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David R. Karger

Researcher at Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Publications -  357
Citations -  55665

David R. Karger is an academic researcher from Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The author has contributed to research in topics: Semantic Web & User interface. The author has an hindex of 95, co-authored 349 publications receiving 53806 citations. Previous affiliations of David R. Karger include Stanford University & Akamai Technologies.

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Seeding Course Forums using the Teacher-in-the-Loop

TL;DR: In this article, a supervised machine learning (ML) model was proposed to select high-quality seeds and evaluate their impact over one course instance of a 186-student biology class, where the authors designed a scale for measuring the seeding suitability score of a given thread (an opening comment and its ensuing discussion).
Proceedings ArticleDOI

Eyebrowse: Selective and Public Web Activity Sharing

TL;DR: This work presents a system called Eyebrowse that allows users to selectively share their web browsing publicly and with friends, using a whitelist at the domain level, which opens up the capabilities to conduct discussions both in real-time and asynchronously around webpages that are designated by the user as a “public space”, much like public spaces in real life.

Understanding and Supporting Directed Content Sharing on the Web

TL;DR: This paper study and augment link-sharing via e-mail, the most popular means of sharing web content today, and presents FeedMe, a plug-in for Google Reader that makes directed sharing of content a more salient part of the user experience.

Assisted Browsing for Semistructured Data

TL;DR: This paper presents a framework, system, and user interface supporting navigation in semistructured data repositories, and focuses on providing users with helpful “next steps” leading them to the information they are seeking.

MIT Open Access Articles DDoS defense by offense

TL;DR: Speak-Up as mentioned in this paper is a defense against application-level distributed denial-of-service (DDoS), in which attackers crip-ple a server by sending legitimate-looking requests that consume computational resources ( e.g., CPU cycles, disk).