抗原变异可使得多种致病微生物易于逃避宿主免疫应答。表达在感染红细胞表面的恶性疟原虫红细胞表面蛋白1（PfPMP1）与感染红细胞、内皮细胞、树突状细胞以及胎盘的单个或多个受体作用，在黏附及免疫逃避中起关键的作用。每个单倍体基因组var基因家族编码约60种成员，通过启动转录不同的var基因变异体为抗原变异提供了分子基础。

疟原虫var基因转换速率变化导致抗原变异[英]／Paul H, Robert P, Christodoulou Z, et al//Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A

https://www2.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/DeepLearningInNeuralNetworksOverview.JSchmidhuber2015.pdf

Deep learning in neural networks

We have developed a near-real-time computer system that can locate and track a subject's head, and then recognize the person by comparing characteristics of the face to those of known individuals. The computational approach taken in this system is motivated by both physiology and information theory, as well as by the practical requirements of near-real-time performance and accuracy. Our approach treats the face recognition problem as an intrinsically two-dimensional (2-D) recognition problem rather than requiring recovery of three-dimensional geometry, taking advantage of the fact that faces are normally upright and thus may be described by a small set of 2-D characteristic views. The system functions by projecting face images onto a feature space that spans the significant variations among known face images. The significant features are known as "eigenfaces," because they are the eigenvectors (principal components) of the set of faces; they do not necessarily correspond to features such as eyes, ears, and noses. The projection operation characterizes an individual face by a weighted sum of the eigenface features, and so to recognize a particular face it is necessary only to compare these weights to those of known individuals. Some particular advantages of our approach are that it provides for the ability to learn and later recognize new faces in an unsupervised manner, and that it is easy to implement using a neural network architecture.

/pdf/eigenfaces-for-recognition-1vpm5kz4jh.pdf

Eigenfaces for recognition

▪ Abstract The prefrontal cortex has long been suspected to play an important role in cognitive control, in the ability to orchestrate thought and action in accordance with internal goals. Its neural basis, however, has remained a mystery. Here, we propose that cognitive control stems from the active maintenance of patterns of activity in the prefrontal cortex that represent goals and the means to achieve them. They provide bias signals to other brain structures whose net effect is to guide the flow of activity along neural pathways that establish the proper mappings between inputs, internal states, and outputs needed to perform a given task. We review neurophysiological, neurobiological, neuroimaging, and computational studies that support this theory and discuss its implications as well as further issues to be addressed

/pdf/an-integrative-theory-of-prefrontal-cortex-function-2j9unprn5f.pdf

An integrative theory of prefrontal cortex function

A baseline or control state is fundamental to the understanding of most complex systems. Defining a baseline state in the human brain, arguably our most complex system, poses a particular challenge. Many suspect that left unconstrained, its activity will vary unpredictably. Despite this prediction we identify a baseline state of the normal adult human brain in terms of the brain oxygen extraction fraction or OEF. The OEF is defined as the ratio of oxygen used by the brain to oxygen delivered by flowing blood and is remarkably uniform in the awake but resting state (e.g., lying quietly with eyes closed). Local deviations in the OEF represent the physiological basis of signals of changes in neuronal activity obtained with functional MRI during a wide variety of human behaviors. We used quantitative metabolic and circulatory measurements from positron-emission tomography to obtain the OEF regionally throughout the brain. Areas of activation were conspicuous by their absence. All significant deviations from the mean hemisphere OEF were increases, signifying deactivations, and resided almost exclusively in the visual system. Defining the baseline state of an area in this manner attaches meaning to a group of areas that consistently exhibit decreases from this baseline, during a wide variety of goal-directed behaviors monitored with positron-emission tomography and functional MRI. These decreases suggest the existence of an organized, baseline default mode of brain function that is suspended during specific goal-directed behaviors.

/pdf/a-default-mode-of-brain-function-zwenkbmjw7.pdf

A default mode of brain function.

Taste and olfactory activation of the orbitofrontal cortex

A neuroscience-based approach has recently been proposed for the relation between the mind and the brain. The proposal is that events at the sub-neuronal, neuronal, and neuronal network levels take place simultaneously to perform a computation that can be described at a high level as a mental state, with content about the world. It is argued that as the processes at the different levels of explanation take place at the same time, they are linked by a non-causal supervenient relationship: causality can best be described in brains as operating within but not between levels. This mind-brain theory allows mental events to be different in kind from the mechanistic events that underlie them; but does not lead one to argue that mental events cause brain events, or vice versa: they are different levels of explanation of the operation of the computational system. Here, some implications are developed. It is proposed that causality, at least as it applies to the brain, should satisfy three conditions. First, interventionist tests for causality must be satisfied. Second, the causally related events should be at the same level of explanation. Third, a temporal order condition must be satisfied, with a suitable time scale in the order of 10 ms (to exclude application to quantum physics; and a cause cannot follow an effect). Next, although it may be useful for different purposes to describe causality involving the mind and brain at the mental level, or at the brain level, it is argued that the brain level may sometimes be more accurate, for sometimes causal accounts at the mental level may arise from confabulation by the mentalee, whereas understanding exactly what computations have occurred in the brain that result in a choice or action will provide the correct causal account for why a choice or action was made. Next, it is argued that possible cases of "downward causation" can be accounted for by a within-levels-of-explanation account of causality. This computational neuroscience approach provides an opportunity to proceed beyond Cartesian dualism and physical reductionism in considering the relations between the mind and the brain.

Mind Causality: A Computational Neuroscience Approach.

On pattern separation in the primate, including human, hippocampus.

Publisher Summary To analyze the function of the striatum, recordings are being made of the activity of striatal neurons while the striatum is functioning normally in the behaving monkey. The neuronal responses are being examined while the monkey performs tasks known to be impaired by damage to the striatum. One aspect of the findings is that the neuronal responses in different parts of the striatum reflect the activity of the cortical area, which projects most strongly to each region of the striatum. There is a projection from the inferior temporal visual cortex to the striatum, in particular to the tail of the caudate nucleus, which is in the temporal lobe, and the adjoining postero-ventral part of the putamen. The neostriatum contains assemblies of neurons with properties suggesting that they are involved in different stages by which environmental cues prepare animals and enable them to make behavioral responses.

Edmund T. Rolls

Papers

Taste and olfactory activation of the orbitofrontal cortex

Mind Causality: A Computational Neuroscience Approach.

On pattern separation in the primate, including human, hippocampus.

Neuronal responses in the striatum of the behaving monkey: implications for understanding striatal function and dysfunction

In linking affect to action: critical contributions of the orbitofrontal cortex