This paper proposes a paradigm for managing the dynamic aspects of organizational knowledge creating processes. Its central theme is that organizational knowledge is created through a continuous dialogue between tacit and explicit knowledge. The nature of this dialogue is examined and four patterns of interaction involving tacit and explicit knowledge are identified. It is argued that while new knowledge is developed by individuals, organizations play a critical role in articulating and amplifying that knowledge. A theoretical framework is developed which provides an analytical perspective on the constituent dimensions of knowledge creation. This framework is then applied in two operational models for facilitating the dynamic creation of appropriate organizational knowledge.

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A Dynamic Theory of Organizational Knowledge Creation

How are we able to understand and anticipate each other in everyday life, in our daily interactions? Through the use of such "folk" concepts as belief, desire, intention, and expectation, asserts Daniel Dennett in this first full-scale presentation of a theory of intentionality that he has been developing for almost twenty years. We adopt a stance, he argues, a predictive strategy of interpretation that presupposes the rationality of the people - or other entities - we are hoping to understand and predict.These principles of radical interpretation have far-reaching implications for the metaphysical and scientific status of the processes referred to by the everday terms of folk psychology and their corresponding terms in cognitive science.While Dennett's philosophical stance has been steadfast over the years, his views have undergone successive enrichments, refinements, and extensions. "The Intentional Stance" brings together both previously published and original material: four of the book's ten chapters - its first and the final three - appear here for the first time and push the theory into surprising new territory. The remaining six were published earlier in the 1980s but were not easily accessible; each is followed by a reflection - an essay reconsidering and extending the claims of the earlier work. These reflections and the new chapters represent the vanguard of Dennett's thought. They reveal fresh lines of inquiry into fundamental issues in psychology, artificial intelligence, and evolutionary theory as well as traditional issues in the philosophy of mind.Daniel C. Dennett is Distinguished Arts and Sciences Professor at Tufts University and the author of "Brainstorms" and "Elbow Room." "The Intentional Stance," along with these works, is a Bradford Book.

The Intentional Stance

This article can be viewed as an attempt to explore the consequences of two propositions. (1) Intentionality in human beings (and animals) is a product of causal features of the brain. I assume this is an empirical fact about the actual causal relations between mental processes and brains. It says simply that certain brain processes are sufficient for intentionality. (2) Instantiating a computer program is never by itself a sufficient condition of intentionality. The main argument of this paper is directed at establishing this claim. The form of the argument is to show how a human agent could instantiate the program and still not have the relevant intentionality. These two propositions have the following consequences: (3) The explanation of how the brain produces intentionality cannot be that it does it by instantiating a computer program. This is a strict logical consequence of 1 and 2. (4) Any mechanism capable of producing intentionality must have causal powers equal to those of the brain. This is meant to be a trivial consequence of 1. (5) Any attempt literally to create intentionality artificially (strong AI) could not succeed just by designing programs but would have to duplicate the causal powers of the human brain. This follows from 2 and 4.“Could a machine think?” On the argument advanced here only a machine could think, and only very special kinds of machines, namely brains and machines with internal causal powers equivalent to those of brains. And that is why strong AI has little to tell us about thinking, since it is not about machines but about programs, and no program by itself is sufficient for thinking.

/pdf/minds-brains-and-programs-1okdg3cku7.pdf

Minds, brains, and programs

This article can be viewed as an attempt to explore the consequences of two propositions. (1) Intentionality in human beings (and animals) is a product of causal features of the brain I assume this is an empirical fact about the actual causal relations between mental processes and brains It says simply that certain brain processes are sufficient for intentionality. (2) Instantiating a computer program is never by itself a sufficient condition of intentionality The main argument of this paper is directed at establishing this claim The form of the argument is to show how a human agent could instantiate the program and still not have the relevant intentionality. These two propositions have the following consequences (3) The explanation of how the brain produces intentionality cannot be that it does it by instantiating a computer program. This is a strict logical consequence of 1 and 2. (4) Any mechanism capable of producing intentionality must have causal powers equal to those of the brain. This is meant to be a trivial consequence of 1. (5) Any attempt literally to create intentionality artificially (strong AI) could not succeed just by designing programs but would have to duplicate the causal powers of the human brain. This follows from 2 and 4. "Could a machine think?" On the argument advanced here only a machine could think, and only very special kinds of machines, namely brains and machines with internal causal powers equivalent to those of brains And that is why strong AI has little to tell us about thinking, since it is not about machines but about programs, and no program by itself is sufficient for thinking.

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Minds, Brains, and Programs

Traditional approaches to human information processing tend to deal with perception and action planning in isolation, so that an adequate account of the perception-action interface is still missing On the perceptual side, the dominant cognitive view largely underestimates, and thus fails to account for, the impact of action-related processes on both the processing of perceptual information and on perceptual learning On the action side, most approaches conceive of action planning as a mere continuation of stimulus processing, thus failing to account for the goal-directedness of even the simplest reaction in an experimental task We propose a new framework for a more adequate theoretical treatment of perception and action planning, in which perceptual contents and action plans are coded in a common representational medium by feature codes with distal reference Perceived events (perceptions) and to-be-produced events (actions) are equally represented by integrated, task-tuned networks of feature codes – cognitive structures we call event codes We give an overview of evidence from a wide variety of empirical domains, such as spatial stimulus-response compatibility, sensorimotor synchronization, and ideomotor action, showing that our main assumptions are well supported by the data

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/S0140525X01000103

The Theory of Event Coding (TEC): a framework for perception and action planning.

Knowledge and the Flow of Information.

Computers are special technology and they raise some special ethical issues. This chapter discusses what makes computers different from other technology and how this difference makes a difference in ethical considerations. It describes computer ethics and shows why this emerging field is both intellectually interesting and enormously important. A typical problem in computer ethics arises because there is a policy vacuum about how computer technology should be used. Computers provide us with new capabilities and these in turn give us new choices for action. Computer ethics include consideration of both personal and social policies for the ethical use of computer technology. The mark of a basic problem in computer ethics is one in which computer technology is essentially involved and there is an uncertainty about what to do and even about how to understand the situation. Hence, not all ethical situations involving computers are central to computer ethics.

What is computer ethics

The question of whether machine ethics exists or might exist in the future is difficult to answer if we can't agree on what counts as machine ethics. Some might argue that machine ethics obviously exists because humans are machines and humans have ethics. Others could argue that machine ethics obviously doesn't exist because ethics is simply emotional expression and machines can't have emotions. A wide range of positions on machine ethics are possible, and a discussion of the issue could rapidly propel us into deep and unsettled philosophical issues. Perhaps, understandably, few in the scientific arena pursue the issue of machine ethics. As we expand computers' decision-making roles in practical matters, such as computers driving cars, ethical considerations are inevitable. Computer scientists and engineers must examine the possibilities for machine ethics because, knowingly or not, they've already engaged in some form of it. Before we can discuss possible implementations of machine ethics, however, we need to be clear about what we're asserting or denying

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The Nature, Importance, and Difficulty of Machine Ethics

When we think of ethical problems involving computing probably none is more paradigmatic than the issue of privacy. Given the ability of computers to manipulate information to store endlessly, to sort efficiently, and to locate effortlessly we are justifiably concerned that in a computerized society our privacy may be invaded and that information harmful to us will be revealed. Of course, we are reluctant to give up the advantages of speedy and convenient computerized information. We appreciate the easy access to computerized data when making reservations, using automatic teller machines, buying new products on the web, or investigating topics in computer data bases. Our challenge is to take advantage of computing without allowing computing to take advantage of us. When information is computerized, it is greasedto slide easily and quickly to many ports of call. This makes information retrieval quick and convenient. But legitimate concerns about privacy arise when this speed and convenience lead to the improper exposure of information. Greased information is information that moves like lightning and is hard to hold onto. Consider, for example, listed telephone numbers which have been routinely available through a telephone operator and a telephone book but which now are available along with address information in giant electronic phone books on the internet. The Hanover, New Hampshire telephone book (the telephone book for where I live) is rather hard to locate in most places in the world, but now anyone in the world with access to the internet can easily find out my phone number, who my wife is, and where I live. One can even retrieve a map of my residential area. 1 don't consider this to be a breach of privacy, but I use it to point out how the same information, which has technically been public for a long time, can dramatically change levels of accessibility practically speaking when put into electronic form on computer networks. It is ironic that my name may be hard to find in the internet phone book in that it is listed there anachronistically in an abbreviated form. \"James\" is abbreviated as \"Jas,\" an abbreviation I never use and have seen only in old print phone books, presumably introduced to save print space but mindlessly copied when put on the internet. Don't tell anyone. The greasing of information makes information so easy to access that it can be used again and again. Computers have elephant memories big, accurate, and long term. The ability of computers to remember so well for so long undercuts a human frailty that assists privacy. We, humans, forget most things. Most short term memories don't even make it to long term memory. Every time I go to a busy supermarket I am a new customer. Who can remember what I bought the last time I was there? Actually, a computer does. Most of the time I shop at a cooperative food store that gives a rebate at the end of the year. When I buy food, I give the checkout person my account number (I can remember at least that most days). The checkout person scans my purchases which appear on a screen by the name of the item and its price. This information is definitely greased. It appears as quickly as the checker can move the items across the barcode reader. Then my total is displayed and the information is added to my grand total of purchases on which I get a certain percentage back each year. Notice that in addition to the total of my purchases the market also has information about what I have purchased. It helps the market keep track of its inventory. But, it also means that the store has a profile on my buying habits. They know how much wine I purchase, my fondness for Raisin Bran cereal, and the kind of vegetables I prefer. In principle, such evidence could be subpoenaed if my eating habits were relevant to a court case. Does this accumulation of information violate my privacy. I suppose not, but it is greased so that it moves easily and is more accessible over a longer period of time than ever before. Practically speaking, the information is never forgotten. A documented history of purchases generates the possibility for an invasion of privacy that does not exist without it. In the case of my food shopping the collection of information is obvious to me. I can see my eating habits and my limited will power flash on the display screen as the calories tumble by on the conveyor. But information about us can be collected subtlety when we don't realize it. The greasing of information allows other computers to capture and manipulate information in ways we do not expect. Consider a final personal example to illustrate this. Not long ago I lived for a few months in Edinburgh. On days I didn't feel like cooking, I would sometimes order pizza. The pizza was delivered to my apartment and hence was a convenient way to get a quick meal. However, I was somewhat taken aback the second time I phoned the pizza establishment. Without my placing an order the pizzamakers already seemed to know my address and my favorite pizza. Did I want to have another medium pepperoni and mushroom delivered? I hadn't been in Edinburgh very long. How could they possibly know my taste (or lack of taste) so quickly? The answer, of course, was their use of caller ID. No mystery here. I had called before and given in-

Towards a theory of privacy in the information age

The present study is organized into two main parts. In Part I, we respond to a recent criticism that the restricted access theoryofprivacydoes not adequately explain the role that control of personal information plays in protecting one's priva~ In defending a version of the restricted access theory, we put forth a tripartite model that differentiates the concq~tofprivacyfrom both the justification and the management of privacy. This-distinction is important, we argue, because it enables us to avoid conflafing the concept of privacy which we define in terms of protection from intrusion and information gathering [Moor 1990; 1997], from the concept of control, which (a) is used to justifi/ the flaming of polities that provide privacy prrotection and (b) is essential to the management ofptivac~ Separating privacy from control is necessa~ we further argue, to preserve the identityofboth notions. After showingwhy the notion of individual control, as expressed in three different ways-choice, consent, and correction--plays an important role in the management ofpriva~ we conclude Part I with an account of why individual controls alone are not sufficient to guarantee the protection nfpersonal privacy and why certain external controls, such as those provided by privacy polities, are also needed. To illustrate some of the key points made in the first part of this essay we consider examples ofptivacy-enhancing technologies (or PETs) in Part II. We argue that even if PETs provide individuals with a means of controlling their personal information, these tools do not necessarily ensure privacy protection. Became PETs do not provide online users with a zone of privacy protection that incorporates external controls, i.e., controls beyond those at the individual level, we condude that the use of PETs can actually blur the need for privacy protection, rather than provide it.

James H. Moor

Papers

Knowledge and the Flow of Information.

What is computer ethics

The Nature, Importance, and Difficulty of Machine Ethics

Towards a theory of privacy in the information age

Privacy protection, control of information, and privacy-enhancing technologies