世界経済・社会統計 = World development indicators

Norms have never been absent from the study of international politics, but the sweeping “ideational turn” in the 1980s and 1990s brought them back as a central theoretical concern in the field. Much theorizing about norms has focused on how they create social structure, standards of appropriateness, and stability in international politics. Recent empirical research on norms, in contrast, has examined their role in creating political change, but change processes have been less well-theorized. We induce from this research a variety of theoretical arguments and testable hypotheses about the role of norms in political change. We argue that norms evolve in a three-stage “life cycle” of emergence, “norm cascades,” and internalization, and that each stage is governed by different motives, mechanisms, and behavioral logics. We also highlight the rational and strategic nature of many social construction processes and argue that theoretical progress will only be made by placing attention on the connections between norms and rationality rather than by opposing the two.

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International Norm Dynamics and Political Change

In 1974 an article appeared in Science magazine with the dry-sounding title “Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases” by a pair of psychologists who were not well known outside their discipline of decision theory. In it Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman introduced the world to Prospect Theory, which mapped out how humans actually behave when faced with decisions about gains and losses, in contrast to how economists assumed that people behave. Prospect Theory turned Economics on its head by demonstrating through a series of ingenious experiments that people are much more concerned with losses than they are with gains, and that framing a choice from one perspective or the other will result in decisions that are exactly the opposite of each other, even if the outcomes are monetarily the same. Prospect Theory led cognitive psychology in a new direction that began to uncover other human biases in thinking that are probably not learned but are part of our brain’s wiring.

Thinking fast and slow.

The measurement of meaning

List of Figures ix List of Tables xi Preface and Acknowledgments xiii Introduction 1 PART I: VETO PLAYERS THEORY 17 One: Individual Veto Players 19 Two: Collective Veto Players 38 PART II: VETO PLAYERS AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 65 Three: Regimes: Nondemocratic, Presidential, and Parliamentary 67 Four: Governments and Parliaments 91 Five: Referendums 116 Six: Federalism, Bicameralism, and Qualified Majorities 136 PART III: POLICY EFFECTS OF VETO PLAYERS 161 Seven: Legislation 165 Eight: Macroeconomic Policies 187 PART IV: SYSTEMIC EFFECTS OF VETO PLAYERS 207 Nine: Government Stability 209 Ten: Judiciary and Bureaucracies 222 Eleven: Veto Players Analysis of European Union Institutions 248 Conclusion 283 Bibliography 291 Index 309

Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work

Recent research on European integrationhas largely profited from the institutionalist turn inpolitical science. Theoretical progress has, however,been hampered by the diverse understandings of thisnew research tradition. This paper tries to tackle theconceptual diversity in a positive way. We firstanalyze the neo-institutionalist turn in politicalscience and European studies and then move on to adetailed analysis and comparison of the threecompeting approaches – sociological, historical, andrational choice institutionalism. Next, we will showthat the main differences are as much epistemologicalas theoretical. A convergence towards a unifyinginstitutionalist approach can thus only be possible ifsome sort of a methodological convergence takes place.We sketch how a synthesis between the competingschools might appear. `In my country there is a belief ...that the onlything separating us from the animals is mindlesssuperstitions and pointless rituals'. Quoted from Latka, `Taxi', in Tad Tuleja CuriousCustoms (New York: Harmony Books), p. xii. `Love and War are the same thing, and strategems andpolicy are as allowable in one as in the other'. Miguel de Cervantes, Don Quixote (reprint, NewYork: Modern Library, 1955, p. 580, quoted in Tim O'Brien1995. In the Lake of Woods. New York: Penguin, p. 193.)

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Same Menu, Seperate Tables: The Institutionalist Turn in Political Science and the Study of European Integration

'Globalization' has largely superseded the term 'economic interdependence' to describe the rapidly growing links between nations, economies, and societies. The effects that the internationalization of the world system has on social equality, the environment, and economic growth are, however, still largely disputed. In this article, we discuss the literature that covers another intensively debated issue and which attempts to assess the relationship between trade and interstate conflict. Although liberal economists maintain that economic interdependence exerts an unconditionally pacifying influence on interstate relations, we show that the most recent formal work expects that trade will have a negligible and, in the perspective of one important model at least, even an amplifying effect on conflict. Much empirical work, by contrast, supports the claim that the relationship between trade and conflict is direct and not mitigated by contextual factors. We review the different controversies on the link between economic interdependence and militarized disputes and outline some major challenges that have not yet been adequately dealt with in the scientific study of war and peace.

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Globalization and Peace: Assessing New Directions in the Study of Trade and Conflict

One of the perennial questions in the scientific study of war is how war affects the economy. The authors examine the influence that the political developments within three war regions had on global financial markets (CAC, Dow Jones, FTSE) from 1990 to 2000. They embed a rational expectation framework within commercial liberalism, a theoretical strand that tries to assess the interrelationship between war and economic exchanges. Time-series analyses account for the effects that the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, the first confrontation of a U.S.-led alliance against Iraq, and the wars fought in Ex-Yugoslavia exerted. Using daily stock market data, the authors show that the conflicts affected the interactions at the core financial markets in the Western world negatively, if they had any systematic influence at all. They argue that these results lend some support to the rational expectations version of commercial liberalism.

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War and the World Economy STOCK MARKET REACTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS

European integration follows a puzzling stop-and-go pattern that traditional international reations theories cannot fully explain. The predominating paradigms only account for either the achievements or the setbacks of the integration process. An information based explanation makes it possible to move beyond structural accounts provided by realist and functionalist scholarship. Such an approach yields solid micro-level foundations of international bargaining and focuses on leaders' use of threats in negotiations about regional cooperation. Situations involving governments agreeing on the necessity of further integration, but disagreeing about its level, create room for strategic manipulation of information asymmetries. This type of uncertainty stems from the manipulator's information and control advantages concerning domestic costs. The analysis of different summit meetings demonstrates the empirical relevance of such maneuvers for the dynamics of European integration.

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The change of Tide in Political Cooperation : a limited information model of European integration

Recent research has tried to uncover the political space in which the Council of Ministers of the European Union decides. Rather than the left-right conflict or a cleavage between governments with national and supranational attitudes, this article shows that a redistributive dimension, decisively shapes the interactions in this most important legislative body of the European Union. In contrast to extant studies, we employ ex ante rather than ex post preference data and rely on correspondence analysis as a means to identify the underlying dimensions of contestation. The article concludes with an empirical investigation of how enlargement will affect the emerging political space within the European Union. Our quantitative analysis suggests that the gulf between net-contributors and net-receivers will further deepen. Many experts have contended that coalition building in the Council of Ministers of the European Union is unpredictable and time-consuming (Peters and Wright, 2001, p. 160). According to this adage, member states do not build permanent alliances, but common interests on individual issues bind them together (Nugent, 1999, p. 474). The secrecy surrounding the negotiations, decisions and protocols has prevented the public from establishing whether this interpretation of casual coalition building is accurate (see Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace, 1997). The lack of reliable data has made it nearly impossible to study the preference and coalition structure within this core intergovernmental body of the European Union. The data set ‘Decision-Making in the European Union’ (DEU) (Thomson et al., forthcoming) enables us to identify the negotiation positions of the member states and the conflict structure within the Council. This article makes use of this unique resource and attempts to reduce the conflict space to a few dimensions that reveal the most important cleavages. Our results largely confirm the findings of Mattila and Lane (2001), Mattila (2004) and Thomson et al. (2004) who have pinpointed the north-south dimension as the main line of contestation within the European Union. However, we qualify these results and offer some substantial and methodological innovations to the emerging literature on the European political space (Marks and Steenbergen, 2004). First, although some conflict dimensions that we identified cannot be interpreted that easily, some recurrent patterns of contestation do exist in the intergovernmental council. Our calculations reveal more structure in the interactions of the member states than the similar recent inquiries by Selck (2004) and Thomson et al. (2004) did. Second, our results suggest that the north-south division encompasses various sub-dimensions, the most important of which being the conflict between net-receivers and net-contributors to the EU

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Gerald Schneider

Papers

Same Menu, Seperate Tables: The Institutionalist Turn in Political Science and the Study of European Integration

Globalization and Peace: Assessing New Directions in the Study of Trade and Conflict

War and the World Economy STOCK MARKET REACTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS

The change of Tide in Political Cooperation : a limited information model of European integration

The Contested Council: Conflict Dimensions of an Intergovernmental EU Institution