https://www.sfu.ca/~wainwrig/Econ400/jensen-meckling.pdf

Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure

In this paper, the concept of social capital is introduced and illustrated, its forms are described, the social structural conditions under which it arises are examined, and it is used in an analys...

/pdf/social-capital-in-the-creation-of-human-capital-1836wo2872.pdf

Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital

The social world is accumulated history, and if it is not to be reduced to a discontinuous series of instantaneous mechanical equilibria between agents who are treated as interchangeable particles, one must reintroduce into it the notion of capital and with it, accumulation and all its effects. Capital is accumulated labor (in its materialized form or its ‘incorporated,’ embodied form) which, when appropriated on a private, i.e., exclusive, basis by agents or groups of agents, enables them to appropriate social energy in the form of reified or living labor. It is a vis insita, a force inscribed in objective or subjective structures, but it is also a lex insita, the principle underlying the immanent regularities of the social world. It is what makes the games of society – not least, the economic game – something other than simple games of chance offering at every moment the possibility of a miracle. Roulette, which holds out the opportunity of winning a lot of money in a short space of time, and therefore of changing one’s social status quasi-instantaneously, and in which the winning of the previous spin of the wheel can be staked and lost at every new spin, gives a fairly accurate image of this imaginary universe of perfect competition or perfect equality of opportunity, a world without inertia, without accumulation, without heredity or acquired properties, in which every moment is perfectly independent of the previous one, every soldier has a marshal’s baton in his knapsack, and every prize can be attained, instantaneously, by everyone, so that at each moment anyone can become anything. Capital, which, in its objectified or embodied forms, takes time to accumulate and which, as a potential capacity to produce profits and to reproduce itself in identical or expanded form, contains a tendency to persist in its being, is a force inscribed in the objectivity of things so that everything is not equally possible or impossible. And the structure of the distribution of the different types and subtypes of capital at a given moment in time represents the immanent structure of the social world, i.e. , the set of constraints, inscribed in the very reality of that world, which govern its functioning in a durable way, determining the chances of success for practices.

Forms of Capital

This paper considers the prospects for constructing a neoclassical theory of growth and international trade that is consistent with some of the main features of economic development. Three models are considered and compared to evidence: a model emphasizing physical capital accumulation and technological change, a model emphasizing human capital accumulation through schooling, and a model emphasizing specialized human capital accumulation through learning-by-doing.

The mechanics of economic development

http://individual.utoronto.ca/zheli/sa1.pdf

On the mechanics of economic development

This paper analyzes the savings and longevity impacts of mortality‐contingent claims, defined here as income measures, such as annuities and life insurance, under which earned income is contingent on the length of one's life. The postwar increase in mandatory annuity and life insurance programs, as well as the rapid increase in the life expectancy of older ages, motivates a better understanding of the incentive effects that mortality‐contingent claims have on longevity‐related behavior. We claim that these incentives in often alter the standard conclusions obtained about old‐age support when mortality is treated exogenously. In particular, we argue that annuities involve moral hazard effects that increase longevity and, among other things, introduce a positive interaction between public programs for health care and income support for the elderly‐programs that have grown enormously in developed countries

Old-Age Longevity and Mortality-Contingent Claims

ECONOMISTs have often argued that if an industry acts as a monopolist it would be desirable government policy either to break up the monopoly or, if this is undesirable because of increasing returns, to regulate and perhaps even nationalize it.' This proposition, although extremely well known and often accepted as obvious, turns out upon close examination to be far from obvious, and to involve several assumptions of doubtful validity. The argument supporting this proposition goes something as follows: Monopolies cause a maldistribution of resources, since the price charged by a monopolist exceeds marginal costs and an optimal distribution requires price equal to marginal cost. An optimal allocation would occur if the industry were made competitive, since price equals marginal costs in competitive industries. If the industry were a "natural" monopoly, price could be made equal to marginal cost either indirectly by government regulation or directly by government administration. Therefore, the recommendation is an anti-trust law to prevent or break up contrived monopolies and government regulation or government administration of natural monopolies. The non-sequitor in this argument is the sentence beginning with "therefore"; the recommendation of government intervention does not follow from the demonstration that government intervention could improve matters. Demonstrating that a set of government decisions would improve matters is not the same as demonstrating that actual government decisions would do so. This kind of inference is logically equivalent to identifying the actual workings of the market sector with its ideal workings. In Section I a theory of the workings of a political democracy under ideal conditions is developed. It is shown that an ideal democracy is very similar

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/724885.pdf

Competition and Democracy

This paper explores the implications for risk‐taking behavior and the equilibrium distribution of income of assuming that the desire for status positions is a powerful motive and that it raises the marginal utility of consumption. In contrast to previous analyses, we consider the case in which status positions are sold in a hedonic market. We show that such a complete hedonic market in status positions can be perfectly replicated by a simpler arrangement with a “status good” and a social norm that assigns higher status to those that consume more of this good. The main result is that for a wide range of initial conditions the equilibrium distribution over income, status, and consumption is the same, that this allocation requires inequality of income and consumption, and that this allocation coincides with the optimum of a utilitarian planner.

/pdf/the-equilibrium-distribution-of-income-and-the-market-for-fgoxqi93fy.pdf

The Equilibrium Distribution of Income and the Market for Status

In a series of lectures delivered in 1979 at the College de France under the title The Birth of Biopolitics, Michel Foucault conducted a close reading of Gary Becker’s writings on human capital and on crime and punishment, within the context of an elaboration and critique of American neoliberalism. Foucault was assisted at the time, at the College de France, by Francois Ewald. Since then, there has been ongoing debate over Foucault’s views about neoliberalism. In this historic meeting at the University of Chicago between Professors Becker and Ewald, Professor Ewald presents a framework to understand Foucault’s writings on Becker; Professor Bernard Harcourt offers a different reading of Foucault’s views on neoliberalism; and Professor Becker responds to Foucault’s lectures and to possible critical readings of his work on human capital. Apology or critique — that is the motivating question in this rich encounter between contemporary French philosophy and American economic theory.

/pdf/becker-on-ewald-on-foucault-on-becker-american-neoliberalism-fizmaaf3m8.pdf

Gary S. Becker

Papers

Old-Age Longevity and Mortality-Contingent Claims

Competition and Democracy

The Equilibrium Distribution of Income and the Market for Status

Becker on Ewald on Foucault on Becker American Neoliberalism and Michel Foucault's 1979 'Birth of Biopolitics' Lectures

Fertility and Economy