世界経済・社会統計 = World development indicators

https://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/treisman/Papers/causes.pdf

The causes of corruption: a cross-national study

Some scholars suggest that the Middle East's oil wealth helps explain its failure to democratize. This article examines three aspects of this “oil impedes democracy” claim. First, is it true? Does oil have a consistendy antidemocratic effect on states, once other factors are accounted for? Second, can this claim be generalized? Is it true only in the Middle East or elsewhere as well? Is it true for other types of mineral wealth and other types of commodity wealth or only for oil? Finally, if oil does have antidemocratic properties, what is the causal mechanism?The author uses pooled time-series cross-national data from 113 states between 1971 and 1997 to show that oil exports are strongly associated with authoritarian rule; that this effect is not limited to the Middle East; and that other types of mineral exports have a similar antidemocratic effect, while other types of commodity exports do not.The author also tests three explanations for this pattern: a “rentier effect,” which suggests that resource-rich governments use low tax rates and patronage to dampen democratic pressures; a “repression effect,” which holds that resource wealth enables governments to strengthen their internal security forces and hence repress popular movements; and a “modernization effect,” which implies that growth that is based on the export of oil and minerals will fail to bring about die social and cultural changes that tend to produce democratic government. He finds at least limited support for all three effects.

Does Oil Hinder Democracy

This paper aims to clarify the meaning, and explain the utility, of the case study method, a method often practiced but little understood. A “case study,” I argue, is best defined as an intensive study of a single unit with an aim to generalize across a larger set of units. Case studies rely on the same sort of covariational evidence utilized in non-case study research. Thus, the case study method is correctly understood as a particular way of defining cases, not a way of analyzing cases or a way of modeling causal relations. I show that this understanding of the subject illuminates some of the persistent ambiguities of case study work, ambiguities that are, to some extent, intrinsic to the enterprise. The travails of the case study within the discipline of political science are also rooted in an insufficient appreciation of the methodological tradeoffs that this method calls forth. This paper presents the familiar contrast between case study and non-case study work as a series of characteristic strengths and weaknesses—affinities—rather than as antagonistic approaches to the empirical world. In the end, the perceived hostility between case study and non-case study research is largely unjustified and, perhaps, deserves to be regarded as a misconception. Indeed, the strongest conclusion to arise from this methodological examination concerns the complementarity of single-unit and cross-unit research designs.

/pdf/what-is-a-case-study-and-what-is-it-good-for-pr7nzakso7.pdf

What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good for

How can scholars select cases from a large universe for in-depth case study analysis? Random sampling is not typically a viable approach when the total number of cases to be selected is small. Hence attention to purposive modes of sampling is needed. Yet, while the existing qualitative literature on case selection offers a wide range of suggestions for case selection, most techniques discussed require in-depth familiarity of each case. Seven case selection procedures are considered, each of which facilitates a different strategy for within-case analysis. The case selection procedures considered focus on typical, diverse, extreme, deviant, influential, most similar, and most different cases. For each case selection procedure, quantitative approaches are discussed that meet the goals of the approach, while still requiring information that can reasonably be gathered for a large number of cases.

/pdf/case-selection-techniques-in-case-study-research-a-menu-of-19ewy2se85.pdf

Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options

Introduction 1. Democracies and dictatorships 2. Dynamic of political regimes 3. Political regimes and economic growth 4. Political instability and economic growth 5. Political regimes and population Conclusion.

https://assets.cambridge.org/97805217/90321/frontmatter/9780521790321_frontmatter.pdf

Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990

We address the strengths and weaknesses of the main available measures of political regime and extend the dichotomous regime classification first introduced in Alvarez et al. (Stud. Comp. Int. Dev. 31(2):3–36, 1996). This extension focuses on how incumbents are removed from office. We argue that differences across regime measures must be taken seriously and that they should be evaluated in terms of whether they (1) serve to address important research questions, (2) can be interpreted meaningfully, and (3) are reproducible. We argue that existing measures of democracy are not interchangeable and that the choice of measure should be guided by its theoretical and empirical underpinnings. We show that the choice of regime measure matters by replicating studies published in leading journals.

/pdf/democracy-and-dictatorship-revisited-2oo9paz4n2.pdf

Democracy and dictatorship revisited

Democracy and Development: List of Tables and Figures

Is economic development conducive to political democracy? Does democracy foster or hinder material welfare? These two questions are examined by looking at the experience of 135 countries between 1950 and 1990. Descriptive information, statistical analyses, and historical narratives are interwoven to gain an understanding of the dynamic of political regimes and their impact on economic development and other aspects of material welfare. The findings, several most surprising, dispel any notion of a trade-off between democracy and development. Economic development does not generate democracies but democracies are much more likely to survive in wealthy societies. Political regimes have no impact on the growth of total national incomes, while political instability affects growth only in dictatorships. Per capita incomes grow faster in democracies since population increases faster under dictatorships. In general, political regimes have more of an effect on demography than on economics.

Democracy and Development

This study presents a classification of political regimes as democracies and dictatorships for a set of 141 countries between 1950 or the year of independence and 1990. It improves existing classifications by a better grounding in political theory, an exclusive reliance on observables rather than on subjective judgements, an explicit distinction between systematic and random errors, and a more extensive coverage.

José Antonio Cheibub

Papers

Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990

Democracy and dictatorship revisited

Democracy and Development: List of Tables and Figures

Democracy and Development

Classifying political regimes