Earnings Management and Investor Protection: An International Comparison

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Recent sovereign defaults in emerging countries are accompanied by interest rate spikes and deep recessions. This paper develops a small open economy model to study default risk and its interaction with output, consumption, and foreign debt. Default probabilities and interest rates depend on incentives for repayment. Default occurs in equilibrium because asset markets are incomplete. The model predicts that default incentives and interest rates are higher in recessions, as observed in the data. The reason is that in a recession, a risk averse borrower finds it more costly to repay non-contingent debt and is more likely to default. In a quantitative exercise the model matches various features of the business cycle in Argentina such as: high volatility of interest rates, higher volatility of consumption relative to output, a negative correlation of interest rates and output and a negative correlation of the trade balance and output. The model can also predict the recent default episode in Argentina.

Default risk and income fluctuations in emerging economies

Recent sovereign defaults in emerging countries are accompanied by interest rate spikes and deep recessions. This paper develops a small open economy model to study default risk and its interaction with output, consumption, and foreign debt. Default probabilities and interest rates depend on incentives for repayment. Default occurs in equilibrium because asset markets are incomplete. The model predicts that default incentives and interest rates are
higher in recessions, as observed in the data. The reason is that in a recession, a risk averse borrower finds it more costly to repay non-contingent debt and is more likely to default. In a quantitative exercise the model matches various features of the business cycle in Argentina
such as: high volatility of interest rates, higher volatility of consumption relative to output, a negative correlation of interest rates and output and a negative correlation of the trade balance and output. The model can also predict the recent default episode in Argentina.

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Default Risk and Income Fluctuations in Emerging Economies

Aggregate and sectoral comovement are central features of business cycles, so the ability to generate comovement is a natural litmus test for macroeconomic models. But it is a test that most models fail. We propose a unified model that generates aggregate and sectoral comovement in response to contemporaneous and news shocks about fundamentals. The fundamentals that we consider are aggregate and sectoral total factor productivity shocks as well as investment specific technical change. The model has three key elements: variable capital utilization, adjustment costs to investment, and preferences that allow us to parameterize the strength of short-run wealth effects on the labor supply. (JEL

/pdf/can-news-about-the-future-drive-the-business-cycle-b482sd6shw.pdf

Can news about the future drive the business cycle

In recent years, some countries have issued sovereign bonds indexed to real variables such as GDP. Moreover, there has been discussions about this issue during the European crisis. This paper analyzes the effects of introducing this type of contracts in a standard DSGE model with sovereign default risk. We solved the model numerically calibrating it to the Argentine economy and show that the introduction of GDP-indexed sovereign debt contracts reduces the probability of default and makes the government willing to hold non-contingent assets and issue real-indexed bonds at the same time. The magnitude of the welfare effect that this type of instruments could generate is equivalent to an increase of approximately half a percentage point per year in certainty equivalent aggregate consumption.

Indexed Sovereign Debt: An Applied Framework

This study develops a novel model of endogenous sovereign debt maturity choice that rationalizes various stylized facts about debt maturity and the yield spread curve: first, sovereign debt duration and maturity generally exceed one year, and co-move positively with the business cycle. Second, sovereign yield spread curves are usually non-linear and upward-sloped, and may become non-monotonic and inverted during a period of high credit market stress, such as a default episode. Finally, output volatility, sudden stops, impatience and risk aversion are key determinants of maturity, both in our model and in the data.

/pdf/sovereign-default-and-the-choice-of-mat-25f8u4ofex.pdf

Sovereign Default and the Choice of Mat

This paper explores the direct effects and spillovers of unconventional monetary and exchange rate policies. We find that official purchases of foreign assets have a large positive effect on a country's current account that diminishes considerably as capital mobility rises. There is an important additional effect through the lagged stock of official assets. Official purchases of domestic assets, or quantitative easing (QE), appear to have no significant effect on a country's current account when capital mobility is high, but there is a modest positive impact when capital mobility is low. The effects of purchases of foreign assets spill over to other countries in proportion to their degree of international financial integration. We also find that increases in US bond yields are associated with increases in foreign bond yields and in stock prices, as well as with depreciations of foreign currencies, but that all of these effects are smaller on days of US unconventional monetary policy announcements. We develop a theoretical model that is broadly consistent with our empirical results and that highlights the potential usefulness of domestic unconventional policies as responses to the effects of foreign policies of a similar type.

Unconventional Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies

Government support to banks through the provision of explicit or implicit guarantees affects the willingness of banks to take on risk by reducing market discipline or by increasing charter value. We use an international sample of rated banks and find that government support is associated with more risk taking by banks, especially prior and during the 2008-2009 financial crisis. We also find that restricting banks’ range of activities ameliorates the link between government support and bank risk taking. We conclude that strengthening market discipline by reducing bank complexity is needed to address this moral hazard problem.

International evidence on government support and risk taking in the banking sector

Our paper studies the role of the collateral channel for bank credit using confidential bank-firm-loan data. We estimate that for a 1 percent increase in collateral values, firms pledging real estate collateral experience a 12 basis point higher growth in bank lending with higher sensitivities for more credit constrained firms. Higher real estate values boost firm capital expenditures and lead to lower unemployment and higher employment growth and business creation. Our estimates imply that as much as 37 percent of employment growth over the period from 2013 to 2019 can be attributed to the relaxation of borrowing constraints.

Horacio Sapriza

Papers

Indexed Sovereign Debt: An Applied Framework

Sovereign Default and the Choice of Mat

Unconventional Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies

International evidence on government support and risk taking in the banking sector

The Collateral Channel and Bank Credit