Emotion and Adaptation

Originally published in Contemporary Psychology: APA Review of Books, 1994, Vol 39(2), 225. Reviews the book, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion by John Zaller (1992). The author's commendable effort to specify a model of mass opinion formation offers readers an introduction to the prevailing vi

The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion.

In this paper, we describe the R package mediation for conducting causal mediation analysis in applied empirical research. In many scientific disciplines, the goal of researchers is not only estimating causal effects of a treatment but also understanding the process in which the treatment causally affects the outcome. Causal mediation analysis is frequently used to assess potential causal mechanisms. The mediation package implements a comprehensive suite of statistical tools for conducting such an analysis. The package is organized into two distinct approaches. Using the model-based approach, researchers can estimate causal mediation effects and conduct sensitivity analysis under the standard research design. Furthermore, the design-based approach provides several analysis tools that are applicable under different experimental designs. This approach requires weaker assumptions than the model-based approach. We also implement a statistical method for dealing with multiple (causally dependent) mediators, which are often encountered in practice. Finally, the package also offers a methodology for assessing causal mediation in the presence of treatment noncompliance, a common problem in randomized trials.

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mediation: R Package for Causal Mediation Analysis

Benedict Anderson’s deservedly famous thesis about the origins and nature
of modern nationalism turns around the central notion of an “imagined
community.” This category provides him with a matrix out of which one
can apprehend-theoretically and historically-the different variants of nationalist discourse formulated over the last two hundred years. We will refer,
in the brief comments that follow, to three basic dimensions structuring
the fabric of Anderson’s argument: 1) the presuppositions implicit in the
notion of an “imagined” community; 2) the kind of substitutability or solidarity which is required to be a member of such a community; 3) the kind
of relationship that is established between such a community-which is by
definition finite or limited-and its outside. Before that, however, let us
describe the main features of Anderson’s thesis.

On Imagined Communities

Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe.

We examine whether and how elite discourse shapes mass opinion and action on immigration policy. One popular but untested suspicion is that reactions to news about the costs of immigration depend upon who the immigrants are. We confirmthissuspicioninanationallyrepresentativeexperiment:newsaboutthecostsofimmigrationboostswhiteopposition far more when Latino immigrants, rather than European immigrants, are featured. We find these group cues influence opinion and political action by triggering emotions—in particular, anxiety—not simply by changing beliefs about the severity of the immigration problem. A second experiment replicates these findings but also confirms their sensitivity to the stereotypic consistency of group cues and their context. While these results echo recent insights about the power of anxiety, they also suggest the public is susceptible to error and manipulation when group cues trigger anxiety independently of the actual threat posed by the group.

/pdf/what-triggers-public-opposition-to-immigration-anxiety-group-1zn4xtaha1.pdf

What Triggers Public Opposition to Immigration? Anxiety, Group Cues, and Immigration Threat

In the years following 9/11, surveys have revealed high levels of public support for policies related to the war on terror that, many argue, contravene long‐standing American ideals. Extant research would suggest that such preferences result from the activation of authoritarianism. That is, the terrorist attacks caused those predisposed toward intolerance and aggression to become even more intolerant and aggressive. However, using data from two national surveys, we find that those who score high in authoritarianism do not become more hawkish or less supportive of civil liberties in response to perceived threat from terrorism; they tend to have such preferences even in the absence of threat. Instead, those who are less authoritarian adopt more restrictive and aggressive policy stands when they perceive threat from terrorism. In other words, many average Americans become susceptible to "authoritarian thinking" when they perceive a grave threat to their safety.

Authoritarianism, Threat, and Americans’ Support for the War on Terror

Affective and social political polarization—a dislike of political opponents and a desire to avoid their company—are increasingly salient and pervasive features of politics in many Western democrac...

The Polarizing Effects of Online Partisan Criticism: Evidence from Two Experiments:

Evidence has accumulated that people often conform to political norms. However, we know little about the mechanisms underlying political conformity. Whose norms are people likely to follow, and why? This article discusses two phenomena—social identity and “self-conscious” emotions—that are key to understanding when and why people follow the crowd. It argues that adherence to in-group norms is a critical basis of status among in-group peers. Conformity generates peer approval and leads to personal pride. Deviance generates disapproval and causes embarrassment or shame. These emotional reactions color an individual’s political perspectives, typically generating conformity. These same mechanisms can spur between-group polarization. In this case, differentiation from the norms of disliked out-groups results in peer approval and pride, and conformity to out-group norms disapproval and embarrassment or shame. This framework is supported by the results of two experiments that examine the influence of group opinion norms over economic and social aspects of citizens’ political ideologies. One exogenously varies the social identity of attitudinal majorities; the other primes the relevant emotions. In addition to contributing to the study of political conformity and polarization, this article adds to our growing understanding of the relevance of social identity and emotion to political life.

Explaining Group Influence: The Role of Identity and Emotion in Political Conformity and Polarization

Political psychologists have established that politically motivated reasoning is a common phenomenon; however, the field knows comparatively less about the psychological mechanisms that drive it. Drawing on advances in the understanding of the relevance of emotion to political reasoning and behavior, we argue that anger likely plays a major role in motivating individuals to engage in the biased assimilation of political information—an evaluative bias in favor of information that bolsters one’s views and against information that undercuts them. We test this proposition with two online studies, the second of which includes a quasirepresentative sample of Americans. The studies support our expectations. Individuals felt more negative emotions toward arguments that undermined their attitudes and positive emotions toward arguments that confirmed them; however, anger was nearly alone in fueling biased reactions to issue arguments.

Elizabeth Suhay

Papers

What Triggers Public Opposition to Immigration? Anxiety, Group Cues, and Immigration Threat

Authoritarianism, Threat, and Americans’ Support for the War on Terror

The Polarizing Effects of Online Partisan Criticism: Evidence from Two Experiments:

Explaining Group Influence: The Role of Identity and Emotion in Political Conformity and Polarization

The Role of Anger in the Biased Assimilation of Political Information