Machine Learning is the study of methods for programming computers to learn. Computers are applied to a wide range of tasks, and for most of these it is relatively easy for programmers to design and implement the necessary software. However, there are many tasks for which this is difficult or impossible. These can be divided into four general categories. First, there are problems for which there exist no human experts. For example, in modern automated manufacturing facilities, there is a need to predict machine failures before they occur by analyzing sensor readings. Because the machines are new, there are no human experts who can be interviewed by a programmer to provide the knowledge necessary to build a computer system. A machine learning system can study recorded data and subsequent machine failures and learn prediction rules. Second, there are problems where human experts exist, but where they are unable to explain their expertise. This is the case in many perceptual tasks, such as speech recognition, hand-writing recognition, and natural language understanding. Virtually all humans exhibit expert-level abilities on these tasks, but none of them can describe the detailed steps that they follow as they perform them. Fortunately, humans can provide machines with examples of the inputs and correct outputs for these tasks, so machine learning algorithms can learn to map the inputs to the outputs. Third, there are problems where phenomena are changing rapidly. In finance, for example, people would like to predict the future behavior of the stock market, of consumer purchases, or of exchange rates. These behaviors change frequently, so that even if a programmer could construct a good predictive computer program, it would need to be rewritten frequently. A learning program can relieve the programmer of this burden by constantly modifying and tuning a set of learned prediction rules. Fourth, there are applications that need to be customized for each computer user separately. Consider, for example, a program to filter unwanted electronic mail messages. Different users will need different filters. It is unreasonable to expect each user to program his or her own rules, and it is infeasible to provide every user with a software engineer to keep the rules up-to-date. A machine learning system can learn which mail messages the user rejects and maintain the filtering rules automatically. Machine learning addresses many of the same research questions as the fields of statistics, data mining, and psychology, but with differences of emphasis. Statistics focuses on understanding the phenomena that have generated the data, often with the goal of testing different hypotheses about those phenomena. Data mining seeks to find patterns in the data that are understandable by people. Psychological studies of human learning aspire to understand the mechanisms underlying the various learning behaviors exhibited by people (concept learning, skill acquisition, strategy change, etc.).

Machine learning

Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

This paper gives an overview of the development of the field of Knowledge Engineering over the last 15 years. We discuss the paradigm shift from a transfer view to a modeling view and describe two approaches which considerably shaped research in Knowledge Engineering: Role-limiting Methods and Generic Tasks. To illustrate various concepts and methods which evolved in recent years we describe three modeling frameworks: CommonKADS, MIKE and PROTEGE-II. This description is supplemented by discussing some important methodological developments in more detail: specification languages for knowledge-based systems, problem-solving methods and ontologies. We conclude by outlining the relationship of Knowledge Engineering to Software Engineering, Information Integration and Knowledge Management.

/pdf/knowledge-engineering-principles-and-methods-6do1hbj75r.pdf

Knowledge engineering: principles and methods

Well adapted to the loosely coupled nature of distributed interaction in large-scale applications, the publish/subscribe communication paradigm has recently received increasing attention. With systems based on the publish/subscribe interaction scheme, subscribers register their interest in an event, or a pattern of events, and are subsequently asynchronously notified of events generated by publishers. Many variants of the paradigm have recently been proposed, each variant being specifically adapted to some given application or network model. This paper factors out the common denominator underlying these variants: full decoupling of the communicating entities in time, space, and synchronization. We use these three decoupling dimensions to better identify commonalities and divergences with traditional interaction paradigms. The many variations on the theme of publish/subscribe are classified and synthesized. In particular, their respective benefits and shortcomings are discussed both in terms of interfaces and implementations.

/pdf/the-many-faces-of-publish-subscribe-59ahrjbweq.pdf

The many faces of publish/subscribe

The term ‘‘Internet-of-Things’’ is used as an umbrella keyword for covering various aspects related to the extension of the Internet and the Web into the physical realm, by means of the widespread deployment of spatially distributed devices with embedded identification, sensing and/or actuation capabilities. Internet-of-Things envisions a future in which digital and physical entities can be linked, by means of appropriate information and communication technologies, to enable a whole new class of applications and services. In this article, we present a survey of technologies, applications and research challenges for Internetof-Things.

/pdf/internet-of-things-vision-applications-and-research-4xfstaiv80.pdf

Internet of things: Vision, applications and research challenges

The 2nd Controlled Adaptation of Self-Adaptive Systems Workshop (CASaS2017) (NII Shonan Meeting 2017-10).

software engineering issues forautonomic computing systems iscritical forthesoftware andinformation technology sectors, whicharecontinually challenged toreduce thecomplexity oftheir systems. Tobeautonomic, asystem must knowitself aswellasitsboundaries anditsenvironment, configure andreconfigure itself, continually optimize itself, recover orheal frommalfunction, protect itself, andfunction ina heterogeneous world-while keeping its complexity hidden from theuser. Thegoalofthisworkshop istobring together researchers andpractitioners, who investigate concepts, methodologies, techniques, technologies, andtools todesign and evolve autonomic software.

DEAS2005: Workshop on theDesign andEvolution ofAutonomic Application Software

Machine Learning (ML) models are now commonly used as components in systems. As any other component, ML components can produce erroneous outputs that may penalize system utility. In this context, self-adaptive systems emerge as a natural approach to cope with ML mispredictions, through the execution of adaptation tactics such as model retraining. To synthesize an adaptation strategy, the self-adaptation manager needs to reason about the cost-benefit tradeoffs of the applicable tactics, which is a non-trivial task for tactics such as model retraining, whose benefits are both context- and data-dependent.To address this challenge, this paper proposes a probabilistic modeling framework that supports automated reasoning about the cost/benefit tradeoffs associated with improving ML components of ML-based systems. The key idea of the proposed approach is to decouple the problems of (i) estimating the expected performance improvement after retrain and (ii) estimating the impact of ML improved predictions on overall system utility.We demonstrate the application of the proposed framework by using it to self-adapt a state-of-the-art ML-based fraud-detection system, which we evaluate using a publicly-available, real fraud detection dataset. We show that by predicting system utility stemming from retraining a ML component, the probabilistic model checker can generate adaptation strategies that are significantly closer to the optimal, as compared against baselines such as periodic retraining, or reactive retraining.

Towards a Framework for Adapting Machine Learning Components

/pdf/a-probabilistic-model-for-personality-trait-focused-2k2v6vb21p.pdf

A Probabilistic Model for Personality Trait Focused Explainability.

Over the past decade, a number of automated techniques and tools have been developed for optimizing architectural designs with respect to quality-attribute goals. In these systems, the optimization process is typically seen as a black box, since it is not possible for a human to have access to the decisions that led to a particular solution generated by an optimization tool. Even when these decisions are available for inspection, the amount of information can be overwhelming for the architect. As a result, humans might not completely understand the rationale behind a given solution or trust that a tool made correct decisions. To mitigate this problem, we propose a semi-automated approach for generating textual explanations for any architectural solution produced by a tool. This kind of explanation provides a summary of the key architectural tactics that were applied to achieve an optimized architecture that satisfies a set of quality-attribute objectives. In this paper, we discuss two procedures for determining the key tactics to be explained. As an initial experiment, we used a popular optimization tool to generate solutions and explanations for a small but non-trivial design space involving performance, reliability, and cost objectives. We also performed an exploratory user study to assess the effectiveness of these explanations.

David Garlan

Papers

The 2nd Controlled Adaptation of Self-Adaptive Systems Workshop (CASaS2017) (NII Shonan Meeting 2017-10).

DEAS2005: Workshop on theDesign andEvolution ofAutonomic Application Software

Towards a Framework for Adapting Machine Learning Components

A Probabilistic Model for Personality Trait Focused Explainability.

Making Architecture Optimization Transparent with Tactic-Based Explanations