Juan Vidal-Puga

TL;DR: An axiomatic characterization based on monotonicity properties is provided and this work defines a cost sharing rule that satisfies many more properties than other rules in the literature.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors studied minimum cost spanning tree problems and defined a cost sharing rule that satisfies many more properties than other rules in the literature, and provided an axiomatic characterization based on monotonicity properties.

TL;DR: The Shapley value of this new game is studied and the worth of a coalition S is defined as the cost of connecting agents in S to the source assuming that agents in N\S are already connected to the sources.

TL;DR: An implementation of the Owen value is presented, inspired by the bidding mechanism introduced by Perez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001), where first players of each coalition play the bidding mechanisms trying to obtain the resources of the coalition.

TL;DR: A unified framework for a broad class of values in transferable utility games with coalition structure is presented, including the Owen coalitional value and two weighted versions with weights given by the size of the coalitions.