Machine Learning is the study of methods for programming computers to learn. Computers are applied to a wide range of tasks, and for most of these it is relatively easy for programmers to design and implement the necessary software. However, there are many tasks for which this is difficult or impossible. These can be divided into four general categories. First, there are problems for which there exist no human experts. For example, in modern automated manufacturing facilities, there is a need to predict machine failures before they occur by analyzing sensor readings. Because the machines are new, there are no human experts who can be interviewed by a programmer to provide the knowledge necessary to build a computer system. A machine learning system can study recorded data and subsequent machine failures and learn prediction rules. Second, there are problems where human experts exist, but where they are unable to explain their expertise. This is the case in many perceptual tasks, such as speech recognition, hand-writing recognition, and natural language understanding. Virtually all humans exhibit expert-level abilities on these tasks, but none of them can describe the detailed steps that they follow as they perform them. Fortunately, humans can provide machines with examples of the inputs and correct outputs for these tasks, so machine learning algorithms can learn to map the inputs to the outputs. Third, there are problems where phenomena are changing rapidly. In finance, for example, people would like to predict the future behavior of the stock market, of consumer purchases, or of exchange rates. These behaviors change frequently, so that even if a programmer could construct a good predictive computer program, it would need to be rewritten frequently. A learning program can relieve the programmer of this burden by constantly modifying and tuning a set of learned prediction rules. Fourth, there are applications that need to be customized for each computer user separately. Consider, for example, a program to filter unwanted electronic mail messages. Different users will need different filters. It is unreasonable to expect each user to program his or her own rules, and it is infeasible to provide every user with a software engineer to keep the rules up-to-date. A machine learning system can learn which mail messages the user rejects and maintain the filtering rules automatically. Machine learning addresses many of the same research questions as the fields of statistics, data mining, and psychology, but with differences of emphasis. Statistics focuses on understanding the phenomena that have generated the data, often with the goal of testing different hypotheses about those phenomena. Data mining seeks to find patterns in the data that are understandable by people. Psychological studies of human learning aspire to understand the mechanisms underlying the various learning behaviors exhibited by people (concept learning, skill acquisition, strategy change, etc.).

Machine learning

Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

This paper gives an overview of the development of the field of Knowledge Engineering over the last 15 years. We discuss the paradigm shift from a transfer view to a modeling view and describe two approaches which considerably shaped research in Knowledge Engineering: Role-limiting Methods and Generic Tasks. To illustrate various concepts and methods which evolved in recent years we describe three modeling frameworks: CommonKADS, MIKE and PROTEGE-II. This description is supplemented by discussing some important methodological developments in more detail: specification languages for knowledge-based systems, problem-solving methods and ontologies. We conclude by outlining the relationship of Knowledge Engineering to Software Engineering, Information Integration and Knowledge Management.

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Knowledge engineering: principles and methods

Well adapted to the loosely coupled nature of distributed interaction in large-scale applications, the publish/subscribe communication paradigm has recently received increasing attention. With systems based on the publish/subscribe interaction scheme, subscribers register their interest in an event, or a pattern of events, and are subsequently asynchronously notified of events generated by publishers. Many variants of the paradigm have recently been proposed, each variant being specifically adapted to some given application or network model. This paper factors out the common denominator underlying these variants: full decoupling of the communicating entities in time, space, and synchronization. We use these three decoupling dimensions to better identify commonalities and divergences with traditional interaction paradigms. The many variations on the theme of publish/subscribe are classified and synthesized. In particular, their respective benefits and shortcomings are discussed both in terms of interfaces and implementations.

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The many faces of publish/subscribe

The term ‘‘Internet-of-Things’’ is used as an umbrella keyword for covering various aspects related to the extension of the Internet and the Web into the physical realm, by means of the widespread deployment of spatially distributed devices with embedded identification, sensing and/or actuation capabilities. Internet-of-Things envisions a future in which digital and physical entities can be linked, by means of appropriate information and communication technologies, to enable a whole new class of applications and services. In this article, we present a survey of technologies, applications and research challenges for Internetof-Things.

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Internet of things: Vision, applications and research challenges

An important goal in software engineering is to describe complex software systems at an architectural level of abstraction While there are many useful architectural paradigms (pipes, blackboards, etc) they are typically understood only idiomatically and applied in an ad hoc fashion We show how a formal model allows us to say precisely what we mean by a software architecture, explore its properties, and systematically describe instances of the architecture We illustrate the approach using the well-known example of pipe-filter architectures

Towards Formalized Software Architectures

End-users’ trust in automated agents is important as automated decision-making and planning is increasingly used in many aspects of people’s lives. In real-world applications of planning, multiple optimization objectives are often involved. Thus, planning agents’ decisions can involve complex tradeoffs among competing objectives. It can be difficult for the end-users to understand why an agent decides on a particular planning solution on the basis of its objective values. As a result, the users may not know whether the agent is making the right decisions, and may lack trust in it. In this work, we contribute an approach, based on contrastive explanation, that enables a multi-objective MDP planning agent to explain its decisions in a way that communicates its tradeoff rationale in terms of the domain-level concepts. We conduct a human subjects experiment to evaluate the effectiveness of our explanation approach in a mobile robot navigation domain. The results show that our approach significantly improves the users’ understanding, and confidence in their understanding, of the tradeoff rationale of the planning agent.

Tradeoff-Focused Contrastive Explanation for MDP Planning

Computers support more and more tasks in the personal and professional activities of users. Such user tasks increasingly span large periods of time and many locations across the enterprise space and beyond. Recently there has been a growing interest in developing applications that can cope with the specific environmental conditions at each location, and adapt to dynamic changes in system resources. However, in a given situation there may be many possible configuration solutions, and an awareness of the user's intent for each task is a critical element in knowing which one to pick. In this paper, we discuss the limitations of building such awareness into applications, and propose to factor the awareness of user tasks into a common software layer. That however, brings up the problem of coordinating the system-wide adaptation performed by such a layer with fine-grain adaptation performed by resource-aware applications. We summarize the main features of an architectural framework that incorporates such a layer, and distill some of the lessons learned in implementing the framework.

Capitalizing on Awareness of User Tasks for Guiding Self-Adaptation.

Design decisions made during early development stages of self-adaptive systems tend to have a significant impact upon system properties at run time (e.g., safety, QoS). However, understanding the implications of these decisions a priori is difficult due to the different types and degrees of uncertainty that affect such systems (e.g., simplifying assumptions, human-in-the-loop). To provide some assurances about self-adaptive system designs, evidence can be gathered from activities such as simulations and prototyping, but these demand a significant effort and do not provide a systematic way of dealing with uncertainty. In this chapter, we describe an approach based on model checking of stochastic multiplayer games (SMGs) that enables developers to approximate the behavioral envelope of a self-adaptive system by analyzing best- and worst-case scenarios of alternative designs for self-adaptation mechanisms. Compared to other sources of evidence, such as simulations or prototypes, our approach is purely declarative and hence has the potential of providing developers with a preliminary understanding of adaptation behavior with less effort, and without the need to have any specific adaptation algorithms or infrastructure in place. We illustrate our approach by showing how it can be used to mitigate different types of uncertainty in contexts such as self-protecting systems, proactive latency-aware adaptation, and human-in-the-loop adaptation.

Analyzing Self-Adaptation Via Model Checking of Stochastic Games

Software systems are increasingly called upon to manage their goals autonomously in changing contexts and environments, and under evolving requirements. In some circumstances, autonomous systems cannot be fully automated but instead cooperate with human operators to maintain and adapt themselves. Furthermore, there are times when a choice should be made between doing a manual or automated repair. Involving operators in self-adaptation should itself be adaptive, and consider aspects such as the training, attention, and ability of operators. Not only do these aspects change from person to person, but they may change with the same person. These aspects make the choice of whether to involve humans nonobvious. Self-adaptive systems should trade-off whether to involve operators, taking these aspects into consideration along with other business qualities it is attempting to achieve. In this chapter, we identify the various roles that operators can perform in cooperating with self-adaptive systems. We focus on humans as effectors—doing tasks that are difficult or infeasible to automate. We describe how we modified our self-adaptive framework, Rainbow, to involve operators in this way, which involved choosing suitable human models and integrating them into the existing utility trade-off decision models of Rainbow. We use probabilistic modeling and quantitative verification to analyze the trade-offs of involving humans in adaptation, and complement our study with experiments to show how different business preferences and modalities of human involvement may result in different outcomes.

David Garlan

Papers

Towards Formalized Software Architectures

Tradeoff-Focused Contrastive Explanation for MDP Planning

Capitalizing on Awareness of User Tasks for Guiding Self-Adaptation.

Analyzing Self-Adaptation Via Model Checking of Stochastic Games

Evaluating Trade-Offs of Human Involvement in Self-Adaptive Systems