Machine Learning is the study of methods for programming computers to learn. Computers are applied to a wide range of tasks, and for most of these it is relatively easy for programmers to design and implement the necessary software. However, there are many tasks for which this is difficult or impossible. These can be divided into four general categories. First, there are problems for which there exist no human experts. For example, in modern automated manufacturing facilities, there is a need to predict machine failures before they occur by analyzing sensor readings. Because the machines are new, there are no human experts who can be interviewed by a programmer to provide the knowledge necessary to build a computer system. A machine learning system can study recorded data and subsequent machine failures and learn prediction rules. Second, there are problems where human experts exist, but where they are unable to explain their expertise. This is the case in many perceptual tasks, such as speech recognition, hand-writing recognition, and natural language understanding. Virtually all humans exhibit expert-level abilities on these tasks, but none of them can describe the detailed steps that they follow as they perform them. Fortunately, humans can provide machines with examples of the inputs and correct outputs for these tasks, so machine learning algorithms can learn to map the inputs to the outputs. Third, there are problems where phenomena are changing rapidly. In finance, for example, people would like to predict the future behavior of the stock market, of consumer purchases, or of exchange rates. These behaviors change frequently, so that even if a programmer could construct a good predictive computer program, it would need to be rewritten frequently. A learning program can relieve the programmer of this burden by constantly modifying and tuning a set of learned prediction rules. Fourth, there are applications that need to be customized for each computer user separately. Consider, for example, a program to filter unwanted electronic mail messages. Different users will need different filters. It is unreasonable to expect each user to program his or her own rules, and it is infeasible to provide every user with a software engineer to keep the rules up-to-date. A machine learning system can learn which mail messages the user rejects and maintain the filtering rules automatically. Machine learning addresses many of the same research questions as the fields of statistics, data mining, and psychology, but with differences of emphasis. Statistics focuses on understanding the phenomena that have generated the data, often with the goal of testing different hypotheses about those phenomena. Data mining seeks to find patterns in the data that are understandable by people. Psychological studies of human learning aspire to understand the mechanisms underlying the various learning behaviors exhibited by people (concept learning, skill acquisition, strategy change, etc.).

Machine learning

Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

This paper gives an overview of the development of the field of Knowledge Engineering over the last 15 years. We discuss the paradigm shift from a transfer view to a modeling view and describe two approaches which considerably shaped research in Knowledge Engineering: Role-limiting Methods and Generic Tasks. To illustrate various concepts and methods which evolved in recent years we describe three modeling frameworks: CommonKADS, MIKE and PROTEGE-II. This description is supplemented by discussing some important methodological developments in more detail: specification languages for knowledge-based systems, problem-solving methods and ontologies. We conclude by outlining the relationship of Knowledge Engineering to Software Engineering, Information Integration and Knowledge Management.

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Knowledge engineering: principles and methods

Well adapted to the loosely coupled nature of distributed interaction in large-scale applications, the publish/subscribe communication paradigm has recently received increasing attention. With systems based on the publish/subscribe interaction scheme, subscribers register their interest in an event, or a pattern of events, and are subsequently asynchronously notified of events generated by publishers. Many variants of the paradigm have recently been proposed, each variant being specifically adapted to some given application or network model. This paper factors out the common denominator underlying these variants: full decoupling of the communicating entities in time, space, and synchronization. We use these three decoupling dimensions to better identify commonalities and divergences with traditional interaction paradigms. The many variations on the theme of publish/subscribe are classified and synthesized. In particular, their respective benefits and shortcomings are discussed both in terms of interfaces and implementations.

/pdf/the-many-faces-of-publish-subscribe-59ahrjbweq.pdf

The many faces of publish/subscribe

The term ‘‘Internet-of-Things’’ is used as an umbrella keyword for covering various aspects related to the extension of the Internet and the Web into the physical realm, by means of the widespread deployment of spatially distributed devices with embedded identification, sensing and/or actuation capabilities. Internet-of-Things envisions a future in which digital and physical entities can be linked, by means of appropriate information and communication technologies, to enable a whole new class of applications and services. In this article, we present a survey of technologies, applications and research challenges for Internetof-Things.

/pdf/internet-of-things-vision-applications-and-research-4xfstaiv80.pdf

Internet of things: Vision, applications and research challenges

A critical level of abstraction in the modeling of a large, complex system is its architecture. At an architectural level one models the principal system elements and their interaction. Architectural models are typically used to provide an intellectually tractable, birds-eye view of a system and to permit design-time reasoning about system-level concerns such as performance, reliability, portability, and conformance to external standards and architectural styles.

Modeling of Architectures with UML

Self-adaptive systems increasingly need to reason about and adapt both structural and behavioral system aspects, such as in mobile service robots, which must reason about missions that they need to achieve and the architecture of the software executing them. Deciding how to best adapt these systems to run time changes is challenging because it entails considering mutual dependencies between the software architecture that the system is running and the outcome of plans for completing tasks, while also considering multiple trade-offs and uncertainties. Considering all these aspects in planning for adaptation often yields large solution spaces which cannot be adequately explored at run time. We address this challenge by proposing a planning approach able to consider the impact of mutual dependencies between software architecture and task planning on the satisfaction of mission goals. The approach is able to reason quantitatively about the outcome of adaptation decisions handling both the reconfiguration of the system's architecture and adaptation of task plans under uncertainty and in a rich trade-off space. Our results show: (i) feasibility of run-time decision-making for self-adaptation in an otherwise intractable solution space by dividing-and-conquering adaptation into architecture reconfiguration and task planning sub-problems, and (ii) improved quality of adaptation decisions with respect to decision making that does not consider dependencies between architecture and task planning.

https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/3387939.3391591

Software architecture and task plan co-adaptation for mobile service robots

Modern data analytic and machine learning jobs find in the cloud a natural deployment platform to satisfy their notoriously large resource requirements. Yet, to achieve cost efficiency, it is crucial to identify a deployment configuration that satisfies user-defined QoS constraints (e.g., on execution time), while avoiding unnecessary over-provisioning.This paper introduces Lynceus, a new approach for the optimization of cloud-based data analytic jobs that improves over state-of-the-art approaches by enabling significant cost savings both in terms of the final recommended configuration and of the optimization process used to recommend configurations.Unlike existing solutions, Lynceus optimizes in a joint fashion both the cloud-related (i.e., which and how many machines to provision) and the application-level (e.g. the hyper-parameters of a machine learning algorithm) parameters. This allows for a reduction of the cost of recommended configurations by up to 3.7× at the 90-th percentile with respect to existing approaches, which treat the optimization of cloud-related and application- level parameters as two independent problems.Further, Lynceus reduces the cost of the optimization process (i.e., the cloud cost incurred for testing configurations) by up to 11×. Such an improvement is achieved thanks to two mechanisms: i) a timeout approach which allows to abort the exploration of configurations that are deemed suboptimal, while still extracting useful information to guide future explorations and to improve its predictive model – differently from recent works, which either incur the full cost for testing suboptimal configurations or are unable to extract any knowledge from aborted runs; ii) a long-sighted and budget-aware technique that determines which configurations to test by predicting the long-term impact of each exploration – unlike state-of-the-art approaches for the optimization of cloud jobs, which adopt greedy optimization methods.

Lynceus: Cost-efficient Tuning and Provisioning of Data Analytic Jobs

Many self-adaptive systems benefit from human involvement, where a human operator can provide expertise not available to the system and perform adaptations involving physical changes that cannot be automated. However, a lack of transparency and intelligibility of system goals and the autonomous behaviors enacted to achieve them may hinder a human operator’s effort to make such involvement effective. Explanation is sometimes helpful to allow the human to understand why the system is making certain decisions. However, explanations come with costs in terms of, e.g., delayed actions. Hence, it is not always obvious whether explanations will improve the satisfaction of system goals and, if so, when to provide them to the operator. In this work, we define a formal framework for reasoning about explanations of adaptive system behaviors and the conditions under which they are warranted. Specifically, we characterize explanations in terms of their impact on a human operator’s ability to effectively engage in adaptive actions. We then present a decision-making approach for planning in self-adaptation that leverages a probabilistic reasoning tool to determine when the explanation should be used in an adaptation strategy in order to improve overall system utility. We illustrate our approach in a representative scenario for the application of an adaptive news website in the context of potential denial-of-service attacks.

David Garlan

Papers

Modeling of Architectures with UML

Software architecture and task plan co-adaptation for mobile service robots

Lynceus: Cost-efficient Tuning and Provisioning of Data Analytic Jobs

Reasoning about When to Provide Explanation for Human-involved Self-Adaptive Systems

Proceedings of the First ACM SIGSOFT Workshop on Self-Healing Systems (WOSS '02) : November 18-19, 2002, Charleston, South Carolina, USA