A Treatise on the Family. G. S. Becker. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 1981. Gary Becker is one of the most famous and influential economists of the second half of the 20th century, a fervent contributor to and expounder of the University of Chicago free-market philosophy, and winner of the 1992 Nobel Prize in economics. Although any book with the word "treatise" in its title is clearly intended to have an impact, one coming from someone as brilliant and controversial as Becker certainly had such a lofty goal. It has received many article-length reviews in several disciplines (Ben-Porath, 1982; Bergmann, 1995; Foster, 1993; Hannan, 1982), which is one measure of its scholarly importance, and yet its impact is, I think, less than it may have initially appeared, especially for scholars with substantive interests in the family. This book is, its title notwithstanding, more about economics and the economic approach to behavior than about the family. In the first sentence of the preface, Becker writes "In this book, I develop an economic or rational choice approach to the family." Lest anyone accuse him of focusing on traditional (i.e., material) economics topics, such as family income, poverty, and labor supply, he immediately emphasizes that those topics are not his focus. "My intent is more ambitious: to analyze marriage, births, divorce, division of labor in households, prestige, and other non-material behavior with the tools and framework developed for material behavior." Indeed, the book includes chapters on many of these issues. One chapter examines the principles of the efficient division of labor in households, three analyze marriage and divorce, three analyze various child-related issues (fertility and intergenerational mobility), and others focus on broader family issues, such as intrafamily resource allocation. His analysis is not, he believes, constrained by time or place. His intention is "to present a comprehensive analysis that is applicable, at least in part, to families in the past as well as the present, in primitive as well as modern societies, and in Eastern as well as Western cultures." His tone is profoundly conservative and utterly skeptical of any constructive role for government programs. There is a clear sense of how much better things were in the old days of a genderbased division of labor and low market-work rates for married women. Indeed, Becker is ready and able to show in Chapter 2 that such a state of affairs was efficient and induced not by market or societal discrimination (although he allows that it might exist) but by small underlying household productivity differences that arise primarily from what he refers to as "complementarities" between caring for young children while carrying another to term. Most family scholars would probably find that an unconvincingly simple explanation for a profound and complex phenomenon. What, then, is the salient contribution of Treatise on the Family? It is not literally the idea that economics could be applied to the nonmarket sector and to family life because Becker had already established that with considerable success and influence. At its core, microeconomics is simple, characterized by a belief in the importance of prices and markets, the role of self-interested or rational behavior, and, somewhat less centrally, the stability of preferences. It was Becker's singular and invaluable contribution to appreciate that the behaviors potentially amenable to the economic approach were not limited to phenomenon with explicit monetary prices and formal markets. Indeed, during the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s, he did undeniably important and pioneering work extending the domain of economics to such topics as labor market discrimination, fertility, crime, human capital, household production, and the allocation of time. Nor is Becker's contribution the detailed analyses themselves. Many of them are, frankly, odd, idiosyncratic, and off-putting. …

A Treatise on the Family

Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity

What makes organizations so similar? We contend that the engine of rationalization and bureaucratization has moved from the competitive marketplace to the state and the professions. Once a set of organizations emerges as a field, a paradox arises: rational actors make their organizations increasingly similar as they try to change them. We describe three isomorphic processes-coercive, mimetic, and normative—leading to this outcome. We then specify hypotheses about the impact of resource centralization and dependency, goal ambiguity and technical uncertainty, and professionalization and structuration on isomorphic change. Finally, we suggest implications for theories of organizations and social change.

The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields (Chinese Translation)

The Political Consciousness of Post-Industrialism@@@The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics.

http://library.um.ac.id/free-contents/downloadpdf.php/buku/focus-groups-as-qualitative-research-by-morgan-david-l-11476.pdf

Focus groups as qualitative research / by Morgan, David L.

This article reviews research on the effects of economic recessions on fertility in the developed world. We study how economic downturns, as measured by various indicators, especially by declining GDP levels, falling consumer confidence, and rising unemployment, were found to affect fertility. We also discuss particular mechanisms through which the recession may have influenced fertility behavior, including the effects of economic uncertainty, falling income, changes in the housing market, and rising enrollment in higher education, and also factors that influence fertility indirectly such as declining marriage rates. Most studies find that fertility tends to be pro-cyclical and often rises and declines with the ups and downs of the business cycle. Usually, these aggregate effects are relatively small (typically, a few percentage points) and of short durations; in addition they often influence especially the timing of childbearing and in most cases do not leave an imprint on cohort fertility levels. Therefore, major long-term fertility shifts often continue seemingly uninterrupted during the recession—including the fertility declines before and during the Great Depression of the 1930s and before and during the oil shock crises of the 1970s. Changes in the opportunity costs of childbearing and fertility behavior during economic downturn vary by sex, age, social status, and number of children; childless young adults are usually most affected. Furthermore, various policies and institutions may modify or even reverse the relationship between recessions and fertility. The first evidence pertaining to the recent recession falls in line with these findings. In most countries, the recession has brought a decline in the number of births and fertility rates, often marking a sharp halt to the previous decade of rising fertility rates.

/pdf/economic-recession-and-fertility-in-the-developed-world-1m72npm7fw.pdf

Economic Recession and Fertility in the Developed World

In the paper we analyse the leaving-home experience of men and women born around 1960 in 16 European countries. We use extensive empirical evidence from Fertility and Family Survey data, providing a large-scale comparison. We focus on some key indicators of the process of leaving home: the timing, sequencing and synchronisation of leaving home with the end of education and the formation of a first union. As far as these dimensions of leaving home are concerned, Europe appears to be extremely heterogeneous, and explaining this will undoubtedly be a challenge. The complex interplay between the present economic situation of young people and long-term institutional and cultural factors is thought to be the main driving factor. Our findings constitute a benchmark against which subsequent behaviour, such as that of cohorts coming of age after the fall of the Iron Curtain, could be compared. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/6385753.pdf

Leaving Home in Europe: The Experience of Cohorts Born Around 1960

We use survey data from Bulgaria and Hungary to investigate the determinants of whether women intend to have a first or a second child and, if so, whether they intend to have the child within the ensuing 2 years or later. These determinants differ significantly by the order and timing of the intended birth. The variables used include measures of anomie and social capital and these appear to be among the factors that determine both whether to have a child and when. There is some evidence that these measures and economic factors are relatively more important in Bulgaria than in Hungary, and that ideational factors are more important in Hungary, particularly in the case of voluntary childlessness.

Soon, later, or ever? The impact of anomie and social capital on fertility intentions in Bulgaria (2002) and Hungary (2001)

In this article, we study fertility decision-making through timing parity-progression intentions. The theoretical framework builds on Ajzen’s social-psychological “Theory of Planned Behavior”: intentions are seen as directly dependent on three components: attitudes, norms and perceived behavioural control. We study the case of Bulgaria, a “lowest-low” fertility country. In 2002, a sample survey containing a specially designed module was conducted. This module included an implementation of our framework, with a special attention to the links between normative pressure and the social network of respondents. Results show that the three components are broadly predictive of fertility intentions. More specifically, attitudes are more relevant than norms for higher parities. Socio-economic, ideational, psychological and social capital-based factors are relevant background determinants.

/pdf/attitudes-norms-and-perceived-behavioural-control-explaining-5dt546nk8z.pdf

Attitudes, Norms and Perceived Behavioural Control: Explaining Fertility Intentions in Bulgaria

In Central and Eastern Europe following the political transformations of the late 1980s and early 1990s, there were dramatic declines in marriage and childbearing, significant increases in nonmarital cohabitation and childbearing, and a movement from reliance on abortion to a reliance on contraception for fertility limitation. Although many explanations have been offered for these trends, we offer new explanations based on ideational influences and the intersection of these ideational influences with structural factors. We focus on the political, economic, social, and cultural histories of the region, with particular emphasis on how countries in the region have interacted with and been influenced by Western European and North American countries. Our explanations emphasize the role of developmental models in guiding change in the region, suggesting that developmental idealism influenced family and demographic changes following the political transformations. Developmental idealism provides beliefs that modern family systems help to produce modern political and economic accomplishments, and it helps establish the importance of freedom and equality as human rights in both the public and private spheres. The disintegration of the governments and the fall of the iron curtain in the late 1980s and early 1990s brought new understanding about social, economic, and family circumstances in the West, increasing consumption aspirations and expectations which clashed with both old economic realities and the dramatic declines in economic circumstances. In addition, the dissolution of the former governments removed or weakened systems supporting the bearing and rearing of children; and the legitimacy of the former governments and their programs was largely destroyed, thereby removing government support for old norms and patterns of behavior. In addition, the attacks of previous decades on the religious institutions in the region had in many places left these institutions weak. During this period, many openly reached out to embrace the values, living standards, and economic, political, and familial systems of the West. And, the thirst for freedom—and its considerable expansion—operated in personal and familial as well as political and economic realms. These dramatic changes combined together to produce the many changes occurring in family and demographic behavior.

/pdf/sweeping-changes-in-marriage-cohabitation-and-childbearing-1rwdv9p7kk.pdf

Dimiter Philipov

Papers

Economic Recession and Fertility in the Developed World

Leaving Home in Europe: The Experience of Cohorts Born Around 1960

Soon, later, or ever? The impact of anomie and social capital on fertility intentions in Bulgaria (2002) and Hungary (2001)

Attitudes, Norms and Perceived Behavioural Control: Explaining Fertility Intentions in Bulgaria

Sweeping Changes in Marriage, Cohabitation, and Childbearing in Central and Eastern Europe: New Insights from the Developmental Idealism Framework.