Introduction: Explaining the EU Political System PART I: GOVERNMENT Executive Politics Legislative Politics Judicial Politics PART II: POLITICS Public Opinion Democracy, Parties and Elections Interest Representation PART III: POLICY-MAKING Regulation of the Single Market Expenditure Policies Economic and Monetary Union Citizen Freedom and Security Policies Foreign Policies Conclusions: Rethinking the European Union Appendix: Decision-making Procedures of the European Union Bibliography

The political system of European Union

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European integration has created a constitutional asymmetry between policies promoting market efficiencies and policies promoting social protection and equality. National welfare states are legally and economically constrained by European rules of economic integration, liberalization and competition law, whereas efforts to adopt European social policies are politically impeded by the diversity of national welfare states, differing not only in levels of economic development and hence in their ability to pay for social transfers and services but, even more significantly, in their normative aspirations and institutional structures. In response, the ‘open method of coordination’ is now being applied in the social-policy field. It leaves effective policy choices at the national level, but tries to improve these through promoting common objectives and common indicators, and through comparative evaluations of national policy performance. These efforts are useful but cannot overcome the constitutional asymmetry. Hence there is reason to search for solutions which must have the character of European law in order to establish constitutional parity with the rules of European economic integration, but which also must be sufficiently differentiated to accommodate the existing diversity of national welfare regimes. The article discusses two such options, ‘closer co-operation’ and a combination of differentiated ‘framework directives’ with the open method of co-ordination.

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The European Social Model: Coping with the Challenges of Diversity

The contemporary debate on compliance has been framed in terms of two contending perspectives on how to best make states comply with international rules: the enforcement approach and the management approach. Whereas enforcement theorists stress a coercive strategy of monitoring and sanctions, management theorists embrace a problem-solving approach based on capacity building, rule interpretation, and transparency. This article challenges the conception of enforcement and management as competing strategies for achieving compliance. Based on the case of the EU and a comparison with other international regimes, I submit that enforcement and management mechanisms are most effective when combined. The twinning of cooperative and coercive instruments in a “management-enforcement ladder” makes the EU highly successful in combating violations, thus reducing non-compliance to a temporal phenomenon. Regimes in the areas of trade, environment, and human rights lend additional support to this proposition; compliance systems that offer both forms of mechanisms are particularly effective in securing rule conformance, whereas systems that only rely on one of the strategies suffer in identifiable ways.

Paths to Compliance: Enforcement, Management, and the European Union

This book presents the report on the European economic system, which was submitted to the President of the European Commission in July 2003. The report is divided into three parts. The first contains an assessment of the economic performance in terms of growth, stability, and cohesion. The second explores the challenges facing the European Union. The third presents a series of policy recommendations for the future.

An Agenda for a Growing Europe: The Sapir Report

Taking economic co-ordination in EMU as a starting point, this article explores the development of the open method of co-ordination, addressing whether it is a new form of governance from two related perspectives. First, to what extent can the method be effectively applied outside the scope of economic policy? Second, will it lead to policy transfer to the EU and hence act only as a transitional mode of governance? Identified at the Lisbon European Council, the method codified practices such as benchmarking, target-setting and peer review developed in the Luxembourg, Cardiff and Cologne processes. The method offers a new approach to governance of the EU as a heterarchical, decentred and dynamic process. It supports and radicalizes the principle of subsidiarity; offers an alternative to the treaty rules on enhanced co-operation; and addresses some of the legitimacy issues inherent in the EU. In EMU, the method arose out of a specific policy framework with a common monetary policy complemented by the coordination of national economic policies. The recent recommendation issued against Ireland is the first example of the operation of the method in EMU and shows how debate can be stimulated and how different and arguably equally valid perspectives defended. The particular experience of EMU with a sound money, sound finance paradigm, a long history of project-building by key elites and the central role of the European Council suggest similar conditions are required for the effective application of the method in other policy spheres. The context within which the method has operated to date is contingent and could change either over time or between policy fields. If so, the very openness of the method may serve to reconfigure the boundaries of competence between the Member States and the Union, after all.

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The open method as a new mode of governance: the case of soft economic policy co-ordination

There are differing views about the need for economic policy coordination in the EU and about the adequacy of the system that has evolved under EMU. This article examines the case for such policy coordination, then describes and assesses the current arrangements for both ‘hard’ coordination - epitomised by the much-maligned Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) - and the ‘soft’ forms of coordination that have evolved in the EU to complement formal rules. Although the system achieves more than is sometimes recognised, it is shown to have weaknesses. Options for reforming the SGP and other facets of the system are discussed.

Economic Policy Coordination in the European Union

The highly formalized Stability and Growth Pact gives ECOFIN power to impose sanctions on states that breach the Pact's budgetary targets. As the ECOFIN meeting in November 2003 showed, it has considerable but not unlimited discretion. The Commission has called for a more flexible interpretation of the Pact, the strengthening of sanctions against non-compliant member states and successfully litigated the legality of the ECOFIN decision. We argue that the predominance of soft law in EMU's fiscal framework is functionally suited to the uncertainty that surrounds economic co-ordination over the medium term. This suggests an inherent tension in the Commission's proposals: although a more flexible interpretation of the Pact gives more room for fiscal manoeuvre to states that start from healthy budgetary positions, it also makes it more difficult for ECOFIN to measure compliance. This uncertainty re-emphasizes the soft law elements of the Pact, rather than bolstering the efficacy of its sanction mechanisms.

Soft law and sanctions: economic policy co-ordination and reform of the Stability and Growth Pact

Central to the internationalization of competition law has been the emergence of transnational networks of competition officials and experts. These networks have operated in three main areas: co-ordination on enforcement; technical assistance; and moves to develop overarching competition principles at the level of the WTO. The debate over the nature of internationalization of competition norms has fallen into three phases: early failures mainly due to the lack of any network; politicization of competition policy within a UN context followed by the emergence of a network primarily focused on the OECD. The current phase concerns coordination and the attempt to develop a competition law regime at the WTO level. This process is spearheaded by the European Union, with the United States of America favouring bilateral agreements on enforcement and technical assistance only. The way the debate has changed over the past ten years and how the two main protagonists have modified their positions, is indicative of the influence and importance of networks which, while they may give rise to formal agreements, can operate through soft power and persuasion. What emerges from the analysis is the centrality of these networks to this important aspect of contemporary international governance. They supplement rather than replace more traditional forms of internationalism and, while they may fundamentally regard themselves as technocratic, deriving legitimacy from outputs, current pressures on international policy making require them to attend to the process aspects associated with legitimacy of democratic regimes.

Competition Law in the International Domain: Networks as a New Form of Governance

Book synopsis: Treaty making is a site of struggle between those who claim the authority to speak and act on the international stage. The European Union (EU) is an important test case in this respect because the manner in which the Union and its member states make treaties has shifted significantly over the last six decades. Drawing insights from EU law, comparative constitutionalism and international relations, this book shows how and why parliaments, the people and courts have entered a domain once dominated by governments. It presents qualitative and quantitative evidence on the importance of public trust and political tactics in explaining this transformation of EU treaty making and challenges the idea that EU treaties are too rigid. Analysing legal developments in the EU and each of its member states, this will be essential reading for those who wish to understand the EU's controversial experiment in treaty making and its wider significance.

Imelda Maher

Papers

The open method as a new mode of governance: the case of soft economic policy co-ordination

Economic Policy Coordination in the European Union

Soft law and sanctions: economic policy co-ordination and reform of the Stability and Growth Pact

Competition Law in the International Domain: Networks as a New Form of Governance

The Transformation of EU Treaty Making: The Rise of Parliaments, Referendums and Courts since 1950