Fractional Differential Equations

Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

EDDINGTON'S “Internal Constitution of the Stars” was published in 1926 and gives what now ranks as a classical account of his own researches and of the general state of the theory at that time. Since then, a tremendous amount of work has appeared. Much of it has to do with the construction of stellar models with different equations of state applying in different zones. Other parts deal with the effects of varying chemical composition, with pulsation and tidal and rotational distortion of stars, and with the precise relations between the interior and the atmosphere of a star. The striking feature of all this work is that so much can be done without assuming any particular mechanism of stellar energy-generation. Only such very comprehensive assumptions are made about the distribution and behaviour of the energy sources that we may expect future knowledge of their mechanism to lead mainly to more detailed results within the framework of the existing general theory. An Introduction to the Study of Stellar Structure By S. Chandrasekhar. (Astrophysical Monographs sponsored by The Astrophysical Journal.) Pp. ix+509. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press; London: Cambridge University Press, 1939.) 50s. net.

An Introduction to the Study of Stellar Structure

nonlinear functional analysis and its applications is available in our book collection an online access to it is set as public so you can get it instantly. Our books collection hosts in multiple countries, allowing you to get the most less latency time to download any of our books like this one. Merely said, the nonlinear functional analysis and its applications is universally compatible with any devices to read.

Nonlinear Functional Analysis And Its Applications

Impulsive Differential Equations

We introduce new invexity-type properties for differentiable functions, generalizing (F, ρ)-convexity. Optimality conditions for nonlinear programming problems are established under such assumptions, extending previously known results. Wolfe and Mond-Weir duals are also considered, and we obtain direct and converse duality theorems.

Mathematical Programming with ( Φ, ρ )-invexity

Motivated by important applications, the theory of mathematical programming has been extended to the case of infinitely many restrictions. At the same time, this theory knew remarcable developments since invexity and its further generalizations have been introduced as substitute of convexity. Here, we consider the multiobjective programming with a set of restrictions indexed in a compact. We obtain optimality criteria of Kuhn-Tucker type under new weaker invexity conditions. Also some dual probles are introduced and it is proved that the weak and strong duality properties hold within the same environement. AMS 2000 Subject Classification: 90C34, 90C29.

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Semi-infinite multiobjective programming with generalized invexity

In this paper, we investigate the existence of one weak solution for a class of fractional differential systems. The approach is based on variational methods for smooth functionals defined on reflexive Banach spaces. The main result is also demonstrated with examples.

Existence results for fractional differential systems through a local minimization principle

We study the existence of at least one weak solution for a class of elliptic Navier boundary value problems involving the p(x)-biharmonic operator. Our technical approach is based on variational methods. In addition, an example to illustrate our results is given.

Existence of one weak solution for p( x)-biharmonic equations with Navier boundary conditions

In this paper, the existence of infinitely many solutions for perturbed systems of impulsive non-linear fractional differential equations including Lipschitz continuous non-linear terms is discussed. The approach is based on variational methods. In addition, examples are presented to illustrate the feasibility and effectiveness of the main results.

Giuseppe Caristi

Papers

Mathematical Programming with ( Φ, ρ )-invexity

Semi-infinite multiobjective programming with generalized invexity

Existence results for fractional differential systems through a local minimization principle

Existence of one weak solution for p( x)-biharmonic equations with Navier boundary conditions

Infinitely many solutions for perturbed impulsive fractional differential systems