G
Ganesh Iyer
Researcher at University of California, Berkeley
Publications - 70
Citations - 3441
Ganesh Iyer is an academic researcher from University of California, Berkeley. The author has contributed to research in topics: Competition (economics) & Price discrimination. The author has an hindex of 26, co-authored 62 publications receiving 3033 citations. Previous affiliations of Ganesh Iyer include Washington University in St. Louis & Emory University.
Papers
More filters
Journal ArticleDOI
The Targeting of Advertising
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine advertising strategy when competing firms can target advertising to different groups of consumers within a market, and find that firms advertise more to consumers who have a strong preference for their product than to comparison shoppers who can be attracted to the competition.
Journal ArticleDOI
Job Satisfaction, Job Performance, and Effort: A Reexamination Using Agency Theory
TL;DR: In this article, a model that incorporates the main constructs from agency theory and organizational psychology was used to find a negative, direct effect of effort and a positive effect of job performance on job satisfaction.
Journal ArticleDOI
A Bargaining Theory of Distribution Channels
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors develop a framework to examine bargaining between channel members and demonstrate that the bargaining process actually affects the degree of coordination and that two-part tariffs will not be part of the market contract even in a simple one manufacturer-one retailer channel.
Journal ArticleDOI
Coordinating Channels Under Price and Nonprice Competition
TL;DR: The authors analyzes how manufacturers should coordinate distribution channels when retailers compete in price as well as important nonprice factors such as the provision of product information, free repair, faster check-out, or after-sales service.
Journal ArticleDOI
Research Note Consumer Addressability and Customized Pricing
Yuxin Chen,Ganesh Iyer +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine the strategic implications of consumer addressability on competition between database/direct marketing firms, and show that when the degree of addressability or reach of a firm's database is defined as the proportion of consumers at each point in the market, firms make symmetric investments in equilibrium, when the extent of market differentiation or consumer heterogeneity in preferences for a product/brand attribute, as well as the incremental cost of addressing consumers are sufficiently large, firms face the prospect of destructive competition.