/pdf/convex-analysisnoer-san-nojin-zhan-nituite-5dl2rbmoyr.pdf

Convex Analysisの二,三の進展について

/pdf/the-theory-of-industrial-organization-19bejph0ej.pdf

The Theory of Industrial Organization

A new era of theoretical computer science addresses fundamental problems about auctions, networks, and human behavior.

http://www.maths.lse.ac.uk/Personal/stengel/TEXTE/agt-stengel.pdf

Algorithmic Game Theory

Cost Effectiveness in Health and Medicine.

ESPEN guideline on clinical nutrition and hydration in geriatrics

The actual contribution of intensive care to total hospital costs in Denmark has yet not been completely identified. In order to adapt the DRG system to better reflect the actual costs of the intensive care units (ICUs) the original primarily diagnosis-based DRG system was modified in order to be based on ICU-related procedure codes. A new DRG system for ICU patients was developed and implemented in 2004. The ICU DRG-system consists of four groups reflecting progressive deterioration in organ failure. As a result there has since been a qualitative improvement in the documentation of the activities in the ICUs. The information categorized according to the new ICU DRG-groups allows for better differentiation of patients, and might lead to an increasing understanding of the quality of healthcare provision in the ICU by the use of comparisons in a database. A meaningful cost comparison between intensive care units can only be made by combining activity with quality of delivered care.

[Diagnosis Related Groups in intensive care units--cost model for critically ill patients].

In the literature on cost-effectiveness analyses, there has recently been considerable debate on the way of measuring the production gain caused by a new treatment as well as its proper evaluation In this paper, we propose a general framework for the discussion of such questions in the form of a general equilibrium model with separate health variables It is shown how the standard methods of cost-effectiveness and cost-utility analysis are derived from basic assumptions Also, the question of whether to choose the human capital or the frictional method in evaluating production gains can be given an answer in this model

Production Gains In Cost-Effective- Ness Analyses - A Welfare-Theoreti- Cal Approach

The authors considered a model of commercial television market with advertising with probabilistic viewer choice of channel, where private broadcasters may coexist with a public television broadcaster. The broadcasters influence the probability of getting viewer attention through the amount that they spend on programming, so that their advertising capacity depends on their own program outlays as well as on those of their competitors. A larger number of broadcasters will reduce overall capacity even when total program outlays are kept fixed, because the attention of viewers is split among a larger number of channels. The authors derive properties of equilibrium in an oligopolistic market with private broadcasters and show that the number of firms has a negative effect on overall advertising and viewer satisfaction. If there is a public channel that also sells advertisements but does not maximize profits, this will have a positive effect on advertiser and viewer satisfaction.

Equilibria in a Random Viewer Model of Television Broadcasting

Summary This study is an attempt to explain profit shares in general equilibrium. A common argument states that profit is payment for services which are not traded on the market. We investigate whether this is true in the simple case where the extended production set admits constant returns to scale. It turns out that if the number of agents is finite, rather dubious assumptions about agents' behavior have to be made in order to obtain a positive answer. With a measure space of agents, the argument holds.

Equilibrium in economies with non- marketed goods*

This paper proposes a mechanism for the regulation of firms in the context of asymmetric information with the aim to induce firms to report its private information truthfully and to save information rents. Baron and Myerson (1982) have considered this problem and derived an optimal policy for regulating a monopolist with unknown costs. They show that it was possible to create a regulatory mechanism that induced the firm to report its private information truthfully. To secure this, a part of the mechanism is to pay the firm a subsidy. This article presents a regulatory mechanism which explores competition in the context of an industry characterized by increasing returns to scale. In contrast to the model in this article, the Baron and Myerson model doesn’t consider increasing returns to scale. In equilibrium each firm chooses to report truthfully without receiving any subsidy. However, the use of competition gives rise to an efficiency lost.

/pdf/regulated-competition-under-increasing-returns-to-scale-1g8pftf5me.pdf

Hans Keiding

Papers

[Diagnosis Related Groups in intensive care units--cost model for critically ill patients].

Production Gains In Cost-Effective- Ness Analyses - A Welfare-Theoreti- Cal Approach

Equilibria in a Random Viewer Model of Television Broadcasting

Equilibrium in economies with non- marketed goods*

Regulated Competition Under Increasing Returns to Scale