D
David Epstein
Researcher at Columbia University
Publications - 38
Citations - 4171
David Epstein is an academic researcher from Columbia University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Voting & Legislation. The author has an hindex of 21, co-authored 38 publications receiving 3969 citations.
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Book
Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making under Separate Powers
David Epstein,Sharyn O'Halloran +1 more
TL;DR: The first unified theory of policy making between the legislative and executive branches was proposed by Epstein and O'Halloran as discussed by the authors, who examined major US policy initiatives from 1947 to 1992 and described the conditions under which the legislature narrowly constrains executive discretion and when it delegates authority to the bureaucracy.
Posted Content
A Global Model for Forecasting Political Instability
Jack Andrew Goldstone,Robert H. Bates,David Epstein,Ted Robert Gurr,Michael B. Lustik,Monty G. Marshall,Jay Ulfelder,Mark Woodward +7 more
TL;DR: In this article, the authors developed a model that distinguishes countries that experienced instability from those that remained stable with a two-year lead time and over 80% accuracy, using a nonlinear five-category measure of regime type based on the polity components.
Journal ArticleDOI
A Global Model for Forecasting Political Instability
Jack Andrew Goldstone,Robert H. Bates,David Epstein,Ted Robert Gurr,Michael B. Lustik,Monty G. Marshall,Jay Ulfelder,Mark Woodward +7 more
TL;DR: In this article, the authors developed a model that distinguishes countries that experienced instability from those that remained stable with a two-year lead time and over 80% accuracy, using a nonlinear five-category measure of regime type based on the polity components.
Journal ArticleDOI
Administrative Procedures, Information, and Agency Discretion
David Epstein,Sharyn O'Halloran +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate the design of administrative procedures when policy consequences are uncertain and show that when Congress has both ex post agenda control and access to information, it will delegate a large degree of discretionary authority to all agencies, regardless of differences in policy preferences.
Journal ArticleDOI
Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?
TL;DR: In this paper, a trade-off between increasing the number of minority officeholders and enacting legislation that furthers the interests of the minority community was explored, and it was shown that such a tradeoff does exist.