypothesis that the need to belong is a powerful, fundamental, and extremely pervasive motivation.

The need to belong: Desire for interpersonal attachments as a fundamental human motivation.

The present research develops and tests a theoretical extension of the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) that explains perceived usefulness and usage intentions in terms of social influence and cognitive instrumental processes. The extended model, referred to as TAM2, was tested using longitudinal data collected regarding four different systems at four organizations ( N = 156), two involving voluntary usage and two involving mandatory usage. Model constructs were measured at three points in time at each organization: preimplementation, one month postimplementation, and three months postimplementation. The extended model was strongly supported for all four organizations at all three points of measurement, accounting for 40%--60% of the variance in usefulness perceptions and 34%--52% of the variance in usage intentions. Both social influence processes (subjective norm, voluntariness, and image) and cognitive instrumental processes (job relevance, output quality, result demonstrability, and perceived ease of use) significantly influenced user acceptance. These findings advance theory and contribute to the foundation for future research aimed at improving our understanding of user adoption behavior.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2634758.pdf

A Theoretical Extension of the Technology Acceptance Model: Four Longitudinal Field Studies

Co-Planar Stereotaxic Atlas of the Human Brain—3-Dimensional Proportional System: An Approach to Cerebral Imaging, J. Talairach, P. Tournoux. Georg Thieme Verlag, New York (1988), 122 pp., 130 figs. DM 268

Despite evidence pointing to a ubiquitous tendency of human minds to wander, little is known about the neural operations that support this core component of human cognition. Using both thought sampling and brain imaging, the current investigation demonstrated that mind-wandering is associated with activity in a default network of cortical regions that are active when the brain is "at rest." In addition, individuals' reports of the tendency of their minds to wander were correlated with activity in this network.

/pdf/wandering-minds-the-default-network-and-stimulus-independent-zmbe7twta2.pdf

Wandering Minds: The Default Network and Stimulus-Independent Thought

A theory of ironic processes of mental control is proposed to account for the intentional and counterintentional effects that result from efforts at self-control of mental states. The theory holds that an attempt to control the mind introduces 2 processes: (a) an operating process that promotes the intended change by searching for mental contents consistent with the intended state and (b) a monitoring process that tests whether the operating process is needed by searching for mental contents inconsistent with the intended state. The operating process requires greater cognitive capacity and normally has more pronounced cognitive effects than the monitoring process, and the 2 working together thus promote whatever degree of mental control is enjoyed. Under conditions that reduce capacity, however, the monitoring process may supersede the operating process and thus enhance the person's sensitivity to mental contents that are the ironic opposite of those that are intended.

Ironic processes of mental control.

The most influential theory of group behavior that has ever been developed is currently in disfavor. This is the theory of the group mind. Social commentators once found it very useful to analyze the behavior of groups by the same expedient used in analyzing the behavior of individuals. The group, like the person, was assumed to be sentient, to have a form of mental activity that guides action. Rousseau (1767) and Hegel (1807) were the early architects of this form of analysis, and it became so widely used in the 19th and early 20th centuries that almost every early social theorist we now recognize as a contributor to modern social psychology held a similar view. McDougall, Ross, Durkheim, Wundt, and LeBon, to name just a few, were willing to assume that the group has a mental life that plays a part in the patterning of group behavior.

Transactive Memory: A Contemporary Analysis of the Group Mind

Do we consciously cause our actions, or do they happen to us? Philosophers, psychologists, neuroscientists, theologians, and lawyers have long debated the existence of free will versus determinism. In this book Daniel Wegner offers a novel understanding of the issue. Like actions, he argues, the feeling of conscious will is created by the mind and brain. Yet if psychological and neural mechanisms are responsible for all human behavior, how could we have conscious will? The feeling of conscious will, Wegner shows, helps us to appreciate and remember our authorship of the things our minds and bodies do. Yes, we feel that we consciously will our actions, Wegner says, but at the same time, our actions happen to us. Although conscious will is an illusion, it serves as a guide to understanding ourselves and to developing a sense of responsibility and morality. Approaching conscious will as a topic of psychological study, Wegner examines the issue from a variety of angles. He looks at illusions of the will -- those cases where people feel that they are willing an act that they are not doing or, conversely, are not willing an act that they in fact are doing. He explores conscious will in hypnosis, Ouija board spelling, automatic writing, and facilitated communication, as well as in such phenomena as spirit possession, dissociative identity disorder, and trance channeling. The result is a book that sidesteps endless debates to focus, more fruitfully, on the impact on our lives of the illusion of conscious will.

The Illusion of Conscious Will

In a first experiment, subjects verbalizing the stream of consciousness for a 5-min period were asked to try not to think of a white bear, but to ring a bell in case they did. As indicated both by mentions and by bell rings, they were unable to suppress the thought as instructed. On being asked after this suppression task to think about the white bear for a 5-min period, these subjects showed significantly more tokens of thought about the bear than did subjects who were asked to think about a white bear from the outset. These observations suggest that attempted thought suppression has paradoxical effects as a self-control strategy, perhaps even producing the very obsession or preoccupation that it is directed against. A second experiment replicated these findings and showed that subjects given a specific thought to use as a distracter during suppression were less likely to exhibit later preoccupation with the thought to be suppressed.

/pdf/paradoxical-effects-of-thought-suppression-1dfwms5euz.pdf

Daniel M. Wegner

Papers

Wandering Minds: The Default Network and Stimulus-Independent Thought

Ironic processes of mental control.

Transactive Memory: A Contemporary Analysis of the Group Mind

The Illusion of Conscious Will

Paradoxical Effects of Thought Suppression