Introduction 1. Woman's Place in Man's Life Cycle 2. Images of Relationship 3. Concepts of Self and Morality 4. Crisis and Transition 5. Women's Rights and Women's Judgment 6. Visions of Maturity References Index of Study Participants General Index

In a Different Voice. Psychological Theory and Women’s Development. Cambridge, MA (Harvard University Press) 1982.

This paper reviews the literature on gender differences in economic experiments. In the three main sections, we identify robust differences in risk preferences, social (other-regarding) preferences, and competitive preferences. We also speculate on the source of these differences, as well as on their implications. Our hope is that this article will serve as a resource for those seeking to understand gender differences and to use as a starting point to illuminate the debate on gender-specific outcomes in the labor and goods markets.

/pdf/gender-differences-in-preferences-1wffy691ko.pdf

Gender Differences in Preferences

https://thema.u-cergy.fr/IMG/pdf/07-02-13_AEEF.pdf

Crowdfunding: Tapping the right crowd

1 Front Matter 2 1 The Drama of the Commons 3 Part I: Resource Users, Resource Systems, and Behavior in the Drama of the Commons 4 2 Common Resources and Institutional Sustainability 5 3 Unequal Irrigators: Heterogeneity and Commons Management in Large-Scale 6 4 Factors Influencing Cooperation in Commons Dilemmas: A Review of Experimental Psychological Research 7 5 Appropriating the Commons: A Theoretical Explanation 8 Part II: Privatization and Its Limitations 9 6 The Tradable Permits Approach to Protecting the Commons: What Have We Learned? 10 7 Common Property, Regulatory Property, and Environmental Protection: Comparing Community-Based Management to Tradable Environmental Allowances 11 Part III: Cross-Scale Linkages and Dynamic Interactions 12 8 Institutional Interplay: The Environmental Consequences of Cross-Scale Interactions 13 9 Cross-Scale Institutional Linkages: Perspectives from the Bottom Up 14 Part IV: Emerging Issues 15 10 Scientific Uncertainty, Complex Systems, and the Design of Common-Pool Institutions 16 11 Emergence of Institutions for the Commons: Contexts, Situations, and Events 17 12 An Evolutionary Theory of Commons Management 18 13 Knowledge and Questions After 15 Years of Research 19 About the Contributors 20 Index

The Drama of the Commons

With crowdfunding, an entrepreneur raises external financing from a large audience (the "crowd"), in which each individual provides a very small amount, instead of soliciting a small group of sophisticated investors. This article compares two forms of crowdfunding: entrepreneurs solicit individuals either to pre-order the product or to advance a fixed amount of money in exchange for a share of future profits (or equity). In either case, we assume that "crowdfunders" enjoy "community benefits" that increase their utility. Using a unified model, we show that the entrepreneur prefers pre-ordering if the initial capital requirement is relatively small compared with market size and prefers profit sharing otherwise. Our conclusions have implications for managerial decisions in the early development stage of firms, when the entrepreneur needs to build a community of individuals with whom he or she must interact. We also offer extensions on the impact of quality uncertainty and information asymmetry.

/pdf/crowdfunding-tapping-the-right-crowd-2jqrl5m0g4.pdf

Crowdfunding: Tapping the Right Crowd

http://darp.lse.ac.uk/PapersDB/Cadsby-Maynes_(JPubE_99).pdf

Voluntary provision of threshold public goods with continuous contributions: experimental evidence

Procedures for measuring abnormal performance around events when securities do not trade daily are examined. A rank test patterned after the statistic proposed by Corrado [Corrado, C.J. (1989), A nonparametne test for abnormal security-price performance in event studies Journal of Financial Economics 23, 385-395] is derived. The empirical frequency distributions of the rank test statistic and a conventional test statistic are assessed under different rules for handling missing stock returns. The results suggest that the traditional procedures are reasonably well-specified for thickly and moderately traded stocks but misspecified for thinly traded stocks. The rank test however performs well for all trading frequencies and trade-to-trade returns are the best way to handle missing returns.

Conducting event studies with thinly traded stocks

This paper examines experimentally the effect of gender on contributions in a threshold public good framework which permits both strong free-riding and cooperative threshold equilibria. Subjects are recruited from a randomly selected sample of students. Females initially contribute significantly more than males, but significance vanishes as the game evolves. However, female groups are significantly better able to coordinate around a selected equilibrium. Such coordination does not imply greater efficiency at avoiding wasteful contributions. It does seem related to a tendency of females to behave more like each other throughout the game. Results are compared with the continuous provision framework.

Gender and free riding in a threshold public goods game: Experimental evidence

Six groups of economics and business students and six groups of nurses each participated in a laboratory threshold public goods game. This game is consistent both with equilibria involving cooperative and an equilibrium involving non-cooperative behavior. This contrasts with other games in which economics and business students proved less cooperative than others in contexts consistent only with equilibria involving non-cooperative behavior. Nevertheless, in the threshold game, the students moved inexorably toward the strong free-riding equilibrium, cooperating far less than the nurses, who cycled around an efficient threshold equilibrium. Subject pool selection clearly affects equilibrium selection in the threshold framework.

Choosing between a socially efficient and free-riding equilibrium: Nurses versus economics and business students

In most experimental studies of tax evasion, participants are instructed that they may report any amount of income from zero up to the amount they actually earned or received. This amounts to an invitation to gamble. In contrast, real-world tax authorities unambiguously demand compliance. We develop two new settings for conducting tax experiments. Both involve an explicit demand for compliance. Thus, we can determine whether knowing that the experimental authority would regard evasion as wrongful disobedience will influence compliance decisions. We demonstrate that simply telling people that they are required to pay a “participation fee” analogous to a tax produces remarkably high compliance rates and less sensitivity to changes in economic variables than in the earlier experimental literature using invitation-to-gamble language. This suggests that many people pay taxes despite the financial attraction of non-compliance because they are strongly inclined towards obeying authority. Furthermore, we show that giving participants a week to make their reporting decisions at home without an authority figure physically present overcomes the inclination to obey for some people, significantly lowering compliance rates. However, the majority still complies, even after the audit rate falls from 25% to 1%, which would make non-compliance extremely attractive if it were viewed only as a simple matter of risk and expected return.

Elizabeth Maynes

Papers

Voluntary provision of threshold public goods with continuous contributions: experimental evidence

Conducting event studies with thinly traded stocks

Gender and free riding in a threshold public goods game: Experimental evidence

Choosing between a socially efficient and free-riding equilibrium: Nurses versus economics and business students

Tax compliance and obedience to authority at home and in the lab: A new experimental approach