世界経済・社会統計 = World development indicators

In Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, henceforth AJR, (2001), we advanced the hypothesis that the mortality rates faced by Europeans in different parts of the world after 1500 affected their willingness to establish settlements and choice of colonization strategy. Places that were relatively healthy (for Europeans) were—when they fell under European control—more likely to receive better economic and political institutions. In contrast, places where European settlers were less likely to go were more likely to have “extractive” institutions imposed. We also posited that this early pattern of institutions has persisted over time and influences the extent and nature of institutions in the modern world. On this basis, we proposed using estimates of potential European settler mortality as an instrument for institutional variation in former European colonies today. Data on settlers themselves are unfortunately patchy—particularly because not many went to places they believed, with good reason, to be most unhealthy. We therefore followed the lead of Curtin (1989 and 1998) who compiled data on the death rates faced by European soldiers in various overseas postings. 1 Curtin’s data were based on pathbreaking data collection and statistical work initiated by the British military in the mid-nineteenth century. These data became part of the foundation of both contemporary thinking about public health (for soldiers and for civilians) and the life insurance industry (as actuaries and executives considered the

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The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation

The explanations offered for the contrasting records of long-run growth and development among the societies of North and South America most often focus on institutions. The traditional explanations for the sources of these differences in institutions, typically highlight the significance of national heritage or religion. We, in contrast, argue that a hemispheric perspective across the wide range of colonies established in the New World by the Europeans suggests that although there were many influences, factor endowments or initial conditions had profound and enduring effects on the long-run paths of institutional and economic development followed by the respective economies.

https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/jep.14.3.217

History Lessons Institutions, Factor Endowments, and Paths of Development in the New World

After World War II a select number of countries outside Japan and the West-those that Alice Amsden calls "the rest"-gained market share in modern industries and altered global competition. By 2000, a great divide had developed within "the rest", the lines drawn according to prewar manufacturing experience and equality in income distribution. China, India, Korea and Taiwan had built their own national manufacturing enterprises that were investing heavily in R&D. Their developmental states had transformed themselves into champions of science and technology. By contrast, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico had experienced a wave of acquisitions and mergers that left even more of their leading enterprises controlled by multinational firms. The developmental states of Mexico and Turkey had become hand-tied by membership in NAFTA and the European Union. Which model of late industrialization will prevail, the "independent" or the "integrationist," is a question that challenges the twenty-first century.

http://disciplinas.stoa.usp.br/pluginfile.php/347405/mod_resource/content/1/Amsden%20Rise%20of%20the%20Rest%20caps%2067.pdf

The Rise of "The Rest": Challenges to the West from Late-Industrializing Economies

We construct a model of simultaneous change and persistence in institutions. The model consists of landowning elites and workers, and the key economic decision concerns the form of economic institutions regulating the transaction of labor (e.g., competitive markets versus labor repression). The main idea is that equilibrium economic institutions are a result of the exercise of de jure and de facto political power. A change in political institutions, for example a move from nondemocracy to democracy, alters the distribution of de jure political power, but the elite can intensify their investments in de facto political power, such as lobbying or the use of paramilitary forces, to partially or fully offset their loss of de jure power. In the baseline model, equilibrium changes in political institutions have no effect on the (stochastic) equilibrium distribution of economic institutions, leading to a particular form of persistence in equilibrium institutions, which we refer to as invariance. When the model is enriched to allow for limits on the exercise of de facto power by the elite in democracy or for costs of changing economic institutions, the equilibrium takes the form of a Markov regime-switching process with state dependence. Finally, when we allow for the possibility that changing political institutions is more difficult than altering economic institutions, the model leads to a pattern of captured democracy, whereby a democratic regime may survive, but choose economic institutions favoring the elite. The main ideas featuring in the model are illustrated using historical examples from the U.S. South, Latin America and Liberia.

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Persistence of Power, Elites and Institutions

Africa and Latin America secured their independence from European colonial rule a century and half apart: most of Latin America after 1820 and most of Africa after 1960. Despite the distance in time and space, they share important similarities. In each case independence was followed by political instability, violent conflict and economic stagnation lasting for about a half-century (lost decades). The parallels suggest that Africa might be exiting from a period of post-imperial collapse and entering a period of relative political stability and economic growth, as did Latin America a century and a half earlier.

Lost Decades: Lessons from Post-Independence Latin America for Today's Africa

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La construcción del ferrocarril mexicano (1837-1880)

Trayectorias económicas e institucionales en América Latina durante el siglo XIX

This paper uncovers a fact that has not been well appreciated: tariffs in Latin America were far higher than anywhere else in the century before the Great Depression. This is a surprising fact given that this region has been said to have exploited globalization forces better than most during the pre-1914 belle epoque and for which the Great Depression has always been viewed as a critical policy turning point towards protection and de-linking from the world economy. This paper shows that the explanation cannot lie with output gains from protection, since, while such gains were present in Europe and its non-Latin offshoots, they were not present in Latin America. The paper then explores Latin American tariffs as a revenue source, as a protective device for special interests, and as the result of other political economy struggles. We conclude by asking whether the same pro-protection conditions exist today as those which existed more than a century ago.

The Roots of Latin American Protectionism: Looking Before the Great Depression

This chapter describes trends in the growth of precious metals production in eighteenth century New Spain, assesses the relations between government and industry in the Bourbon era, analyzes the role of the mining sector in the colonial economy, and sketches the causes of the collapse of the mining industry after 1810. In fact, the late colonial mining industry was in such deep trouble that it survived by draining the public treasury and diverting resources from other sectors. Government promotion cannot explain a boom that did not occur; it can only explain an increase in physical output based on propping up marginal operations. However it is measured, the mining industry of New Spain entered into a crisis during the era of the Bourbon reforms, an economic crisis in which the declining market value of precious metals combined with rising costs of production. Government policy towards the mining industry not only recognized this crisis, but in part created it.

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John H. Coatsworth

Papers

Lost Decades: Lessons from Post-Independence Latin America for Today's Africa

La construcción del ferrocarril mexicano (1837-1880)

Trayectorias económicas e institucionales en América Latina durante el siglo XIX

The Roots of Latin American Protectionism: Looking Before the Great Depression

The Mexican Mining Industry in the Eighteenth Century