Geoffrey P. Martin

TL;DR: In this paper, the behavioral agency model (BAM) is used to examine the socioemotional trade-offs that R&D represents for the family firm and how this differentiates their investment decision from non-family firms.

TL;DR: The authors revisited predictions of the behavioral effects of equity-based pay using the behavioral agency model (BAM) and provided an explanation for previous conflicting empirical results by theorizing that the anticipation of prospective wealth attenuates the negative effect of accumulated current equity wealth upon CEO strategic risk taking.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine the unique nature of agency problems within publicly traded family firms by investigating the earnings management decision of dominant family owners relative to non-family owners, and find that potential reputational consequences of earnings management lead family principals to engage in less of this practice relative to other nonfamily firms and that founder family firms are less likely than non-founder family firms to use earnings management.

TL;DR: Using a sample of 3,745 firms across manufacturing industries in the United States during the period 2001-2009, support is found for the moderation argument and less convincing support for mediation, suggesting that firms may not form interlocks necessarily to reduce uncertainty.

TL;DR: The authors combine behavioral agency and family business literature to analyze the role of dominant firm principals in constraining the managerial agent's (CEO's) response to equity-based pay, and find that dominant firms have a strong influence on the CEO's response to pay.