https://www.hse.ru/data/816/479/1225/Oct%2019%20Cited%20%231%20Manage%20THE%20THEORY%20OF%20PLANNED%20BEHAVIOR.pdf

The theory of planned behavior

The Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) has received considerable attention in the literature. The present study is a quantitative integration and review of that research. From a database of 185 independent studies published up to the end of 1997, the TPB accounted for 27% and 39% of the variance in behaviour and intention, respectively. The perceived behavioural control (PBC) construct accounted for significant amounts of variance in intention and behaviour, independent of theory of reasoned action variables. When behaviour measures were self-reports, the TPB accounted for 11% more of the variance in behaviour than when behaviour measures were objective or observed (R2s = .31 and .21, respectively). Attitude, subjective norm and PBC account for significantly more of the variance in individuals' desires than intentions or self-predictions, but intentions and self-predictions were better predictors of behaviour. The subjective norm construct is generally found to be a weak predictor of intentions. This is partly attributable to a combination of poor measurement and the need for expansion of the normative component. The discussion focuses on ways in which current TPB research can be taken forward in the light of the present review.

/pdf/efficacy-of-the-theory-of-planned-behaviour-a-meta-analytic-32gm69pazu.pdf

Efficacy of the Theory of Planned Behaviour: a meta-analytic review.

Revealing how smart design is the new competitive frontier, this innovative book is a powerful primer on how--and why--some products satisfy customers while others only frustrate them.

https://www.cc.gatech.edu/~stasko/6750/Talks/08-doet.pdf

Design of Everyday Things

The longstanding and widespread tradition of the person approach focuses on the unsafe acts—errors and procedural violations—of people at the sharp end: nurses, physicians, surgeons, anaesthetists, pharmacists, and the like. It views these unsafe acts as arising primarily from aberrant mental processes such as forgetfulness, inattention, poor motivation, carelessness, negligence, and recklessness. Naturally enough, the associated countermeasures are directed mainly at reducing unwanted variability in human behaviour. These methods include poster campaigns that appeal to people’s sense of fear, writing another procedure (or adding to existing ones), disciplinary measures, threat of litigation, retraining, naming, blaming, and shaming. Followers of this approach tend to treat errors as moral issues, assuming that bad things happen to bad people—what psychologists have called the just world hypothesis.

Human error: models and management

Purpose. To review applications of Ajzen's theory of planned behavior in the domain of health and to verify the efficiency of the theory to explain and predict health-related behaviors. Methods. Most material has been drawn from Current Contents (Social and Behavioral Sciences and Clinical Medicine) from 1985 to date, together with all peer-reviewed articles cited in the publications thus identified. Findings. The results indicated that the theory performs very well for the explanation of intention; an averaged R2 of .41 was observed. Attitude toward the action and perceived behavioral control were most often the significant variables responsible for this explained variation in intention. The prediction of behavior yielded an averaged R2 of .34. Intention remained the most important predictor, but in half of the studies reviewed perceived behavioral control significantly added to the prediction. Conclusions. The efficiency of the model seems to be quite good for explaining intention, perceived be...

The theory of planned behavior: a review of its applications to health-related behaviors.

Contents: Hazards, losses and defences Defeating the defences Dangerous defences The human contribution Maintenance can seriously damage your system Navigating the safety space A practical guide to error management The regulatora (TM)s unhappy lot Engineering a safety culture Reconciling the different approaches to safety management.

Managing the risks of organizational accidents

In considering the human contribution to accidents, it seems necessary to make a distinction between errors and violations; two forms of aberration which may have different psychological origins and demand different modes of remediation. The present study investigated whether this distinction was justified for self-reported driver behaviour. Five hundred and twenty drivers completed a driver behaviour questionnaire (DBQ) which asked them to judge the frequency with which they committed various types of errors and violations when driving. Three fairly robust factors were identified: violations, dangerous errors, and relatively harmless lapses, respectively. Violations declined with age, errors did not. Men of all ages reported more violations than women. Women, however, were significantly more prone to harmless lapses (or more honest) than men. These findings were consistent with the view that errors and violations are indeed mediated by different psychological mechanisms. Violations require explanation in terms of social and motivational factors, whereas errors (slips, lapses, and mistakes) may be accounted for by reference to the information-processing characteristics of the individual.

Errors and violations on the roads: a real distinction?

(1) Human rather than technical failures now represent the greatest threat to complex and potentially hazardous systems. This includes healthcare systems. (2) Managing the human risks will never be 100% effective. Human fallibility can be moderated, but it cannot be eliminated. (3) Different error types have different underlying mechanisms, occur in different parts of the organisation, and require different methods of risk management. The basic distinctions are between: Slips, lapses, trips, and fumbles (execution failures) and mistakes (planning or problem solving failures). Mistakes are divided into rule based mistakes and knowledge based mistakes. Errors (information-handling problems) and violations (motivational problems) Active versus latent failures. Active failures are committed by those in direct contact with the patient, latent failures arise in organisational and managerial spheres and their adverse effects may take a long time to become evident. (4) Safety significant errors occur at all levels of the system, not just at the sharp end. Decisions made in the upper echelons of the organisation create the conditions in the workplace that subsequently promote individual errors and violations. Latent failures are present long before an accident and are hence prime candidates for principled risk management. (5) Measures that involve sanctions and exhortations (that is, moralistic measures directed to those at the sharp end) have only very limited effectiveness, especially so in the case of highly trained professionals. (6) Human factors problems are a product of a chain of causes in which the individual psychological factors (that is, momentary inattention, forgetting, etc) are the last and least manageable links. Attentional "capture" (preoccupation or distraction) is a necessary condition for the commission of slips and lapses. Yet, its occurrence is almost impossible to predict or control effectively. The same is true of the factors associated with forgetting. States of mind contributing to error are thus extremely difficult to manage; they can happen to the best of people at any time. (7) People do not act in isolation. Their behaviour is shaped by circumstances. The same is true for errors and violations. The likelihood of an unsafe act being committed is heavily influenced by the nature of the task and by the local workplace conditions. These, in turn, are the product of "upstream" organisational factors. Great gains in safety can ve achieved through relatively small modifications of equipment and workplaces. (8) Automation and increasing advanced equipment do not cure human factors problems, they merely relocate them. In contrast, training people to work effectively in teams costs little, but has achieved significant enhancements of human performance in aviation. (9) Effective risk management depends critically on a confidential and preferable anonymous incident monitoring system that records the individual, task, situational, and organisational factors associated with incidents and near misses. (10) Effective risk management means the simultaneous and targeted deployment of limited remedial resources at different levels of the system: the individual or team, the task, the situation, and the organisation as a whole.

https://qualitysafety.bmj.com/content/qhc/4/2/80.full.pdf

Understanding adverse events: human factors.

A survey of over 1600 drivers is reported, the results of which are consistent with those reported in an earlier study (Reason et al. 1990), which identified a three-fold typology of aberrant driving behaviours. The first type, lapses, are absent-minded behaviours with consequences mainly for the perpetrator, posing no threat to other road users. The second type, errors, are typically misjudgements and failures of observation that may be hazardous to others. The third type, violations, involve deliberate contraventions of safe driving practice. In the present study the survey instrument used, the Driver Behaviour Questionnaire, was also shown to be reliable over time. Each type of behaviour was found to have different demographic correlates. Most importantly, accident liability was predicted by self-reported tendency to commit violations, but not by tendency to make errors or to have lapses. The implications for road safety are discussed.

James T. Reason

Papers

Human error: models and management

Managing the risks of organizational accidents

Errors and violations on the roads: a real distinction?

Understanding adverse events: human factors.

Driving errors, driving violations and accident involvement